blockade, everything in short except actual war. recently a group or sub-committee of the British Leag has advanced nearly as far as Mr Woolf. They prop that one of the objects of the League shall be to supp any decision of the Supreme Court, which they prop. to create, against any State which fails to carry it i effect; but it is pretty clear from the context that support is not to take the form of military force.

To sum up, all pin their faith on the moratorium athe compulsory submission of disputes, and trust tl this would be enough, and that obedience to the decis would follow. No doubt these are great steps, and th will not be many cases of disobedience; but, unless th is some power to enforce obedience, there will be cal of disobedience. It would be best to be thorough in t matter and say that the State which has agreed submit its dispute to arbitration must loyally abide the result, and to make no distinction when, instead procedure by arbitration, the matter has been submit to the Council of the League. If all the other States the League except the disputant party come to a c clusion, it ought to be obeyed. The disobedient St should be treated as a covenant-breaker; and perfor ance of its obligations should be enforced by every mea at the disposal of the League, including war upon it,

necessary.

If this cannot be agreed to, either obedience shot be enforced, as Mr Woolf suggests, by every means sho of war, or at least the injured State should be giv licence to redress its grievance, collecting as many all as it could. They might be allowed, like the Jews that curious passage in the Book of Esther (Ch. viii, 1 'To gather themselves together, and to stand for the life, to destroy, to slay, and to cause to perish, all t power of the people and province that would assau them.' On the other hand, the disobedient State will stripped of all assistance, for it would be a provision th in such circumstances any particular Treaties of Allianc if any such are tolerated within the League, should b dissolved.

It will now be seen what bearing all this has upon highly controversial topic, concerning which the peopl

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of this country are so rightly sensitive, the so-called Freedom of the Seas. The meaning which the Germans attach to this phrase is discussed in another article in this number. It will therefore be sufficient to say here that they mean by it the deliverance of that nation which has the weaker navy from the effect of Sea Power. Let us consider this claim in the light of a League of Nations. First, as to neutrals, within the League there would be none. War will have arisen because one State has either broken the moratorium, or is not content with the redress which the Tribunal has awarded to it, or will not give the redress which the Tribunal has directed it should give. This State is a covenant-breaker and an outlaw. All the members of the League are at war with it and all their subjects will be rightly forbidden to trade with the enemy. As to States outside the League, one would hope that they would be gradually diminishing in number and ultimately vanishing. Meanwhile the

States of the League would say to them, 'We are very sorry for any inconvenience to which we may put you, but this is a criminal, an outlaw, against whom we are using police measures; and, for the general benefit of the world, you must submit to them. For this purpose we keep the old Sea Laws and the old rights of war.' After all, neutrality will now be seen in its true light; it will no longer be deemed a virtue, but a weak indifference to the cause of right.

Next, as to the suggested immunity of private property at sea, every one now has learned the lesson that commercial and financial boycott and so forth is preferable to war. Every one will agree that, if the outlaw State can be coerced by seizure of its property, it will be better so f to bring matters to a conclusion and avoid, or at least diminish and shorten, the shedding of blood. The use of the sea for warlike purposes will be recognised as one of the most legitimate and practical forms of international coercion.

It must not be supposed, however, that, when all these provisions for enforcing the moratorium and supplying a tribunal to settle disputes and sanctions to enforce obedience have been agreed upon and the Treaty embodying them has been made, we shall have made it absolutely certain for our descendants that they will

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always have the blessings of peace. arises for working out the rules of the Treaty in practic much will depend upon the goodwill and loyalty of thi various States in the League; some may hang bac some may be even inclined to favour the wrongdoet No laws will avail if people in general are not la abiding; but diplomatic ingenuity must be taxed so frame the provisions of the Treaty as to leave no loo hole for evasion. The consequence must be made. follow automatically. For this reason the Treaty wou provide, as already stated, that the wrong-doing Sta would be ipso facto at war with all the other Stat party to the League. It will not be necessary for the to declare war. If the constitution of any State is su as to take away from the Executive the power to decla war without the sanction of the Senate, as in the Unit States, or without that of the Chambers, as in sor other republican countries, it will not be a case waiting for this consent; the State is ipso facto at war

Again, no State will be able to say that it is waiti to see what the other States do; it will not be a case of joint guarantee of peace like the inept guarantee of t neutrality of Luxemburg, under which no guarantor w bound to act unless all the guarantors concurred. Ea State will have severally contracted to take its pa and will be bound to act, whatever its colleagues do abstain from doing. No doubt, if the war became serious or prolonged operation some combination wou be necessary, and the Staffs of the several States wou have to lay their heads together. For this purpose son writers would set up an International Standing Arn and Navy, to which the several States would ser contingents, with a Staff, or Chief of Staff, taken fro a particular State. To this proposal there are at lea three objections. Such an international force would 1 slow to put in motion and tardy in action. Its form tion and use would give occasion to jealousy and quarrel If there were a real effectual Staff, that Power whic wielded it would be the mistress of the world, just a to compare small things with great, Athens was th mistress of the Delian League.

In connexion with this question of an internationa force it may well be asked, What is to be the effec

of a League of Nations upon disarmament? The answer seems to be: directly, none. No State could afford to disarm abruptly till the world has settled down from its great unrest, and till it sees that there is no military Power so great as to be a match, or nearly a match, for the combined forces of the other States. But gradually, as a muscle atrophies from want of use, so it is to be expected that military forces will decline. Any systematic compulsory disarmament seems impracticable. The scale of armies must differ widely in small compact nations and in those loosely extended over wide territories; while, as to fleets, federations like the British Empire, and other States with over-sea dominions or large mercantile marines, must have navies quite out of proportion with those of other States.

An interesting point arises as to the extent of the application of the moratorium. Should it be confined to the prohibition of actual war, or should it operate to prevent preparations for hostilities, such as increased armaments, mobilisation, and the like? There is much to be said on both sides. If nations prepare for war with feverish activity, still more if they mobilise their forces and raise new levies, their passions will be more and more roused, and the warlike tendency may become irresistible. On the other hand, the mutual recriminations would be endless, and each disputant would think and say that the other is taking some military step. Indeed it would be hardly in human nature to avoid taking some steps; and the Council of the League would have an almost insoluble task in balancing such mutual accusations.

There is even some difficulty in determining what is war; and Mr Jacobs, in his clever and suggestive book, proposes only to forbid the invasion of the enemy territories by an armed force, by which he means an invasion in the old-fashioned manner by an armed land force, so that even bombardments from the sea or from the air would not be prohibited. He has somewhat modified his scheme in a later broadsheet; but he still regards all aets of hostility, other than invasion, as matters for Complaint to the Council of States and not as 'acts of war, and he would forbid the aggrieved State making war in his sense of the term. This is hardly a practical

suggestion. But there is clearly no little difficulty i framing an adequate definition of acts of war.'

There is another and more subtle reason for drawin the line at actual warfare. Suppose two States, on militarily disposed, keeping itself in 'shining armour spending money in maintaining large establishment be many vessels of war, and well-drilled standing armies and another State peaceably disposed, with small force but waxing rich by peaceful industry. If, at the momer of the outbreak of a dispute, a stop were placed upo the military preparations of either side and ultimate the States were to go to war, the military State wou ar retain its superiority, and, being conscious of this, wou Co be the more impracticable; while, if free preparation were permitted, the other State with its materi resources would soon draw to a level, and the knowled of this would make for peace.

There remain to be considered two serious objection to any League of Peace. In the first place, it is objecte that such a League will stereotype the existing bou daries of States, however artificial they may be, or how ever unsuited to later conditions and the growth development of nationalities. Secondly, while the Leag apparently prevents any such rectifications, it giv encouragement to every aggressive State which, whi not actually making war, will contrive to injure i neighbour in various ways and to exasperate it annoyance ranging from pin-pricks to serious outrages.

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To take the second objection first. Some write have found a remedy in the suggestion that there shou be a power in some International Tribunal to grant a injunction, as the lawyers would say, pendente lite. Th is at first sight an attractive suggestion, but it is doubtf whether it would have occurred to any but English an American writers; the precise legal notion involved is n familiar to, nor would it be easily understood by, othe nations. Moreover, considering that some time woul elapse before the Council could be got to work, considerin also the further difficulty of the Council making, upon pr liminary materials only, what will approach to a decisio upon the merits of the case, it hardly seems that th process of injunction would be suitable. It will also b