upon the courses laid to enable them to escape the submarines and, largely, upon luck. The Mercantile Marine survived the ordeal amazingly well, but the toll was very heavy.

C

di

While the Mercantile Marine had to become, against its will, a fighting force, it was the one force which could Ques not be relieved from service on the conclusion of heav hostilities. The declaration of war in August 1914 vinn opened an era of tremendous trial for the fighting its s forces. The signing of the Armistice meant relaxation re of effort for the Navy and the Army; it meant for the Mercantile Marine merely a transfer of effort. Just as on during the war, the Mercantile Marine had to adapt itself to novel conditions, so, with the closing of hostilities, it had to re-adapt itself to a new set of conditions. They Som were not, and are not yet, ordinary peaceful conditions, because British shipping was called upon to take a very per large share in effecting the change from war to peace and It had brought millions of men across the oceans to the fighting areas; it was now called upon to take them back again. It had enabled the Allies to prosecute the the war, and it was now called upon to enable them, som first, to get back to more normal conditions, and secondly, the to make commerce between the nations possible. There re could be no breathing-space for British shipping.

bece

ing

The position was rendered much more difficult because Chi a very great deal of leeway had to be made up. 18 During the conflict, all the available resources of British shi shipping were used solely with the object of enabling tots the allied and associated nations to win the war. No th regard was paid to what the effect after the war would ex be. A substantial proportion of shipping had previously been engaged in carrying for other nations, these services representing an important element of national the revenue. Such services were ruthlessly cut down. Gre When the American troops were being poured across Jay the North Atlantic, British ships were diverted from 23 every trade. Ships intended to face the North Atlantic Th weather are often designed with particular strength 31, for that trade. Considerations such as these were not allowed to weigh. Any liners which were considered sea-worthy for service were put into the North Atlantic. It was sufficient that they were fit to make the voyage; io

ba

90

to

the fact that their hulls might be strained and that their 1ew use might affect the length of their life could not De counted. In normal times their owners would not have employed them in the North Atlantic; their employment in this service would have been too costly. Questions of cost did not count in the war. A very leavy price had to be paid in lives and treasure for the vinning of the war, and British shipping had to make ts share of sacrifice. It was a very full share indeed; recisely how large it was can never be known.

Considering, first, shipping losses, the United Kingdom onnage destroyed, owing to direct war causes, is stated y Lloyd's Register to have been 7,753,000 tons gross. In ddition, there were 1,033,000 tons lost by marine causes. Some of the losses by marine causes were really indirect var losses, the distinction between the two classes of erils being sometimes very small. Vessels were stranded nd so were accounted to have been lost by marine perils, ecause these were the proxima causa, although the strandng may really have been due indirectly to the removal of he usual aids to navigation or even to the withdrawal of ome of the most efficient officers for the Navy. Similarly, when the convoy system was in operation, collisions were requent because vessels were moving in close proximity to each other. In any case, the total tonnage of the United Kingdom lost during the war amounted to ,786,000 tons. If the losses of the British Dominions hipping, amounting to 269,000 tons, be added to this, the otal British loss was 9,055,000 tons. The losses of no ther nation could approach these in magnitude. The ext heaviest losses were those of Norway, which mounted to 1,172,000 tons. Italy came third with a oss of 861,000 tons; France fourth with 807,000 tons; and he United States with a total loss of 531,000 tons. treece lost 415,000 tons. Then there was a long interval. apan lost 270,000 tons, Sweden 264,000 tons, Denmark 45,000 tons, Spain 238,000 tons, and Holland 229,000. he Belgian loss was 105,000 tons and that of Brazil 1,000 tons.

These are the actual figures of tonnage lost, but they aturally do not show the very serious depreciation affered by the tonnage remaining afloat. This depreciaon was suffered chiefly by the Allies. It was of a very Vol. 232.-No. 461.

2 I

WOO mer

formidable character, as in the case of British passenger with liners which were converted into armed cruisers and mbe were often employed while running at high speed for long periods. In the emergency, such considerations as the strain thrown on to the engines could not be taken Japa into account. Further, a very large number of the ships per which are still included as active units of the British last Mercantile Marine were badly damaged by mine or per torpedo. The strain to the hulls has only appeared in at 7 many instances when the vessels were put into dry dock. tons The extent of the actual damage done to British shipping repr may be gauged by the fact that, taking into account I shipping repairing and also fitting after launching, there is pu were 1,500,000 tons out of action in April 1918. This 388 figure remained stationary throughout 1918, but in February 1919 it increased to 1,900,000 tons. The figure ban now stands at about 1,400,000 tons.

not

loss

Mer

The present is an opportune time for taking stock of Sim British tonnage, in view of the statistics of ownership 339 recently issued by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The Register sets out the steam tonnage owned by the been principal maritime countries in June last and compares Alli it with the corresponding figures for June 1914. It thus to shows the net result of five years of war, after taking 1,75 into account both the losses and new construction. The Register includes in its calculations steamships of 100 the tons and upwards, and shows that, as compared with Asa

WOO

18,892,000 tons in June 1914, there were in June last to b 16,345,000 tons owned in the United Kingdom, a net reduc resu tion of 2,547,000 tons, or 13.5 per cent. If this figure be of deducted from that of the tonnage (8,786,000 tons) shown seag to have been lost from all causes, we get the amount of Jun new construction during the five years, amounting to Mer 6,239,000 tons. This figure included vessels built at home ther and abroad. Considering these figures of net losses, the Stat next greatest sufferer was Greece, which owned in June last only 291,000 tons, as compared with 821,000 tons in ship 1914, a loss of 530,000 tons, or 64.6 per cent. Norway mee owned in June last 1,597,000 tons-a reduction of 350,000 tim tons, or 18.4 per cent. As her total losses were shown earlier to have been 1,172,000 tons, she appears to have acquired during the quinquennial period some 821,000 tons. Norwegian owners placed a large number of orders

com

Eur

car

bat

with American shipbuilders, but all these contracts were subsequently requisitioned by the United States. It would seem, therefore, that the additions additions to her nercantile fleet were, to some extent, secured in Japan. The net loss of Italy was 192,000 tons, or 13.4 er cent., thus reducing her Mercantile Marine in June ast to 1,238,000 tons. Spain lost 175,000 tons, or 19.8 per cent., her Mercantile Marine standing this summer t 709,000 tons. Denmark incurred a net loss of 139,000 ons, or 18.1 per cent. Her Mercantile Marine is now epresented by 631,000 tons.

In these returns the Mercantile Marine of Germany 8 put at 3,247,000 tons, a reduction of 1,888,000 tons, or 36.8 per cent.; but it is pointed out that these figures do hot take into account the tonnage which was to be anded over to the Allies under the Peace Treaty. The oss of Germany is, therefore, in reality very much greater. Jimilarly, the loss of Austria-Hungary is put at only 139,000 tons, or 32.2 per cent., thereby reducing her Mercantile Marine to 713,000 tons. This figure has since been further diminished by vessels handed over to the Allies. The total tonnage of enemy vessels handed over o the Allies since the Armistice amounts to over 4,750,000 tons.

On

One of the most striking features of the returns is he great increase in the American Mercantile Marine. As already shown, the total loss of the United States due o both war and marine perils was 531,000 tons. The net esult of the five years ended June last was an increase if no less than 7,746,000 tons, or 382.1 per cent., in the eagoing Merchant Fleet of the United States. Tune 1914, there were 2,027,000 tons in the ocean-going Merchant Marine of the United States; five years later here were 9,773,000 tons. The total for the United States, it should be noted, included about 1,300,000 tons of vooden steam shipping. The construction of the wooden hips may have been justified as a war emergency measure-the United States had the carpenters and the imber-but the wooden ships cannot be regarded as a Commercial success. They have been appearing in European waters and have been engaged notably in arrying coals from the United States to Scandinavia, put their future is obscure. There may, no doubt, be

uses for wooden ships in the coasting trade of the United pres States. If these were entirely excluded, the American 2500 seagoing tonnage would be reduced to 8,426,000 tons, as Th compared with 16,267,000 tons for the United Kingdom. arin

Lloyd's Register makes a very striking comparison sac between the relative positions of the United Kingdom develo and United States in 1919 and 1914. In the earlier year atp 41.6 per cent. of the world's tonnage was owned in the 4033,0 United Kingdom, and 4.46 per cent. consisted of the sea-ross going tonnage of the United States. At the present mou time, the United Kingdom owns 34.1 per cent. and the n United States 24.9 per cent., including 20-4 per cent. of all f the seagoing tonnage. These United States figures Admi include wooden shipping.

Our

That

74

An interesting calculation is made by the Register to ear show the real effect of the war on the world's Merchant ons Marine. The calculation is made on the assumption that Gover the percentage of addition to the world's tonnage would the have continued at the ratio (a decreasing one) recorded tron during the last fifteen pre-war years, and that countries oth in which there had been a large addition of tonnage tho during the previous quinquennial period might be ex struct pected to show a reduction in the ratio of increase. nere The conclusion is reached that the real loss of British The tonnage was 5,202,000 tons, and that of foreign tonnage, the U excluding the United States, 9,000,000 tons, making a total lloyd loss for the world of 14,202,000 tons. The net gain to ears the United States is put at 6,729,000 tons, thus reducing the net world's loss to 7,473,000 tons. It will therefore be seen that by far the largest loss was incurred by the 8 United Kingdom. Excluding enemy countries, the hat greatest sufferers on this basis after the United Kingdom King were Norway, which lost over 1,000,000 tons; Italy to the 914extent of 677,000 tons; and France, which lost 536,000 meretons. Further, there is a hidden loss, through deprecis The tion in the efficiency of ships by special strain, and also gar owing to the fact that a large proportion of the tonnage built during the war was not equal in general efficiency un to that completed in the few years previous to the these war. The Register does not, however, attempt to estimate the full extent of the depreciation, and considers ship it reasonable to assume that the world has actually of E lost through the war 8,500,000 tons gross of shipping been

did I