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termination, for his will and actions.* Thus it is, and always will be true, that the organs of the moral faculties given by the Creator, are the principle of what we call sometimes propensity, sometimes inclination, desire or passion, according to the different energy of action of these organs. Every one allows that, in this respect, the empire of man is limited; it is not in his power to annihilate his propensities, nor to give himself inclinations at will. But, in the midst of the most earnest desires of man, if several faculties of a superior order, the exercise of which is maintained by a perfect organization, act in him, and join themselves to the external motives which education, the laws, religion, &c., furnish him, these same desires are overcome. The will which man then manifests, is no longer the action of a single organ.

It is the business of the man, secured within and without by multiplied motives, and endowed with the faculty of comparing them, to weigh them, and to be determined, or to determine himself, according to these motives. Now it is incontestable, that, so long as man enjoys his good sense, he can act thus, and that he often wills and does the entire contrary of what his propensities direct him; consequently, he is morally free. It is this liberty which makes of man a moral being, which gives to his actions morality and responsibility.

But, let us not believe, that this faculty of willing or not willing, this moral liberty, has been given up to chance by the Creator.

The determination which takes place by motives, is also submitted to laws in such a manner that, in the exercise of moral liberty, there can never be any question as to unlimited or absolute liberty. The laws of nature, for instance, ordain that the faculties of an inferior order

* Nec tardum ingenium, nec labilis memoria, nec inquietus appetitus, nec sensus obtusus, nec vita languens reum per se statuerunt hominem, sicut nec contraria innocentem, et hoc non ob aliud, nisi quia et hæc necessario et præter voluntatem posse prævenire probatur. (S. Augustinus, de liber. arbit.)

should obey those of a superior order; that every living creature should love himself, and, consequently, employ all his means and his faculties for his own happiness. "All men," says Pascal, "desire to be happy. This is so without exception. The will makes no effort except toward this object. It is the motive of all the actions of all men, even of those who destroy themselves." Man must, then, necessarily desire a good, and dread an evil, which he acknowledges as such. If several motives present themselves, it is not in the power of the man to decide indifferently for one or the other; but he is determined, according to the laws of thought, by the motive which acts most powerfully upon him, or offers him the greatest good. Without this necessity, man, with all his moral liberty, would fall into that unreasonable contradiction against the laws of nature, of which I have made mention in speaking of unlimited and absolute liberty.

Meanwhile, this liberty, conformable to the dependence in which we are placed in the creation, to the laws of nature and of our organization, fulfils all the conditions which we can expect from a finite, but reasonable being. It not only renders those who direct man, responsible, but makes each individual so, for his actions; it is the only liberty which can be useful in life, and, as Locke‡ says, the only one which is supposed in human institutions; while, in admitting an unlimited or absolute liberty, all the efforts which tend to guide man, would be absurd.

When certain philosophers require, that we should practise virtue and justice, without any motive, for the sake of virtue only, far from doing away with the ne

* Pensées sur la religion, p. 162.

† Quelles facultés sentez-vous en vous-même? R. Deux facultés principales: la faculté de connaitre et la faculté de vouloir, ou de me porter a ce quil me plait. (Catechisme à l'usage de toutes les eglises de l' Empire Francais. p. 22.)

L. c. tom. iii. p. 454.

cessity of motives, they present to you virtue and justice as the most sublime motives, and the most worthy to lead you to act. Every thing, then, proves, that in all states of human society, men have supposed no other freedom than that of being able to be determined, or to determine one's self, by the most powerful motives.

It is certain, that all individuals do not enjoy moral freedom to the same extent. How happens this?

We have seen that the faculty of appreciating motives of a superior order, constitutes the first condition of moral freedom. Now, all motives are founded either in our own constitution, on a happy organization, or on external circumstances. As our internal faculties are more limited, the fewer motives will they furnish us to do good, or to avoid evil; and the more the noble sentiments and faculties predominate over the propensities, the more will these be counterbalanced, when their tendency becomes prejudicial. Thus, the man with great talents has more liberty than the ordinary man; and the more the faculties descend towards idiocy, the more, also, moral liberty goes on decreasing.

The second source of our motives is in external circumstances. The man who has fewest wants, will also be less tempted than the man who is sunk in misery. The man formed and cultivated by education, morality, and religion, and who understands the laws and the duties of society, will have infinitely more motives in his power than he whose heart and mind have been abandoned to ignorance and brutality. In general, the greater disproportion there is between the motives, whether internal or external, and the energy of the propensities, the more precarious becomes the exercise of moral liberty.

Are our Actions uncontrollable by reason of our Propensities and our Faculties being innate?

What I have now said on moral liberty, proves how far I am from maintaining the uncontrollable character

of our actions. It is not because those who accuse me of this absurdity, do not understand my principles; neither will I say that it is through ignorance, or through piety, that they have assumed so bitterly the character of censors of my doctrine. No; let us leave it to posterity to do justice to their motives and intentions, and let us pursue our own task of rectifying erroneous ideas.

Professor Ackermann of Heidelburg, whom my adversaries in Germany have adopted as their leader, and whom my adversaries in France have faithfully copied, has directed himself with a suspicious animosity against the innateness of the moral qualities and intellectual faculties. If these dispositions are innate, said he, we have done with moral liberty; our actions are inevitable, and malefactors of all kinds have gained their cause.* Observe to what means he has recourse to prove this consequence.

Objection.

"An organ is the real representation of the faculty itself. The organ being given, its action is so likewise. A muscle which contracts is a different muscle from one which is extended. This is the true definition of an organ; but it cannot be adapted to the trash of Dr. Gall, since he would be obliged to say, that the organs being given, their peculiar action is so likewise, which annihilates the liberty of man."

*

Compare with this passage, the remark of M. Moreau, de la Sarthe: Exposition of the system of Dr. Gall, extracted from the Decade Philosophique, etc. and the Journal de l' Empire; many passages in the Dictionnaire des Sciences Medicales; Tupper on Inquiry into Dr. Gall's System, etc.

20*

Reply.

All the objections of Ackermann turn upon the same false definition of organ, and I should be almost ashamed to regard them as worthy of the least attention, if they had not found so many partisans.

If the organ and the manifestation of its functions are the same thing, the organ cannot exist, unless its function takes place, and the agent must disappear every time the function ceases; consequences which Professor Ackermann himself derives immediately from his definition. Thus, not to lose an organ, we must keep them all in eternal activity, together; we must always, and at the same time, taste, smell, hear, look, touch, run, sing, dance, speak, eat, think, learn by heart, judge, will, &c. In sleep, all the organs of animal life would disappear. Who does not see the absurdity of Ackermann's definition, and, consequently, the absurdity of his whole argument?

I call an organ, the material condition which renders possible the exercise or the manifestation of a faculty. According to this definition, it may be conceived that no exercise of a faculty is possible without an organ, but that the organ may exist without the faculty to which it belongs, being put in exercise.

*

Professor Ackermann will have it, that men cannot refrain from doing things, for which they have received material conditions or organs. He does not perceive that he contradicts himself. According to him, the cochlea of the ear is the organ of music; according to him, too, the thalami nervorum opticorum, (couches optiques,) and well-organized senses are the organs of the imitative arts;† he likewise maintains that the organ of painting is a practised eye. Now, if it be

⚫ L. c. § 157.

+ L. c. § 160.

+ L. c. § 156.

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