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CASE of the KING against JOHN STOCKDALE, tried in the Court

of King's Bench, before LORD KENYON and a Special Jury, at Westminster, on the 9th of December 1789, upon an Information filed against him by the ATTORNEY-GENERAL, for a Libel on the HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE SUBJECT.

THE trial of Mr John Stockdale, of Piccadilly, is so immediately connected with the well-known impeachment of Mr Hastings, the Governor-General of India, that very little preface is necessary for the illustration of Mr Erskine's defence of him.

When the Commons of Great Britain ordered that impeachment, the articles were prepared by Mr Edmund Burke, who had the lead in all the inquiries which led to it, and, instead of being drawn up in the usual dry method of legal accusation, were expanded into great length, and were characterised by that fervid and affecting language which distinguishes all the writings of that extraordinary person. The articles so prepared, instead of being confined to the records of the House of Commons, until they were carried up to the Lords for trial, were printed and sold in every shop in the kingdom, without question or obstruction by the managers of the impeachment or the House of Commons, and undoubtedly, from the style and manner of their composition, made a very considerable impression against the accused.

To repel the effects of the articles, thus (according to the reasoning of Mr Erskine) prematurely published, the Rev. Mr Logan, one of the ministers of Leith in Scotland, a person eminent for learning, drew up a review of the articles of impeachment (which, as has been already stated, were then in general circulation), and carried them to Mr Stockdale, an eminent and respectable bookseller in Piccadilly, who published them in the usual course of his business. Mr Logan's review was composed with great accuracy and judgment, but undoubtedly with strong severity of observation against the accusation of Mr Hastings; and having an immediate and very extensive sale, was complained of by Mr Fox to the House of Commons, and upon the motion of that great and eminent person, then one of the managers of the impeachment, the House unanimously voted an address to the King, praying His Majesty to direct his Attorney-General to file an information against Mr Stockdale, as the publisher of a libel upon the Commons House of Parliament, which was filed accordingly.

It is not necessary to lengthen this preface by the passages from Mr Logan's book which were selected by the Attorney-General in forming the information, and which gave the greatest offence to the House of

Commons; neither is it necessary to print the information itself, because the principal passages complained of and contained in it, were read by Lord Chief-Baron Macdonald, then Attorney-General, in his very fair and able address to the jury, which we have printed, as well as his judicious reply, and the summing up of Lord Chief-Justice Kenyon; because this trial, above any other in print, contains the invaluable principles of a free press, and the important privilege of the jury since the passing of the memorable Libel Act. The application of these principles to an acquittal or conviction in this particular instance, is not within our province: but we may state as a fact, that the verdict gave very general satisfaction, and, what is a proud consideration for the subjects of this country, under our invaluable constitution, neither the highest Court in the kingdom, nor the House of Commons, who were the accusers, had a right to question its authority.

The evidence consisted of nothing but the common proof of publication, and is therefore omitted as unnecessary.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL opened the case as follows:

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY,-This information, which it has been my duty to file against the defendant, John Stockdale, comes before you in consequence of an address from the House of Commons. This, you may well suppose, I do not mention as in any degree to influence the judgment which you are by and by to give upon your oath: I state it as a measure which they have taken, thinking it in their wisdom, as everybody must think it, to be the fittest to bring before a jury of the country, an offender against themselves, avoiding thereby, what sometimes indeed is unavoidable, but which they wish to avoid, whenever it can be done with propriety-the acting both as judges and accusers; which they must necessarily have done, had they resorted to their own powers, which are great and extensive, for the purpose of vindicating themselves against insult and contempt, but which, in the present instance, they have wisely forborne to exercise, thinking it better to leave the defendant to be dealt with by a fair and impartial jury.

The offence which I impute to him is that of calumniating the House of Commons: not in its ordinary legislative character, but when acting in its accusatorial capacity, conceiving it to be their duty, on adequate occasions, to investigate the conduct of persons in high stations, and to leave that conduct to be judged of by the proper constitutional tribunal, the peers in Parliament assembled.

After due investigation, as it is well known to the public, the Commons of Great Britain thought it their duty to submit the conduct of a servant of this country, who had governed one of its most opulent dependencies for many years, to an inquiry before that tribunal. One would have thought that every good subject of this country would have forborne imputing to the House of Commons

motives utterly unworthy of them, and of those whom they represent instead of this, to so great a degree now has the licentiousness of the press arisen, that motives the most unbecoming that can actuate any individual who may be concerned in the prosecution of public justice, are imputed to the representatives of the people. No credit is given to them for meaning to do justice to their country, but, on the contrary, private, personal, and malicious motives have been imputed to the Commons of Great Britain.

When such an imputation is made upon the very first tribunal that this country knows, namely, the great inquest of the nation, the Commons in Parliament assembled, carrying a subject, who, as they thought, had offended, to the bar of the House of Lords, I am sure you will think this an attack so dangerous to every tribunal, so dangerous to the whole administration of justice, that if it be well proved, you cannot fail to give it your stigma, by a verdict against the defendant.

Gentlemen, the particular passages which I shall put my finger upon in this libel it will now be my duty to state. You know very well that it is your duty to consider of the meaning that I have imputed to them by the information. If you agree with me in that meaning, you convict; if you disagree with me, of course you acquit.

The rule of your judgment, I apprehend (with submission to his Lordship), will be the ordinary acceptation of the words, and the plain and obvious sense of the several passages. If there be doubt, or if there be difficulty, if there be screwing or ingenuity, or unworthy straining, on the part of a public prosecutor, you certainly will pay no attention to that; but, on the contrary, if he who runs may read, if the meanest capacity must understand the words, in their plain and obvious sense, to be the same as imputed in this information, in such a case as that, ingenuity on the other side must be laid aside by you, and you will not be over-anxious to give a meaning to words other than the ordinary and plain one.

In my situation, it does not become me to raise in you more indignation than the words themselves and the plain and simple reading of the libel will do: far be it from me, if it were in my power to do so, to provoke any undue passions or animosity in you against conduct even such as this. The solemnity of the situation in which I am placed on this occasion, obliges me to address the intellect both of the Court and jury, and neither their passions nor their prejudices. For that reason I shall content myself with the few observations I have made, and betake myself merely to the words of the libel; and leaving that with you, I am most confident that if you follow the rule of interpretation which you always do upon such occasions, it cannot possibly happen that you should differ from me in the construction which I have put upon them.

Gentlemen, this, I should however mention to you, is a libel of a more dangerous nature than the ribaldry that we daily see crowding every one of the prints which appear every morning upon our tables, because it is contained in a work which discovers the author of it to be by no means ignorant of composition, but certainly to be of good understanding, and eminently acquainted with letters. Therefore, when calumny of this sort comes so recommended, and addressing itself to the understandings of the most enlightened part of mankind-I mean those who have had the best education-it may sink deep into the minds of those who compose the thinking and the judging part of the community; and by misleading them, perhaps may be of more real danger than the momentary misleading, or the momentary inflammation, of common minds, by the ordinary publications of the day.

This book is entitled, "A Review of the Principal Charges against Warren Hastings, Esquire, late Governor-General of Bengal."

One passage in it is this: "The House of Commons has now given its final decision with regard to the merits and demerits of Mr Hastings. The grand inquest of England have delivered their charges, and preferred their impeachment: their allegations are referred to proof; and from the appeal to the collective wisdom and justice of the nation in the supreme tribunal of the kingdom, the question comes to be determined, whether Mr Hastings be guilty or not guilty?"

Another is this: "What credit can we give to multiplied and accumulated charges, when we find that they originate from misrepresentation and falsehood?"

Another is: "An impeachment of error in judgment with regard to the quantum of a fine, and for an intention that never was executed, characterises a tribunal of inquisition, rather than a court of Parliament."

In another part it is said: "The other charges are so insignificant in themselves, or founded on such gross misrepresentations, that they would not affect an obscure individual, much less a public character."

And again: "If success, in any degree, attends the designs of the accusers of Mr Hastings, the voice of Britain henceforth to her sons is, Go and serve your country; but if you transgress the line of official orders, though compelled by necessity, you do so at the risk of your fortune, your honour, and your life; if you act with proper prudence against the interests of the empire, and bring calamity and disgrace upon your country, you have only to court opposition and coalesce with your enemies, and you will find a party zealous and devoted to support you; you may obtain a vote of thanks from the House of Commons for your services, and you may read your history in the eyes of the mob by the light of bonfires and

VOL. I.

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illuminations. But if, after exerting all your efforts in the cause of your country, you return, covered with laurels and crowned with success; if you preserve a loyal attachment to your Sovereign, you may expect the thunders of parliamentary vengeance; you will certainly be impeached, and probably be undone.'

Another passage is this: "The office of calm deliberate justice is to redress grievances as well as to punish offences. It has been affirmed, that the natives of India have been deeply injured; but has any motion been made to make them compensation for the injuries they have sustained? Have the accusers of Mr Hastings ever proposed to bring back the Rohillas to the country from which they were expelled? To restore Cheit Sing to the Zemindary of Benares, or to return the Nabob of Oude the present which the Governor of Bengal received from him for the benefit of the Company? Till such measures are adopted, and in the train of negotiation, the world has every reason to conclude that the impeachment of Mr Hastings is carried on"-now, gentlemen, I leave you to judge what sort of motives are imputed to the House of Commons here" from motives of personal animosity, not from regard to public justice."

The general meaning, without specifying it in technical language, which I have thought it my duty to impute to these words, is shortly this: That the House of Commons, without consideration, without reading, without hearing, have not been ashamed to accuse a man of distinguished situation; and to pervert their accusatorial character from the purposes of deliberate, thoughtful, considerate justice, to immediate, hasty, passionate, vindictive, personal animosity. The work represents that the better a man conducts himself-that the more deserving he has rendered himself of his country's favour from his past conduct, the more he exposes himself to the vindictive proceedings of Parliament; and that such a man will be impeached and ruined.

In another passage, PERSONAL ANIMOSITY (the very words are used) is imputed to the Commons of Great Britain as the motive of their conduct. These are too plain for you, gentlemen, to differ with me in the interpretation.

I do not choose to waste your time, and that of the Court, in so plain a case, with much observation; but, hackneyed as it may be, it is my duty, upon every one of these occasions, to remind you, that the liberty of the press consists in its good regulation: if it be meant that it should be preserved with benefit to the public, it must be from time to time lopped of its unjust excesses, by reasonable and proper verdicts of juries, in fit and clear cases.

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