between the different members of the League, w provisions for settling disputes between them; and that extent a League promotes peace.

But a League is not the less a League because, w it promotes peace between its members, it does sc order the more effectually to act in opposition to even to wage war with, other States. It may be that the Delphic Amphictyony had for its sole ob the provision of mutual peace and goodwill; but, if it is the only League of that kind known to hist The Delian League, the early Swiss Confederation, towns forming the early Dutch Republic, the orig Confederation of the revolted Colonies of British No America, had for their main object a defensive allia against an external foe. The so-called Grand Des mythically attributed to Henry IV of France, wa combination against Spanish-Austrian power.

Is the future League to be such a combination, m in reference to, and possibly against, other states nations of the globe-Germany, for instance, or Yellow Peril; or is it to seek to become an all-embrac Union of all the peoples of the globe, feeling it imperfect till this development has been obtained, so framing its statutes as to facilitate instead of venting such a Union? It is impossible to say w effect may have been produced by the sudden and t collapse of the Central Powers; but, at any rate, months ago, there were many people who dreaded inclusion of the Central Powers, and particularly tha Germany, in any League of Peace; who felt that t Powers were not to be trusted; who dreaded their m and subtlety, and preferred to keep them out, ever the risk of their forming themselves into a rival Leag

It is to be hoped that such counsels will not prevail. They were counsels of despair, despair of peace of the world. If followed, they would b divided the world into two great factions, each ar to the teeth, with a burden of armaments ever increas and each bidding against each other for the nat which have been neutral in the present strife, incluc some of those States of South America which s destined to take place among the Great Powers of future. Lord Robert Cecil, in his recent inaug

address as Chancellor of the University of Birmingham, took the opposite and the wiser and more Christian view. His scheme for a League of Nations would include all. Indeed he went so far as to suggest that, if any State refused to join the League, it might be forced into it by means of a boycott. Other writers, again, including some who are most keen that the League should include Germany, have drawn the line at what they are pleased to call, somewhat insolently, 'the backward nations.'

Still, while the object of the League should be that it should embrace all, a start may be made on less ambitious lines; but it would be madness to throw away the opportunities of the coming Peace, and one of its terms ought to be that the belligerent Powers, at all events the chief of them, should enter into a treaty establishing as between themselves a League of Nations, and making provision for the accession of the neutral Powers, subject of course to certain conditions.

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Given that there should be a League of Nations for the purpose of preserving peace, that it should be as nearly-world-wide as possible, and that it should confine itself, at any rate at first, to the simple object of preserving peace—given the three postulates of this article, what should be the machinery?

It cannot be too plainly laid down that this is a matter for experts. Christian teachers and philanthropic writers have done their part when they have brought the nations to the point of desiring peace, to forgetfulness or pardon of past quarrels and injuries, and to the desire of mutual goodwill and fellowship. These are preliminaries with regard to which it is easy to write and speak in eloquent, even gushing terms; but it is too common for zealots and reformers to think that all is Hone when they have obtained the acceptance of highounding general principles. It is to the drudgery of pade-work that recourse must be had if these principles are to be made sure; and the task is by no means easy. The Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, when he promoted the calling together of the last Hague Conference, incerely desired peace. So did many of the plenipoteniaries and at least some of the States which deputed

them. But the Conference has done little except aff topics for mutual recrimination between the Sta engaged in the recent war, to whom it has been e and comforting to be able from time to time to acc their enemies of breaches of the several Hague Conv tions. Events have shown that such arrangements were the only outcome of the last Hague Conference barriers worthless against any serious impulse towa war. We must begin in another way.

It is useless to set up any system of tribunals arbitration, however excellent and complete, if Sta inclined to war can put them aside. History shows t this was not the way in which internal peace and g order were enforced between the citizens of a coun The first step in civilisation is the regulation, the sec and more effective step is the prohibition, of private v When this is carried out, men are forced to have recou to the tribunals. The tribunals must of course efficient and trustworthy, or else men will revert private war. But the fact that the law is open and r can implead one another is not enough, unless men shown that this is the only way in which they will allowed to get redress. We must, therefore, have firs prohibition of war, with effective sanction to enforce prohibition; and secondly, side by side, arrangements which states and nations forbidden to assert their rig or to redress their wrongs by war, shall neverthe obtain appropriate relief. In homely language the def of past schemes for International Arbitration is that t put the cart before the horse.

The first provision of the treaty should be to proh war. No fighting in the street, please. The internatio police constable, whoever he may be, will say: 'Se your differences some other way, we do not all fighting.' It is a great merit of Mr Jacobs' treat Neutrality versus Justice,' as it is of Prof. Pollard's 'E torical Argument,' that this provision is placed first, that these authors insist that it should be firmly enforc

But, secondly, to make this enforcement feasil there must be a safety valve, and corresponding devi for settling quarrels; otherwise, in spite of all the p hibitions in the world and all the forces behind the States will fight. There must be some body or bodies

decide and determine international disputes, whether Arbitrators, or a Court, or a Council of Nations, or all combined; and this international organ must (1) be ready and willing to act; (2) act justly; (3) have at its back moral and material forces. Civil experience shows that you may have a hierarchy of Courts of Justice; but, if they are procrastinating, unjust, or impotent, men will put them aside and return to private war. You will have Judge Lynch or the Ku-Klux Clan or the Mafia.

But it is not easy to establish a real International Court or Tribunal. Hitherto no one has ventured to do so. The schemes of the Hague Conferences, even of the second, fall far short of it. The essence of an efficient Tribunal or Court of Justice is that it is there, always in existence, not dependent upon the will of suitors or the agreement of disputants, but established from above, open to receive a complaint, and prepared to require the person complained of to come and answer the complaint, or defend himself against the charge.

The Hague Conferences never got so far as that; none of the International Treaties of Arbitration has got so far. The last Hague Conference purported indeed to establish a Court; but the so-called Court is only an office or bureau, to which disputant States anxious to come to terms, and wanting to find an independent body to settle their disputes, can have recourse for advice and guidance as to the procedure of arbitration, and in which they will find a panel of highly distinguished men from among whom they can choose their arbitrators. But, if one of the disputant States does not want to go to arbitration, nothing is done. The last Conference did indeed provide some machinery by which the disputants might be compulsorily sent to arbitration; but, even so, each disputant was to name an arbitrator, and the unwilling State could stop the whole proceeding by the simple process of not naming its arbitrator.

Moreover, there is a more subtle difficulty; the disputants have to determine what the dispute is about, what is the real question which the arbitrators are to ecide. Now every lawyer knows that in many cases he statement of the question of itself determines the nswer, and that often half the discussion turns upon The point, What is the question to be discussed? There

never has been any provision, either in the Hague Co ventions, or in the most advanced international treati for settling this. What is wanted and what alone w supply a safety valve is a tribunal already made rea to hand, to which a suitor can come and make his co plaint, as a plaintiff can take out a writ from a Court Justice, and have the defendant, willingly or unwilling brought in to answer it.

Under the protection of such a system of jurispruden and side by side with forensic litigation there exists most civilised countries a practice of referring disput to arbitrators, which in many cases suits the part better than having recourse to the Courts; and so, international disputes, there may be-and it is high desirable that there should be-provision for arbitrati when the disputant States can agree upon the questi to be decided and upon the composition of the arbit tribunal. But beyond this, and in the background, the must be some permanent and self-sufficient tribunal which, if the States cannot agree to arbitration, a disputant State may insist on applying, and which w take cognizance of the cause even against the will of o of the parties.

But, if it is difficult to find arbitrators to whom Stat will willingly commit their cause for decision, how mu more difficult and delicate will it be to establish judg who will act without the consent of parties? The Leag however, requires a tribunal which will not derive origin from the consent of parties but will sit and adj dicate by virtue of its own inherent right, and w command obedience by its moral strength and mater backing. How is this tribunal to be formed?

Most writers propose two tribunals, some three, sor even four. Those who propose two suggest a Court decide such matters as Municipal Courts decide, i.e. qu tions of law such as the construction of treaties or t application of established rules of International La and questions of fact such as whether the Russian fle in the North Sea had been attacked by Japanese torped boats before it fired on the English fishing fleet. other matters-questions of high policy, questions national honour, and similar matters-they would lea to a Conference of the Powers party to the League.