starvation. It is a generally sound maxim, that the competition of traders ultimately adjusts prices to a fairer standard than would be fixed by legislative interference. But this maxim does not always apply in cases where the rivalry of companies, having large quantities of fixed capital, exists. It is a generally sound maxim, that governments ought not to regulate prices; yet, in cases such as public carriages, where a delay even of a few minutes would be highly inconvenient, and extortion would therefore be practised, such an interference may be expedient.

Now, such exceptions as these are not real exceptions, or rather they are only exceptions because the rule, for the sake of brevity in statement, and from the infirmity of language, is made unnecessarily wide. The rule and the exception, in fact, represent the operation of distinct causes or social laws, but the rule represents the prevailing, the exception the rarer cause. Hence, for ordinary purposes, the one is erected into a general maxim or precept, and the latter is arranged under it as a subordinate or exceptional case. Each, however, has its own principle, which, by a careful and precise analysis, might be separately enounced. For example, the maxim respecting the interference of government in manufactures might be so qualified, as to exclude the cases which are called exceptional. When brought into this state, it would be more cumbrous and complex, but, at the same time, more precise, and less likely to mislead.

In applying a maxim to practice, the hypotheses assumed in the formation of the maxim should be attended to, in order that it may be seen that they coincide with the actual case. If they do not, the maxim is probably inapplicable. If, for example, the maxim assumes an ordinary state of things, and if we have to deal with an extraordinary state of things, its applicability may be reasonably doubted. If a maxim as to the operation of competition, and the interference of the government with the prices of the market, supposes the competition of individual dealers in articles which can be easily moved, and of which the quantity at any given place may be increased or diminished ad libitum, it is possible that it does not apply to the competition of

companies, in articles which are fixed to one place, and which cannot be easily augmented or reduced in quantity.

It is in the comparison between the hypothetical circumstances which form the basis of the major premise, with the actual circumstances which constitute the minor premise, that the difficulty of applying political theory to practice mainly consists. Such a comparison leads to the mutual adaptation of the two premises, or rather to the more accurate determination of the major premise, according to the circumstances of the case enounced in the minor premise which the argument requires. By considering the relation of the hypotheses assumed in the pure theory to the complex facts of the case before him, the politician is able to form a general maxim, which he applies to the case, and which leads him to the practical conclusion of which he is in search. For the proper conduct of this process, no rules more precise than those suggested in a former chapter(1) can perhaps be given. Nor can any system of rules, on this or any other subject, either equalize natural powers, or render the exercise of judgment at the moment of action unnecessary. Happy tact and natural sagacity, combined with experience, may hit the right course more effectually than a slower and more systematic understanding, assisted by a knowledge of rules. But a comprehension of the logical process which must be gone through (whether it be perceived by the reasoner himself or not) would facilitate and guide the exercise even of the strongest natural powers, while it enables a less vigorous or rapid mind to make the best use of more limited means.

No theory can be sufficiently minute and detailed in its exposition, nor can any art or system of practical rules, founded upon it, be sufficiently varied and elastic, to meet all the exigencies of political practice without adaptation. Now, in order that this process of adaptation should be properly made, it is necessary that the practician should have a mastery of the scientific theorems or the rules of art which he handles. He should un

(10) Above, ch. xx.

derstand distinctly how much and how little they imply-what is the foundation on which they have been constructed. If with this knowledge he combines a complete survey and clear appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case with which he has to deal, and if, moreover, he understands the logical mechanism of the process which he has to conduct, and can handle easily the tools with which he has to work, he is in the best position for the solution of his practical problem in which he can place himself, by any exertion dependent on himself. The process is in itself essentially difficult-no excellence of theory or of rules of art, no skill or experience in their application to practice, no felicity of natural powers, can furnish any infallible preservative against error. The road is flanked by pitfalls, into which the most keen-sighted and wary traveller will sometimes fall. Certainly, there is no subject in which the presumptuous confidence of the self-appointed guides who meet us at every turn is less justifiable. At the same time, we are not to suppose that, because a process is difficult, means cannot be found for regulating our discretion or that because we may be liable to slip and fall, we can never learn to stand. There is no subject on which sound rules are so useful, as one which is admitted to be of paramount importance, and of great difficulty and intricacy.(")

§ 4 A third cause of erroneous political practice is when the argument is founded, not upon a general maxim, but upon a precedent or a real model, and, instead of a good precedent or model, a bad one is selected.

We have, in a former chapter, examined the process of reasoning from precedents and real models, and have seen that, although the argument implies a general principle, connecting the two cases, that principle is frequently not expressed. (1) Whether, however, it be expressed or not, if the precedent chosen be an unsound one, the argument founded upon it must lead to an erro

(11) Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium, atque in maximis rebus errantium.-Cic. de Off. ii. 2.

(12) Above, ch. xxi. § 4.

neous practical conclusion; if the real model be unworthy of imitation, the copy must partake of the defects of the original.

The commonest instances of defective precedent are where a routine has been established in any department of public business, whether legislative or executive, and the previous practice is perpetuated simply because it is consecrated by custom, and in spite of the valid objections to which it may be liable. In all the semi-civilized countries, where society has assumed a stationary form, the unprogressive character of the government is owing, in great measure, to the servile and unthinking imitation of bad models, and to the mechanical perpetuation of a vicious system, indicated by existing practice and precedent. Much of the worst parts of an Oriental government is not derived from any maxims of policy, stated in a dogmatic form, but consists merely in a repetition of former measures-in a faithful reproduction of the policy heretofore pursued in the country. In a state of society such as this, the error consists, not in the following of precedents, but in the badness of the precedents which are followed. It is not merely that each generation treads in the steps of its predecessors, but that it follows steps which lead in a wrong direction. If the Persians and Turks, and other Mahometan communities, retained monogamy, as they now retain polygamy—if they retained local municipal institutions as they now retain provincial government by pachas, their adherence to precedent would not be deserving of censure.

§ 5 A fourth cause of erroneous political practice is when a good precedent, or an excellent real model, is selected as an authority, but is misapplied.

We have already seen that much judgment and much care is requisite, in order to make a correct use even of a good precedent. (13) The parallelism of the two cases-the example, and the case under consideration-must be well established before a safe practical conclusion can be drawn. For instance: there may be good precedents for a rapid procedure, and good precedents for a slow procedure; there may be good precedents for

(13) Above, ch. xxi. § 6.

action without previous inquiry, there may be good precedents for action with previous inquiry. But in order to make a correct application of these precedents respectively, it is necessary to examine the circumstances of each, and to apply them to the cases exhibiting similar circumstances. For example, it would be irrational to apply a precedent of legislative inquiry where the subject was complex, the facts imperfectly known, and many discordant opinions prevailed, and where, moreover, there was no pressing need of action, to the case of a general who was called upon for a decision in the midst of a campaign. In cases so manifestly dissimilar as those just suggested, nobody would perhaps think of employing one as a precedent for the other, or, if any such argument were used, its inapplicability would be easily exposed; but where the degrees of dissimilitude are less, the application of irrelevant precedents is often made, and, if the difference should be small, it becomes a hard matter for a perfectly competent judge-a person unbiassed, experienced, and well informed of the facts of each case-to form a confident opinion as to the applicability or non-applicability of the alleged precedent.

It happens not unfrequently, in the discussion of practical affairs, that rival precedents or real examples are cited, and that those who have to decide the question are called upon to judge as to the greater applicability of the one or the other to the case in hand. Inasmuch as no two cases are ever identical in all their circumstances, the comparison is instituted by omitting some of the circumstances of each, and by pointing out the resemblance between their residuary circumstances. Hence, if different portions of the case under consideration are selected for comparison, different precedents may be found, leading to different, or even to opposite conclusions. Thus, let us suppose that the case which stands for decision is composed of the circumstances 4+A'+A”+B+B'+B", and that one party in the debate adduce a precedent consisting of circumstances a+a+a"+c+c+c"; while the other party adduce a different precedent consisting of circumstances b+b'+b+d+d'+d" The former party treat the circumstances A, A', A′′ in the case for decision as material, and reject the others as immaterial.