antitrinitarian clergy whom he nominated? It was, indeed, in the highest degree absurd for Mr. A. even to ask his church, that he might be tried for an alleged delinquency, by persons whom his church supposed to be in the same degree delinquent as himself. It makes no odds, as to the absurdity of the case, whether he was really delinquent, or not; his church supposed him to be so.

We ask, here, what possible objection could Mr. A. have had to all the clergy of Connecticut, except on account of the doctrines which he supposed them to maintain? And what possible predilection could he have had for a certain class of clergy, in Massachusetts, except on account of doctrines which he supposed them to maintain? How came it to pass, then, that in the selection of the second council, where he was left perfectly free to choose for himself, he should have fallen upon men, as to a majority of whom he had NO knowledge of their opinion with respect to his religious sentiments or particular difficulties?'

Mr. A. states, p. 26, that after the public hearing before the consociation, and during their recess, he again proposed a mutual council, and that "this last conciliatory effort also failed of success. Let us hear what this conciliatory effort was; for Mr. A. does not enter into particulars. The Reply states, p. 21, that on receiving this proposal, the brethren inquired of Mr. A. "whether they were to understand him as proposing a council different from that in which he had before consented to unite. He answered in the negative."

From the preceding extracts and remarks we trust it appears, that, so far from refusing a mutual council, the council, the church yielded, at least as much as Mr. A., for the purpose of obtaining one?

But what right had Mr. A. to demand a mutual council. None at all, if he belonged to the consociation. That was a regular tribunal, erected before he, or a single member of his church, was born, and which, on many accounts, would be more likely to be truly impartial than any other tribunal which he and his church would elect, in the midst of their difficulties. Indeed, the first and third grounds of his protest, unless he had been able to make good his second, are altogether irrelevant to his case. If he belonged to the consociation, he could neither insist upon a mutual council, nor deny the authority of councils in matters of faith. The Platform, art. XIII, makes it the duty of the said associated pastors to take notice of any among themselves that may be accused of scandal or heresy, &c.' No provision is made for mutual councils; nor are parties in any way hindered from electing them. When either party is averse, the other has no right to demand such a council. It is a case nearly resembling that which occurs daily, in the civil courts of Connecticut. The parties in a suit may wave the trial by jury, and refer the facts in their case to the court, but if either party chooses not to take this course, the question of fact must go to the jury. Mr. A.'s controversy with his church might have been referred by consent to any tribunal mutually agreed upon, just as suits at law

are taken from the regular courts and referred to arbitrators.

Mr. A. had certainly no peculiar claims to have a mutual council. He settled over the church in Coventry as a believer in the doctrine of the Trinity. The church received him, the council ordained him, as such. It turns out, that he is not, and possibly never has been, a believer in this doctrine. When his religious opinions are called in question, he demands such a council as will either come to a result in his favor, or to no result at all; even if all the allegations of his church should be true. But which is the aggriev. ed party? Have the church departed from their creed? Have they broken covenant with their pastor? What have they done? They are disciplining Mr. A. for departing from the faith which he professed at the time of his settlement, and which they viewed him as obliged to maintain, by the vows of God which were upon him. If there be any precedence, then, in electing a council, who shall have it? Let the common principles of equity decide.

No

Mr. A. seems to take it for granted, that the offer of a mutual council is essential to equity.' Statement, pp. 7, 8, assertion can be more fallacious than this; and Mr. A.'s reasoning upon it is utterly inconclusive. We will venture to assert, that no tribunals in the world are so likely to be partial, as those which are called impartial mutual councils, especially in cases of great interest, which involve party questions. And most cases of extensive importance will be made party questions by one side,

Whether

or the other, or both. the matter in dispute regards doctrine, discipline, or morals, each party will select such men as he supposes agree in opinion with himself; and thus the coun cil will be equally divided, or nearly so, with respect to the very substance of the case, on which they are to give their judgment. Thus, in secular affairs, it has been always found, that arbitrations have been less favorable to justice, than the decisions of the regular courts of law. What would be the result, if a violent political dispute were attempted to be settled by a coun cil composed of an equal number of vehement political champions on each side? Men are liable to human passions, in religion, as well as in politics. The experience of ages will show, that those tribunals are the most im partial, in the constitution of which the parties have the least influence. We could give ma ny substantial reasons why they are so, but our limits forbid.

After being unable to unite in a mutual council to try Mr. A., the church offered to unite in such a council to dissolve the pastoral connexion between him and his people; as we before stated. This offer was frustrated by the society. In making it, we are decidedly of opinion that the church yielded too far. They ought not to have consented that Mr. A. should be dismissed without being called to account for his doctrines. We impute their error in this respect to a love of peace; but an error it cer tainly was, in our opinion,

What reason, then, has Mr. A, to denominate the consociation "a council essentially ex parte"

Suppose a military officer were accused of not having obeyed his superior, in a specified instance, would he be able to evade the charge, on the plea urged by Mr. A? If he would, it would be a mere evasion, and one which would do little credit to his frankness, or his understanding. In short, every charge of a failure in duty, is substantially a nega tive charge, although by much circumlocution it may receive a positive form. A vast multitude of declarations, in suits at law, bring the whole charge in the negative form. Mr. A. has utterly mistaken the maxim, that no man is obliged to prove a negative. If it has any application to his case, it is in a manner entirely different from that in which he understands it; a manner which would have afforded him no relief, as could be easily

shewn.

Mr. A. further says, as to the latter charge, which concludes in the positive form, that "this was a point, the direct proof of which they were not inclined to undertake." Statement, p. 32. Is he authorized to say this? The church committee stated, to be sure, that on this point "they had no evidence to produce, other than had appeared on the other charges." Does Mr. A. suppose it to be impossible to prove two charges by the same evidence? For ourselves, we think Mr. A.'s pamphlet furnishes good evidence that all the charges were proved. The evidence is this, that the consociation voted, that each article separately taken, was proved; and then the general question was put, upon which

Mr. A.'s third ground of protest, "that councils have no au. thority in matters of faith," p. 14, seems to be changed, p. 35, into a denial, "that councils have authority to decide in matters of faith beyond what sacred Scripture decides." We sincerely wish he had told us on which of these positions he meant to rely; for they seem to us not perfectly identical. So different are they, that while we can by no means unite with him in asserting the first, we most cordially agree with him in denying the second. His arguments seem principally calculated for the second; and the great misfortune seems to be, that they have no relation to the case, into the service of which they are impressed. Who pretends that the Scriptures are not a sufficient rule of faith and practice? or that councils have authority beyond what the Scriptures decide?

To those who are doubtful on the general question, Whether councils have any authority in matters of faith? we recommend the perusal of the very excellent little treatise of Dr. Watts, On Christian Communion, lately pubshed, in which principles essentially connected with the decision of this question are very ably illustrated.

In the mean time, we are de