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And infers a Necessity of Volition, as much as an abso-
lute Decree. jyi

Sect. XIII. Whether we suppose the Volitions of moral
Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or
not, yet they must be necessary, in such a Scale, as to
overthrow Arminian Liberty. 183

PART III.

Wherein is inquired, Whether any such Liberty of Will
as Arminians hold, be necessary to moral Agency, Vir-
tue and Vice, Praise and Dispraise, We.

SECT. I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet vir-
tuous and Praiseworthy. Pag. 188
Sect. II. The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of
Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet virtuous, praise-worthy,
rewardable, Sec. 194.
Sect. III. The Cafe of such as are given up of God to Sin,
and of fallen Men in general, proves moral Necessity
and Inability to be consistent with Blame-worthiness. 213
Sect. IV. Command, and Obligation to Obedience, con-
sistent with moral Inability to obey, 222
Sect. V. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours,
which is supposed to excuse in the Non-performance of
Things in themselves good, particularly considered. 237
Sect. VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to
Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it: and all, either
virtuous or vicious Habits 'or Inclinations, inconsistent
with Arminian Notions of Liberty, and moral Agency.

.249

Sect. VII. Arminian Notions of moral Agency incon-
sistent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in
either virtuous or vicious Actions. 260

PART IV.

Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Armi-
nians, in Support and Defence of their Notions of Li-
berty, moral Agency, &c. and against the opposite
Doctrine, are considered.

SECT. I. The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of the
Dispositions of. the Heart, and Acts of the Will,
lies not in their causes, but their Nature, 269
, Sect.

Sect. II, The Falseness and Inconjiflence of that metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency, which seems to be generally entertain'd by the Defenders of the foremenlion'd Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, etc. 278

Sect. 111. The Reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose Things which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame. 288

Sect. IV. It is agreeable to common Sense, and the natural Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. 297

Sect, V. Concerning those Objections, That this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding ot Sin or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain and to no Purpose; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines, in Affairs of Morality and Religion. 309

Sect. VI. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, That it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinion ol Mr. Hobbes.

Sect. VII. Concerning the Necessity of the divine Will.

323

Sect. VIII. Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of Gop'a Volitions, considered. 335

Sect- IX. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintain'd, That it makes God the Author of Sin. 354.

Sect. X. Concerning Sin'sfirfl Entrance into the World.

37°

Sect. XI. Of a supposed Inconft/lence of these Principles with God's moral Character. 379

Sect. XII. Of a supposed Tendency of these Principles to Atheism, and Licentiousness. 385

Sect. XIII. Concerning that Objection against the Reasoning by which the Calvinijlic Doctrine is supported, That it is metaphysical and abjirufe. 393

The CONCLUSION.

WHAT Treatment this Discourse may probably meet with from some Persons. 400 Consequences concerning several Calvinijlic Doctrines ; such a» an univerfali dtclfive Providtnce. 402

The The total Depravity and Corruption of Man's Nature. PART I.

403

Efficacious Grace. 404 An universal and absolute Decree; and absolute, eternal,

personal Eleclion. . 406

Particular Redemption. 40 7

Perseverance of Saints. 408 Concerning the Treatment which Cahini/lic'Wnteis and

Divines have met with. 410 The Unhappiness of the Change lately in many Protejiant

Countries. 411

The Boldness of some Writers. 412 The excellent Wisdom appearing in the holy Scriptures.

413

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Wherein are explained and stated various Terms and Things belonging to the subject of the ensuing Discourse.

Section I.

Concerning the Nature of the Will.

T may possibly be thought, that there is no great Need of going about to define or describe the Will; this Word being generally as well understood as any other Words we can use to explain it: And so perhaps it would be, had not Philosophers, Metaphysicians and Polemic Divines brought the Matter into obscurity by the Things they have faid of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to the greater Clearness in the following Discourse, to fay a few Things concerning it.

B And

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And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical Refining) is plainly, That by which the frlind chuses any Thing. The Faculty of the Will is that Faculty, or Power, or Principle of the Mind by which it is capable of causing. An Act of the Will is the fame as an Act of Chusing or Choice.

If any think 'tis a more perfect Definition of the Will, to fay, that it is that by which the Soul either causes or refuses; I am content with it: tho' I think that 'tis enough to fay, It's that by which the Soul chuses: For in every Act of the Will whatsoever, the Mind chuses one Thing rather than another;: it chuses something rather than the Contrary, or rather than the Want or Non-existence of that Thing. So in every Act of Refufal, the Mind chuses the Absence of the Thing refused; The Positive and the Negative are set before the Mind for its Choice, and it causes the Negative; and the Mind's making its Choice in that Cass e is properly the act of the Will: The Will's determining between the two is a voluntary determining; but that is the fame Thing as making a Choice. So that whatever Names we call the Act of the Will by, a Chusing, Refusing, Approving, Disapproving, Liking, Disiiking, Embracing, Rejecting, Determining, Directing, Commanding, Forbidding, Inclining or being averse to, being pleased or displeased with; all may be reduced to this of Chusing. For the Soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act eleftively.

Mr. Locke * fays, "The Will signifies Nothing "but a Power or Ability to prefer or chuse." And in the foregoing Page fays, " The Word Prefer"ring seems best to express the Act of Volition"

But

* Human Understanding. Edit. 7. Vol. I. p. 197.

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