The question of the federalisation of Ireland is comparatively simple. It means the establishment, in ddition to an All-Ireland Parliament, of two or more provincial legislatures, and the division between the Central Irish Parliament and these provincial legislatures of all powers not reserved to the Imperial Parlianent. Even with a grant of the fullest possible powers of self-government, one parliament and one government vould, from an administrative point of view, be quite ufficient for Ireland. Any decentralisation which might e required could be fully met by a moderate extension of the existing system of local government. The truth s that almost the sole reason why the federalisation of Ireland, or any form of home rule within home ule,' has been advocated is that some people regard The establishment of provincial legislatures as a means of meeting the Ulster objection to Home Rule. It is no ecret that the matter was discussed in the Convention, ut allowed to drop, as no encouragement was forthoming for the idea that the grant of autonomy to Ulster in respect of the matters to be assigned to brovincial legislatures would diminish the objection of Ulster to the control of other matters by an All-Ireland Parliament. It was, however, revived by the Irish entre Party under the leadership of Captain Gwynn; And its claim for consideration has been strengthened by the fact that it is the central feature of the scheme dvocated by 'The Times.'

It may be said at once that this scheme is well hought out, and that the author frankly faces the difficulties of the situation with definite suggestions, nstead of turning them aside with a phrase, as do most English federalists and Irish constitution-makers, not xcluding Sinn Fein republicans. The source from which he scheme emanates has secured for it adequate publicity n England; and in Ireland it has been received, to use he words of The Irish Statesman,' as 'an overture onestly made and made in the grand style.' The scheme uggests the immediate establishment of two state or provincial legislatures in Ireland, one for Ulster and one or the other three provinces, with power over such natters as agriculture, fisheries, technical instruction, nunicipal interests and local government, local works

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and undertakings, licensing, hospitals and charitable the institutions, direct taxation for provincial purposes, vin control of provincial revenues, borrowing on the sole p credit of the province, factory legislation and private bill legislation in matters affecting the province. It dit MacD may be noted that these powers are roughly compar able with the powers possessed by the provinciale a legislatures in Canada, though considerably less than con the powers possessed by an American or Australian vio State. An All-Ireland Parliament is also to be established, le but is to be endowed with power only at some later di date. The powers suggested for this parliament are substantially the powers recommended by the Irish Convention, minus the powers mentioned above as assigned to provincial legislatures. The scheme, so far ser as it has been outlined above, contains nothing new. It is certainly federal, and would possibly be acquiescede in by Nationalists if acceptable to Ulster-a point which and will be shortly considered; but it contains three additional to t features, one of them novel, which entirely alter the Par situation and call for consideration.

In the first place, the Irish Parliament is to be composed of representatives of Ulster and of the rest of Ireland in equal numbers. The Nationalists showed in the Convention that they were quite ready to give both Northern and Southern Unionists generous representation in an Irish Parliament, far in excess of what would be justified by population; but it seems an extreme measure to give one and a half million people in the North of Ireland the same weight as nearly three million people elsewhere. Still, it might be accepted if it would content Ulster.

In the second place, the Ulster state or provincial legislature is to have a perpetual veto on every legislative measure of the Irish Parliament and every administra tive act of the Irish Government, so far as Ulster is concerned. It is known that it was suggested in the Convention 'that the members representing each province

• Treason felony, trade marks, alienage and naturalisation, quarantine and navigation, are the only matters placed under Irish control in the Convention's scheme which are reserved to Imperial Parliament in the

'Times' scheme.

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n the Irish Parliament should be constituted into a rovincial Grand Committee with special powers of veto, nd possibly of initiative, in respect of legislation and dministration, so far as that province was concerned'; nd it is stated that a scheme was worked out by Lord MacDonnell (Report, p. 10). It seems almost impossible to ive one province an absolute veto, so far as that province concerned, over all Irish legislation, and it would bviously be hard to make any administrative veto workble in practice; but still the suggestion might, with odifications, be accepted by Ireland if it would placate Ulster.

The third special feature of the 'Times' scheme is ew, but apparently impossible of acceptance. It is an ssential part of the plan that all the matters indicated For control by the Irish Parliament are to remain under he exclusive control of the Imperial Parliament unless nd until both the state or provincial legislatures assent o the transfer of some or all of these powers to the Irish Parliament, which until that event would be a mere ebating society. Until Ulster consents, the Irish Parlianent could not, to take an example, amend the National Health Insurance Acts or control their administration; to long as Ulster objects, the Irish canals, to take another lustration, must remain under the exclusive control of he Imperial Parliament and the Executive responsible hereto. This would never do. At present, though Ulster blocks the way, it does not claim to exercise a reto over the enjoyment of autonomy by the rest of reland. Its claim is confined to Ulster, and is based not n an Act of Parliament, but mainly on undertakings f certain ministers and ex-ministers. Constitutional Nationalists now deny the reasonableness of this veto nd the sanctity of these undertakings. It seems futile o expect them to accept an arrangement under which Jlster's veto is to be given statutory recognition and xtended to the whole of Ireland.

If this in the eyes of the Nationalists-radical defect vere removed, and the perpetual veto on legislation and dministration modified, the general scheme might be ccepted, if it disarmed Ulster's hostility to Home Rule. his could be the only reason for dividing Ireland (for ertain purposes) into two states, for there is no real

1

need, apart from the Ulster question, for the multiplication of legislatures in Ireland. Moreover, differences in Art. both law and administration between Ulster and the rest of Ireland, in some of the matters suggested for 19 provincial control, might be productive of much inconvenience in view of Ulster's artificial frontier; and the settlement of provincial finance is notoriously difficult.

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There does not, however, seem to be the slightest reason for imagining that Ulster's objection to the establishment of an All-Ireland Parliament would be to any appreciable extent diminished by the assignment to an Ulster provincial legislature of the matters suggested by The Times.' It is not about these matters that the soul of Ulster is mostly vexed; it is about taxation (especially customs and excise), trade, railways, education, etc.; and these matters are, under the 'Times' scheme and every quasi-federal scheme as yet suggested, to be controlled by the All-Ireland Parliament. Ulster might, of course, be placated if these and all the other matters about which it is apprehensive were transferred from the Imperial Parliament, not to the central Irish Parliament but to the provincial legislatures; but that would be only thinly veiled partition. That policy may be good or bad, inevitable or impossible, workable or unworkable, but it is not the 'Times' scheme, nor is it federal, and it is therefore outside the scope of l this article. The conclusion seems inevitable that, while of the solution of the future relations between Great Britain and Ireland may be found in federalism, no federalisation of Ireland, which would leave the central Irish Parlia ment any genuine power, seems to offer any real hope of affording a modus vivendi between Ulster and the rest of

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The outbreak a few years ago of foot-and-mouth disease illustrates tot how easily inconvenience might become disaster if dual control within Ireland of the greatest national industry were permitted. Incidentally it may be noted that similar dangers are inevitable under all schemes of partition.

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Art. 12.—SHIPPING PROSPECTS.

1. Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Vol. III. 1914-15,

3. Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. Annual Report, 1918-19.

1. Merchant Tonnage and the Submarine. Parliamentary Paper. [Cd. 9221.] H. M. Stationery Office.

DURING hostilities the British Mercantile Marine became one of the main fighting forces of the country. It was hot designed for the purpose, but it had to defend itself. The number of merchant ships which, before the war, were planned with any idea of self-defence could be counted on the fingers of one's hand. Protests were even made in certain quarters, when the suggestion was put forward hat some of the principal vessels should be fitted with gun-mountings in the stern. Attempts were made to oring pressure to bear on newspaper offices to print rticles attempting to show how unnecessary such neasures were, and suggesting that it would be imDossible for any German merchant vessels to arm themelves for the purpose of harrying British commerce.

Although, therefore, some perceived that, in the event f a war with Germany, British merchant ships would ave to fight, very few, if any, could have realised the urn which events actually took. It certainly did not ver occur to the public that any Power would be repared to use the submarine weapon to sink merchant essels at sight, regardless of the fate of those on board, vhether women and children passengers or civilian men nd crew. The result was that the Merchant Marine, otally unprepared for such tactics, was called upon to ndergo great risks; and it did not flinch. Many of he ships were quite unsuited for fighting. At the outset, nd for a long time afterwards, merchant ships could ely neither on the protection of a screen of destroyers Lor, as regards the great great majority, on superior peed. Until the convoy system was instituted, fairly ate in the war, British merchant ships had to rely