Gentlemen, advert a little to the time-this was in November 1792. There does not exist upon the face of the earth, I hope, a man more zealously attached to this doctrine than I am. I mean, that every man in this country, and in every country, has an equal right to equal laws, to an equal protection of personal security, to an equal protection of personal liberty, to an equal protection of that without which it requires no reasoning to prove, that neither personal security nor personal liberty ever can exist-I mean to an equal protection of property-that property which the labour of his life, under the blessing of Providence, may have gained to him, or which the superior kindness of Providence may have given him, without bestowing the labour of life in order to acquire it; all this sort of equality is that which the constitution of Great Britain has secured to every man who lives under it, but is not the equality which was connected with the doctrine No King, upon the 6th of November 1792.

Gentlemen, that country, from which it appears, from this conversation, Mr Frost came, and to which it appears, from this conversation, that he expected to go, in the year 1789, had framed what was called a constitution; and almost everything that was valuable in it was borrowed from the constitution of this country in which we live, which had provided for the equal rights of man to equal laws; it laid down in doctrine, however ill or well it supported the principle, the equal right of every man to the protection of his personal liberty, of his personal security, and of his property. But in 1792, that first year of equality, as it was called, a different system of equality, connected materially with this system of No King, had been established: a system which, if it meant anything, meant this: it meant equality of property, for all other equality had been before provided for.

Gentlemen of the jury, it is every man's birthright to have a certain species of equality secured to him; but it neither requires reasoning, nor is it consistent with common sense, and cannot be consistent with reason and common sense, because it is not consistent with the nature of things, as established by the Author of nature, that any other system of equality should exist upon the face of the world.

Gentlemen, this equality, recommended by this gentleman, advisedly, as I think you will be satisfied in this transaction of the 6th of November 1792, is a system which has destroyed all ranksis a system which has destroyed all property-is a system of universal proscription-is a system which is as contrary to the order of moral nature as it is contrary to the order of political natureit is a system which cuts up by the roots all the enjoyments that result from the domestic relations of life, or the political relations of life-it is a system which cuts up by the roots every incentive to virtuous and active industry, and holds out to the man who chooses to live a life of profligacy and idleness that he may take

from him who has exerted through life a laborious and virtuous. conduct those fruits which the God of justice, and every law of justice, have endeavoured to secure to him. This is the only sort of equality that can be connected with this doctrine of No King, upon the 6th of November 1792.

Gentlemen, I am ready to agree, that where the charge is, that words have been spoken, it is fit for those who prosecute for the public to remember, that in that situation they are in a certain degree advocates for the defendant; for no man can do his duty who wishes to press a defendant, charged upon the part of the public with acting more improperly than he shall appear, upon the candid examination of the circumstances, to have acted; it is fit for me also to observe, that the degree of criminality of these words will depend very much upon the temper, the circumstances, the quo animo, with which this gentleman thought proper to utter them.

Gentlemen, I will not depart from this principle, which I have before stated, that if men will dare to utter words, expressions of more serious import than those which produced the mischief to which I have been alluding in other places, it will be the duty of persons in official situations to watch for you and the public over that which they conceive to be a blessing to you and the public; at least to inform those gentlemen that they must account for their conduct; it will be for them, if they can, to account for it satisfactorily.

Gentlemen, you will hear from the witnesses with what temper, with what demeanour, and in what manner these words were uttered; and I allude again to that which will be described to you, I mean the feelings of the persons present, as some degree of evidence, which will have its due, and not more than its due weight, in your minds.

Gentlemen, I will read to you the words of Mr Justice Forster, as containing the principle upon which, though the law holds seditious expressions as an exceeding high misdemeanour, it has not thought proper to consider them as a crime of the magnitude of high treason. He says, "As to mere words, supposed to be treasonable, they differ widely from writings in point of real malignity and proper evidence. They are often the effect of mere heat of blood, which, in some natures, otherwise well disposed, carrieth a man beyond the bounds of decency or prudence; they are always liable to great misconstruction from the ignorance and inattention of the hearers, and too often from a motive truly criminal. Loose words, therefore, not relative to any act or design, are not overt acts of treason, but words of advice or persuasion, and all consultations for the traitorous purposes treated of in this chapter, are certainly so; they are uttered in contemplation of some traitorous purpose, actually on foot or intended, and in prosecution of it.

Gentlemen of the jury, it is competent to Mr Frost, and he will give me leave to say, I think it is incumbent upon him, having made use of words of this sort, to state to you that, in the sentiment which that language conveys, he does not express those sentiments by which his general conduct in life is regulated. For aught I know, he is otherwise well disposed; and I am sure, if evidence of that sort is given to you, you will feel the propriety of giving to it, not only a candid, but you have my leave to give it the very utmost consideration that can possibly be given to it. Gentlemen, you observe, too, that words are not made treason, because words may be spoken to by witnesses from a motive truly criminal. You will be to judge whether the evidence of the witnesses to be called to you to-day proceeds from motives truly criminal, or whether laudable zeal for the constitution of their country is not their only motive for stating to you the conduct of this defendant.

Gentlemen, there is another circumstance. I will say but a word to you upon it; that is this: that the propriety of prosecuting for words of this sort depends a great deal upon the time and season at which those words are uttered.

Gentlemen, we know that in this country the legislature found it necessary to interfere, and by a positive law to enact, that any man who should dare to affirm that the King and Parliament could not regulate the succession to the Crown, should be guilty of high treason. God forbid the time should ever come, and I do not believe it ever can come, when the Legislature, acting upon the same principle, shall be obliged to say, that if it is at this hour high treason for men deliberately to affirm that the King and Parliament of this country cannot regulate the succession to the Crown, it shall be innocent for men to say that the King and Parliament of this country have no right to continue any government in this country. Why, then, gentlemen, if this doctrine of equality and No King has been attended with such consequences as it is notorious to all mankind it has been attended with, the notoriety of the fact renders it incumbent upon those whose duty it is to bring such defendants before a jury of their country, for that jury to say, as between the country and individuals, whether, under such circumstances as will be laid before you, he is to be publicly permitted to hold such doctrines as those which are stated, in a manner that seems to evince that they are not stated for any useful purpose, but that they are stated for the purpose of trying whether there is any law in this country that will secure the government of the country from attacks, which mean nothing but to display the audacity with which men dare to attack that government? And if you shall be convinced, upon the whole of the evidence before you, that the case is such as I have stated it to be, this I am sure of, that you will duly weigh the consequences of the

VOL. I.

2 A

verdict, however you shall be diposed to give it, for the Crown or for the defendant; and I am sure the Crown, upon the temperate consideration of what the jury does, will not be dissatisfied with that verdict, let it be what it may. The constitution of this country, if it be excellent, if it has really handed down to us those great and invaluable blessings which, I believe, ninety-nine persons out of a hundred are convinced it has, and if it be a matter of anxiety to transmit them to our posterity, you will remember that the stability of those blessings finally and ultimately depends upon the conduct of juries. It is with them, by their verdicts, to establish their fellow-subjects in the enjoyment of those rights; it is with them to say in what cases those rights have been invaded; and the same constitution that has left it to them to say in what cases those rights have been invaded, has also bound every honest man to say, that when they have given their decision upon it, they have acted properly between the country and the individual who is charged with the offence.

Gentlemen, under these circumstances, I shall proceed to lay the case before you, and I have only again to repeat, if you shall find, upon a due consideration of this case, that this is a hasty, an unguarded, and unadvised expression of a gentleman otherwise well disposed, and who meant no real mischief to the country, you will be pleased, with my consent, to deal with the defendant as a person under those circumstances ought to be dealt with. I never will press a jury for a verdict in a case in which, whatever may be the strictness of the law as between man and man, acting upon moral and candid feelings, it ought not to be asked for; and having given you my sentiments, I leave the defendant in your hands.

EVIDENCE FOR THE CROWN.

JOHN TAITT, of Oxford Street, upholsterer, sworn.-Examined by Mr SOLICITOR-GENERAL.

Q. Do you know Mr John Frost?

A. I never saw him but that evening in my life.

Q. What evening?

A. The 6th of November last.

Q. Where were you that evening?

A. In the Percy Coffee-house.

Q. Who was with you?

A. Mr Paul Savignac.

Q. Were there any other persons in the coffee-house?

A. Yes, several gentlemen.

Q. Can you name any?

d. Mr Yatman was there, Mr Bullock; there were not many

that I knew.

Q. Did you see Mr Frost there ?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time?

A. About ten in the evening..

Q. Where did Mr Frost come from?

A. He came from a room above-stairs with several gentlemen into the coffee-room.

Q. What did you first perceive with respect to Mr Frost ?

A. He addressed himself, I think, first to Mr Yatman, but of that I am not certain; he was asked how long he had been returned from France.

Lord KENYON. Was he asked that by Mr Yatman ?

A. By Mr Yatman or some of the other gentlemen; he said he was very lately returned.

Mr SOLICITOR-GENERAL. What did he say more?

A. He asked him what they were doing there, and he said, things were going on very well there, they were doing very well. Q. Did you hear him say anything more?

A. That he should very shortly return there.

Q. What more?

A. There was nothing more, till, a few minutes after, he went into the body of the coffee-room, two or three boxes from where I was. I heard him exalting his voice, and he was for equality—" I am for equality"-upon which I got off my seat, and I went forward, and inquired, "Who are you, sir?"

Lord KENYON. You asked him?

A. Yes, because I did not know him. Mr Yatman answered, That is Mr Frost; upon which I asked him how he dared to utter such words? He still continued, "I am for equality, and no King." Mr Yatman asked him if he meant no King in this country, and he said, Yes, no King or no Kings; I rather think it was in the plural number. That the constitution of this country was a very bad one.

Q. Did he say anything more?

A. He said nothing more. I said he ought to be turned out of the coffee-room; upon which he walked up the room and placed his back to the fire, and wished, I believe, rather to retract, if he could have retracted, what he had said; but he still continued, he was for no King, and he was for equality. He quitted the room very shortly after by a general hiss from all the company. Q. How long did he continue there? A. I suppose not above five minutes.

Cross-examined by Mr ERSKINE.

Q. You went, I suppose, to the coffee-house just in the ordinary course of your recreation, I take for granted?