ederal system for the wide differentiation that would eem inevitable under this scheme between the powers f an Irish legislature on the one hand, and the English nd Scottish legislatures on the other hand.

As regards the second point, viz. that the settleent suggested would involve the control by the Irish gislature of matters which, according to all federal recedents, should be reserved to the central parliament, should be observed that the concession of the full Irish emand would still leave the Imperial Parliament with xclusive control over the matters most necessary for a entral parliament, such as foreign relations, defence, eace and war. As regards the other matters in dispute, I must be remembered that there is no hard-and-fast ule for the division of powers between the central and ocal legislatures. Thus the local legislatures have far reater powers in Australia than in Canada; and the re-war German federal system affords some analogies or a certain amount of control by some of the units over ven indirect taxation and postal services. Still, here gain it is undoubtedly true that the existing federal stems afford no true parallel for the possession by local gislatures of some of the powers that seem necessary or an Irish Parliament, if Irish sentiment is to be atisfied.

The true answer to the critics who condemn as antiederal a scheme assigning to one local legislature powers ot assigned to the others, and assigning to a local legislaare power over such matters as customs and excise, usually eserved for the central authority, merely because such n arrangement would be contrary to federal precedents, as been already indicated. The system suggested for he United Kingdom involves the continuance of a ■preme parliament, and is therefore not really federal at at most quasi-federal; and consequently the canons I strict federalism cannot be properly applied to it. recisely the same consideration applies to any scheme Imperial Federation that is likely to be introduced. o one who knows the Dominions imagines that Canada, ustralia, South Africa, New Zealand or even Newundland will ever give up in favour of the Imperial arliament, however representative of the Empire it ay become, their present right of framing their own Vol. 232.-No. 461.

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tariff or making their own trade arrangements. Yet this would be contrary to all federal precedents. The truth is that, as any system of federation that is likely to be introduced, either into the Empire or the United Kingdom, is certain to display, in the existence of a central parliament with illimitable power, at least one striking departure from the essence of legal federation, other departures from the normal federal type are not unnatural and cannot be appropriately described as 'anti-federal.'*

There is, however, an objection of real substance against trying to settle both the Irish Question and the congestion in Parliament by setting up local legislatures in England, Scotland and Ireland, and giving the Irish local legislature, but not the English and Scottish legislatures, power over such matters as indirect taxation, postal services, trade and navigation, etc., apart from the fact that Ulster has declared against such a plan on the ground that Ireland must not receive exceptional treat ment differing from that of the rest of the United Kingdom. This objection is that any such arrangement

There are special reasons why a federation of the United Kingdom and a federation of the Empire are likely to present marked departures from the normal federal type, but one reason common to both cases may be noted, viz. the predominance of Great Britain. It is a recognised principle of the constitution of federal parliaments that each unit should be represented in the popular house in proportion to its population and, though this principle is not so strictly followed, that each unit should be equally represented in the Second Chamber. There are great variations in the population of the different units of the United States, Canada and Australia, but there is no predominance which would enable one unit to direct the legislation that applies to all. Thus, it would take a combination of the ten most populous American States to outvote the rest; and, though Ontario and Quebec could outvote the other seven Canadian Provinces, or New South Wales and Victoria the other four Australian States, these combinations do not in practice occur, and are in fact the least likely combinations. The result is that the views of one unit are checked by the views of the other units, and a healthy federal balance is preserved. The population of Great Britain alone, however, is double the white population of the rest of the Empire, and consequently Ireland and the Dominions are indisposed to acquiesce in the control by a federal parliament of matters such as the tariff, which vitally concerns each unit and in which their interests may not coincide with British interests. It is obvious that even the partition of England and the restoration of the heptarchy would not really affect the predominance of Great Britain. It is, perhaps, not irrele vant to note that the German Federation was the one federation in which one unit dwarfed all the others, and that it was the German Federation which presented the most marked departures from the normal federal type.

would almost hopelessly complicate the working of the Imperial Parliament. The continued representation of Ireland in that parliament is, of course, a root principle of every federal or quasi-federal system. The Imperial Parliament, however, under such a scheme, in addition to dealing with foreign relations, questions involving peace and war, and defence, for England, Scotland, Ireland and the rest of the Empire, would also have to deal, so far as England and Scotland are concerned, with the natters, such as customs and excise, postal services and navigation, over which the Irish, but not the English or Scottish legislatures would have power. In other words, he Imperial Parliament, in addition to having to act as n Imperial legislature for the whole of the United Kingdom, and the Empire, would have to act as a local egislature for Great Britain in certain matters. Obviously it would be unjust if the Irish members could rote on such matters.

This was the great Serbonian Bog' which encompassed Gladstone in 1886 and 1893. The first solution ried was to exclude Ireland from representation at Vestminster. This, besides being anti-federal, meant njustice to Ireland, and was declared by Parnell in 1888, a his famous letter to Cecil Rhodes, to have been a mistake. In 1893 it was at first proposed to allow the rish members to vote on Imperial but not on British matters. Though Gladstone had previously declared it would pass the wit of man to distinguish between the wo classes of matters, the real difficulty was found to e the disturbing effect this 'in and out' solution might ave upon the stability of the Government of the day. Itimately the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes as adopted; and this was followed in the Act of 1914, nough the injustice to Great Britain of Irish interference British matters was diminished by the reduction of -ish representation below the number indicated by opulation. This was, at best, but a partial palliative. he difficulty still remains, and seems to render any uasi-federal solution which takes the form of the reation of local legislatures in England, Scotland and eland with unequal powers not merely a marked eparture from federal principles but also impossible as permanent solution.

While the root difficulty that lies in the way of combining federal devolution with a grant of Irish selfgovernment-viz. the difference between the powers required for the Irish legislature and those suitable for the other local legislatures-cannot, apparently, be removed by either of the solutions usually advanced by federalists, viz. compromise on the question of powers or the assignment of greater powers to an Irish legisla ture than to other local legislatures, it may be satis factorily met in another way. The federalisation of the United Kingdom can be combined with the satisfaction of Ireland's demands if only two subordinate local legislatures with identical powers are established, one in Great Britain, the other in Ireland. As there would be but one local legislature for England and Scotland combined, no question of breaking up the unity which now exists in Great Britain could arise; and there would be nothing to prevent the new British legislature being given power, within its area, over all matters which it is thought desirable to assign to the Irish legislature, including direct and indirect taxation, postal services, trade and navigation, etc.

This scheme would, of course, be open to one of the objections urged against all schemes which contemplate Irish control of customs and excise, postal matters, etc viz. that it would be a marked departure from all federal precedents to assign control over some of these matters to a local legislature. As before, the only complete answer that can be made is that it is misleading to apply the canons of strict federalism to a system that cannot be strictly federal, since the central legislature would possess legally illimitable powers, and the local legisla tures would have no legally exclusive powers. The scheme of two local legislatures, one for Ireland and only one for Great Britain, is, however, free from all the other objections that may be raised against other federal schemes. It enables the Irish demand to be met without either the partition of Great Britain in matters in which British unity is desirable, or, alternatively, the assignment of certain powers to the legislature in Ireland and the withholding of some of them from the local legislatures in England and Scotland. Consequently, it does not involve control by the Imperial Parliament of certain

natters in one part of the United Kingdom and not in nother part, and it does not put the Irish members of he Imperial Parliament in an anomalous position. The cheme certainly relieves the congestion in Parliament; nd, while it preserves the unity in Great Britain which eems essential in such matters as tariff, postal services, rade, etc., there is nothing to prevent the new Parlianent set up for Great Britain from devolving upon minor odies of a quasi-municipal type in Scotland, Wales and England (or parts thereof) such matters as may be hought to require differential treatment. Incidentally, t may be noted that this scheme fulfils the Ulster postuate that Ireland should not receive exceptional treatment differentiating her from the rest of the United Kingdom.

Finally, this scheme of United Kingdom federation would greatly help to clear the way for Imperial federation y establishing in Great Britain and Ireland parliaments with powers similar to those possessed by the Dominion Parliaments, and so relieving the Imperial Parliament, n practice, of all work other than what is truly imperial. The Imperial Parliament would interfere in British and rish affairs only to the same extent as it now interferes n Canadian and Australian affairs. Thus the objection hat is felt against the Dominions sending representatives o the Imperial Parliament, so long as that body is mainly ccupied with the control in the United Kingdom of matters over which the Dominions, within their own reas, are in practice supreme, would disappear.

It may be urged that, under the scheme indicated for he federalisation of the United Kingdom and the settlenent of the Irish Question, the Imperial Parliament, while responsible for foreign and colonial affairs, defence, tc., would have no power to raise the money required or expenditure on these matters, since both direct and ndirect taxation would be under the control of the British and Irish legislatures. This difficulty was, of ourse, the rock upon which the American Confederation f 1777 broke, since the central government could not evy taxes, but could only requisition the sum required rom each of the thirteen States, and had no means of nforcing these requisitions. It may, however, be fairly nswered that the two cases are not comparable. To-day