armies of the Central Powers were upon invaded soil. The German Government replied (Oct. 12) that they accepted the terms and consented to evacuation. Mr Wilson's next note (Oct. 14) informed the German Government that the armistice, the conditions of which would be fixed by the military advisers of the Allies, must be such as would secure the 'present military supremacy of their armies in the field'; and reminded them that his terms included that stated by him on July 4, 'the destruction of every arbitrary power that can. . . of its single choice disturb the peace of the world.'

The President's reply to the Austrian note was delayed for some ten days. It was not till Oct. 18 that he informed the Austrian Government that, owing to recent events in the Empire, he could no longer be content with the autonomy for the subject races which he had demanded on Jan. 8 (Point 10), but that they, having become independent, must decide their own future. This solution was accepted by Austria on Oct. 29.

On Oct. 20 the German Government assured the President that a complete change in the constitution having taking place, power in Germany now rested on a popular basis. Thereupon the President, taking note of this change and of the pledges given by the German Government, informed them (Oct. 23) that he had sub#mitted the proposal for an armistice to the Powers 'assoEciated' with the United States. At the same time he doubted whether the change of system effected in Germany was adequate, and repeated his declaration that he could deal only with veritable representatives of the German people.' If it had to deal with the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany' now or hereafter, his Government 'must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender.' The abdication of the German Emperor

was the result.

On Oct. 29 the German authorities repeated their assurances that their Government was now, de facto and le jure, a popular government, to which the military powers were subordinated. The Allies having intimated o the President their willingness to make peace with Germany on the terms laid down in his address of Jan. 8, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses,' with certain 'qualifications,' the

President, on Nov. 5, communicated this decision to the German Government. The qualifications' were only two. Firstly, the Allies pointed out that clause 2 of the Fourteen Points, concerning the Freedom of the Seas, was open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept'; secondly, they made it clear that, under the term 'restoration,' mentioned in Points 7, 8 and 11, they understood that 'compensation would be made by Germany for all damages done to civilian population by land, by sea, and from the air.' Mr Wilson expressed his agreement with the second 'qualification' but said nothing about the first.

From the moment when the last Presidential note was despatched, the cessation of hostilities proceeded with rapidity. Bulgaria had, as we have seen, left the field on Sept. 30. On Oct. 31 an armistice was concluded with Turkey; on Nov. 3 one with Austria-Hungary. No serious difficulties were experienced with either of these Powers; but it took somewhat longer to reduce our principal antagonist to terms. On Nov. 7 the German delegates received the conditions from Marshal Foch. They made a strenuous resistance, and obtained certain not unimportant 'modifications, mainly in regard to the amount of matériel to be surrendered and the time allowed for evacuation. The armistice was signed on Nov. 11, and hostilities ceased the same day.

With regard to the conditions then imposed on Germany we do not propose to offer any observations, for they only embodied a temporary agreement. Many of the stipulations, such as the surrender of ships and matériel, and the evacuation of territory, were indeed final, but they were not terms of peace; they were but steps towards it. We need only say that, severe as the terms undoubtedly were, they were necessary in order to secure the object stated by Mr Wilson in two of his recent notes as indispensable, viz. to secure the military supremacy of the Allied armies in the field,' and to leave the Allies 'in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into.'

With regard to the steps which led to the armistice, it may be observed that the method of procedure adopted by Mr Wilson was fraught with serious inconveniences. His position, as at once a belligerent and a mediator, was

somewhat illogical, but did not necessarily involve grave difficulties; the attitude of Napoleon III at the close of the Crimean War was somewhat similar. But Mr Wilson was so anxious to bring hostilities to a close that he acted with undue precipitancy; and he showed so little consideration for his associates' that he began the negotiations, and even carried them on for some time, without consulting them. This seems clear from the official British declaration of Oct. 21, and still more from the semi-official telegram of Oct. 23, which says that 'the first German note [of Oct. 5] was sent to Washington for transmission to the Allies, but, before definitively communicating it to them, the President put to the Germans a series of questions,' etc.

Further, the way in which these questions were put was itself inconvenient. The series was a succession of afterthoughts, each of Mr Wilson's four notes containing fresh demands. That this was likely to irritate and alarm the Germans did not perhaps matter much, but it would have been better, not to say more considerate towards the Allies, had the whole series been carefully thought out, in consultation with them, and submitted to the Germans in one collective document. Finally, in one most important respect, he went back on his previous utterances. Having said, on Oct. 5, that he could not submit the proposal for an armistice so long as the German armies were on invaded soil, he actually submitted it before the evacuation began.

It cannot be said that the Presidential diplomacy was faultless, but the defects noted are relatively unimportant, compared with the inopportuneness of the proposal when actually made. That Mr Wilson chose his own time for this, and chose it independently, seems clear from what has preceded. When put before the Allies, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for obvious reasons, for them to refuse. But note the result. Had the war continued for a fortnight longer, there seems to be no doubt that the German armies would have suffered another and a far greater Sedan. Nor is it probable that, considering the rapidly increasing demoralisation of the German forces, this result would have entailed any great loss. Needless to say, it was the sacred duty of all concerned to stop the

bloodshed at the earliest possible moment-the earliest moment, that is, at which the objects of the Allies were fully within their grasp. Those who say that this moment had arrived on Nov. 11 fail to reckon with the peculiar mentality of the German people.

There are doubtless many intelligent men in Germany who know that their armies were hopelessly defeated. But the mass of the German people, including the bulk of their journalists and even of their more educated classes, do not know this and continue to believe that they were undefeated in the field. The troops who passed through Cologne on their way home marched with flags flying and bands playing, and were hailed by the population as victors. The arrival of the Allied forces was, and still is, explained by the assertion that Germany gave way only because she was starved out by the blockade and tricked into submission by perfidious diplomacy. This belief has taken its place as an article of faith in the German mind; and the results have shown themselves in many ominous and unpleasant ways-notably, for instance, in their attitude and action on the Eastern frontier-and will continue to show themselves hereafter. Nothing short of crushing military disaster would have brought the truth home to a people so gifted with the capacity for self-deception, and so deeply infected with the military spirit.

It is therefore no foolish regret for the lost opportunity of a military triumph that leads us to call the armistice inopportune, but the conviction that a grave mistake was made. We wanted not only peace, but a permanent peace; and the chances of permanence are gravely affected by the state of mind of the German people. It is just one of those imponderabilia which, as Bismarck said, are so apt to be neglected by politicians, but, like the sentiment of the French for Alsace-Lorraine, have an immeasurable effect on history. It may be said that the exact nature of the military situation was probably unknown to Mr Wilson at the time. This may be true, but, if so, it is no excuse; for such want of knowledge was the inevitable consequence of his aloofness and his ambition to do everything alone.

The armistice signed, the field was clear for the peace

negotiations. Why did they not begin immediately? Because Mr Lloyd George was anxious to seize the opportunity of 'sweeping the country,' and because Mr Wilson desired to tour' the Allied States in order to create an impression favourable to the League of Nations. As a result, two invaluable months were lost. The object of holding a General Election at that juncture was obvious; its necessity was by no means equally lear. It is true that the Parliament, elected in 1910, had ceased adequately to represent the country. But it had carried through the war, and might very well have been kept in being a few months longer. It was absurd o pretend that the problems of the Peace and those f Reconstruction required the intervention of a new Parliament; for with the discussion of peace terms Parliament could have nothing to do, and Reconstrucion could not really come before it till after peace was ade. The prestige of the Prime Minister, who had aspired the country and maintained its spirit throughut the struggle, could hardly be enhanced by the esult of an election, however favourable. His two uropean colleagues, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando, id not think it necessary to obtain such fresh support; nd Mr Wilson came to the Conference suffering from defeat at the polls, without, so far as can be perceived, sing any influence at the council-table. The fact is hat the character and ability of a negotiator, and the eight of the country which he represents, are the Actors which determine his influence in international fairs; and it required no general election to show that reat Britain had confidence in its Prime Minister.

Be that as it may, two months were consumed in ese occupations; and the formal discussions about the eace, which might have begun within a few days of ov. 11, did not begin till Jan. 12. That peace should be ade as speedily as possible was not only a universal ntiment; it was also a matter of universal interest. long as uncertainty about great territorial and other anges existed, the work of repairing the ruins of war uld not really begin; the blockade of Central Europe id to be continued, with all the hardships and the ngers it involved; the advance of Bolshevism was eus facilitated, and a spirit of bitterness and resentment