Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, and Tcheco-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Power, which is distinctly alien to Western civilisation. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It need hardly be said that, while the Allies desire to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it has never been their design, as has been alleged, to compass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire, above all, is to ensure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, and upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligations, with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.'

Meanwhile the German Government, in their reply to Mr Wilson's note (Dec. 26), refrained entirely from showing their hand, and merely reiterated their proposal for an immediate meeting of delegates' with the object of 'an exchange of views.' The frankness displayed by the Allies was neither congenial nor convenient to the Central Powers.

With this interchange of notes the first attempt at pacification-if such it can be called-came to an end But, a few days later, Mr Wilson summed up the results and his own ideas about peace in an address to the Senate of the United States (Jan. 22, 1917). After noting with satisfaction, that both parties had abjured any intention of crushing their opponents, he observed that to his mind, this statement implied that it must be a peace without victory.' However explained, it was an unfortunate phrase, for it meant, at any rate, a com promise peace, one in which the Allies would have to sacrifice the greater part of their aims. Nevertheless among the results which were to be regarded as assured by universal agreement he included a united, independent and autonomous Poland.' How such a result was to be secured without victory over the Centra Empires it is not easy to perceive. There was no hin of active intervention; nevertheless, ten weeks later, the United States entered the war.

Before this event occurred, but possibly with 'intelligent anticipation' of it, the Emperor Carl, in March 1917, authorised his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, to communicate to President Poincaré, 'secretly and unofficially,' the information that he (the Emperor) would support, by all means and with all his personal influence, the just claims of France with regard to AlsaceLorraine.' He added that Belgium should be entirely restored, with its sovereignty undiminished and its African colonies; and that Serbia should also recover ts sovereignty, with secure access to the sea, subject only to the condition of behaving well in future. The views of Great Britain touching these proposals were also to be ascertained, in order to provide a basis for official conversations which would result in the satisfacion of all concerned.* The Emperor's letter, written vith his own hand, was communicated by the Prince o the French President on March 31.

What connexion this step had with the next is not lear, but the somewhat mysterious negotiations which ook place during the summer of 1917 can hardly be isconnected from the Emperor's letter. In June 1917, he French Government, according to M. Painlevé's statement (April 8, 1917), was informed that Count Nicholas Revertera had made several attempts to get into communication with a distant relation of his, Major Armand, who was in confidential French employ. With the conent of M. Ribot, meetings took place at Freiburg etween these two persons in the month of Augustn what basis does not appear. No positive result as attained; but when, in November, M. Clemenceau ame to power, he found the conversations still going n. Not wishing to put a stop to interviews which might t least result in useful disclosures, the new Premier lowed them to continue-with instructions, however, Major Armand, 'Écouter, et ne rien dire.' According Austrian authorities, Armand renewed his approaches January 1918; and on Feb. 2 a meeting took place at reiburg, in which Revertera informed Armand that punt Czernin was of opinion that a conversation between

* This letter was published in the French papers on April 12, 1918. The rrative in the text is drawn from official or semi-official statements only.

him (Czernin) and a French representative might lead to good results, if only France would abandon the claim to Alsace-Lorraine. M. Clemenceau replied that this was impossible; and the negotiation thereupon dropped.

It would, no doubt, be interesting to know whether the Emperor's letter was written with the knowledge and consent of Berlin, or not. Mr Balfour, speaking later on the matter, inclined to believe that it was all a plot concocted between Vienna and Berlin, with a view to sowing dissension between the Allies. To us his arguments do not appear convincing, but it is hardly worth while to discuss the matter now. That Germany, while apparently willing to make terms of some sort with regard to Belgium, was absolutely firm on the question of Alsace-Lorraine, was shown by Herr von Kühlemann's subsequent statement, that only that question stood in the way of peace. The object of such a statement is too obvious to require explanation.

6

rate

That Austria wished and imperatively needed peace, general or separate, is clear; whether it was possible, is quite another question. The interview, or interviews, between Count Mensdorff and General Smuts in Switzer land seem to show that our Government thought there was some chance of one or other solution, or at any were unwilling to reject offhand an overture doubtless made by Austria. The Reichstag resolution (July 19, 1917), in favour of peace without annexations or indemnities' displayed a pacific tendency in the German people which may have encouraged hopes of success. The Papal appeal (Aug. 1) immediately preceded the Armand-Revertera interviews, of the imminence of which the Vatican could hardly have been ignorant. Finally, Lord Lansdowne's famous letter (Nov. 29), perhaps reflecting the views of a former Government, manifested a conviction that outspoken and conciliatory statements on the part of the Allies might bring about a peace and avert world-wide disaster.

general

Nevertheless, it may be confidently asserted that a separate peace with Austria was then out of the question. Germany would not, and could not, have permitted it;

* According to French authorities, there was only one interview; according to Austrian, there were several.

Hungary, whose interests were bound up with those of Germany, stood to lose everything she valued, and indeed her very existence as a kingdom, through such an event; and, between the two, the Austrian Government was helpless. The change of front regarding Alsace-Lorraine indicated above shows how impossible it was for Austria to emancipate herself from the guidance of the dominant partner; and the almost pathetic apology of the Emperor Carl (April 10, 1918), followed by the patronising acceptance of the Emperor William (April 12), showed that Austria-Hungary was doomed to sink or swim with her imperious ally.

Nor were the prospects of a general peace any brighter. The German Government, whatever the Reichstag was allowed to say, had given no sign whatever of an inclination to make peace on tolerable terms. The military party still reigned supreme. The Russian revolution may have given them some moments of anxiety; but hey calculated, and calculated rightly, that, whether Kerensky retained power or gave way to more extreme nen, Russia was practically lost to the Entente. By this vent, in spite of America, the whole aspect of the war vas changed. Even Mr Wilson, who had travelled a ong way from his peace-without-victory phase, had onvinced himself that attempts at pacification were remature. In his reply to the Papal note of Aug. 1, fter pointing out that Germany was still dominated by he military caste, he said (Aug. 27) that 'to deal with uch a power by way of peace, upon the plan proposed y His Holiness, would . . . involve a recuperation of s strength and a renewal of its policy.'

We have spent some time upon these abortive efforts f 1916-17 because it seems desirable to show, on the one and, that peace could not have been had, on any tolerole terms or with any security for the future, in those ears; and, on the other, that the aims of the Allies, as ablicly set forth, were practically identical with those cured by the Peace. With the opening of the year 18, the war entered on a new phase, marked, on the ne hand, by President Wilson's successive formulations principle, and, on the other, by the great German tacks, their eventual failure, and the Allied advance

which ended the war. On Jan. 8 the President, in his message to Congress, laid down his famous Fourteen Points. On Feb. 11 he stated four principles on which territorial adjustments should be made. On July 4 he somewhat amplified these principles, and added, among the ends he was fighting for, the destruction of every arbitrary power. Finally, on Sept. 27, he stated, in general terms, the issues involved, and, speaking especially of the League of Nations, declared that impartial justice must be done, without discrimination; that every particular settlement must be consistent with the common interest of all; and that there could be no special covenants or alliances and no selfish economic combinations within the League. Attention has been so much concentrated on the Fourteen Points that Mr Wilson's subsequent utterances have often been for gotten; but it should be observed that, equally with the Fourteen Points, they form the basis of the understanding arrived at on Nov. 11. How far they have been observed in the Treaty of Peace we shall endeavour presently to ascertain.

Already, before this last utterance, the disruption of the enemy forces had begun. On Sept. 14 the Austrian Government issued an appeal to the Pope to support their proposal for a conference of the conference of the belligerent Powers. This proposal was curtly declined by Mr Wilson (Sept. 16), at greater length but with equal firmness by Mr Balfour on the same day, and by M. Clemenceau two days later. On Sept. 25 Bulgaria requested an armistice, which was granted on Sept. 30. On Oct. 5 Prince Max of Baden, now Imperial Chancellor, addressed an appeal to President Wilson, begging him to intervene in order to bring about a general armistice with a view to negotiations for peace. He found in the Fourteen Points and the President's later utterances, especially the speech of Sept. 27, a programme for general peace which he was willing to accept. Similar appeals were simultaneously addressed to the President by Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

The President replied by asking certain questions bearing on the nature of the authority by which the proposal was made, and stated that he did not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms so long as the