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fer, or naturally lead to all the rest; yet I don't charge all that have held this Doctrine, with being Arminians. For whatever may be the Consequences of the Doctrine really, yet some that hold this Doctrine, may not own nor fee these Consequences; and it would be unjust, in many instances, to charge every Author with believing and maintaining all the real Consequences of his avowed Doctrines. And I desire it may be particularly noted, that though I have Occasion in the following Discourse, often to mention the Author of the Book entitled, An Ejay on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature, as holding that Notion of Freedom of Will, which I oppose; yet I don't mean to call him an Arminian: however in that Doctrine he agrees with Arminians, and departs from the current and general Opinion of Cahinijls. If the Author of that Essay be the fame as it is commonly ascribed to, he doubtless was not one that ought to bear that Name. But however good a Divine he was in many Respects, yet that particular Arminian Doctrine which he maintains, is never the better for being held by such an One, nor is there less Need of opposing it on that Account; but rather is there the more Need of it; as it will be likely to have the more pernicious Influence, tor being taught by a Divine of his Name and Character; supposing the Doctrine to be wrong, and in itself to be of an ill Tendency.


I have Nothing further to fay by Way of
Preface; but only to bespeak the Reader's
Candour, and calm Attention to what I have
written. The Subject is of such Importance,
as to demand Attention, and the most thorough
Consideration. Of all Kinds of Knowledge
that we can ever obtain, the Knowledge of
God, and the Knowledge of ourselves, are
the most important. As Religion is the great
Business, for which we are created, and on
which our Happiness depends; and as Reli-
gion consists in an intercourse between our-
selves and our Maker; and so has its Foun-
dation in God's Nature and ours, and in the
Relation that God and we stand in to each
other; therefore a true Knowledge of both
must be needful in Order to true Religion,
But the Knowledge of ourselves consists
chiefly in right Apprehensions concerning those
two chief Faculties of our Nature, the Under-*
standing and Will. Both are very important:
yet the Science of the latter must be confess'd
to be of greatest Moment ; in as much as all
Virtue and Religion have their Seat more im-
mediately in the Will, consisting more espe-
cially in right Acts and Habits of this Facul-
ty. And the grand Question about the Free-
dom of the Will, is the main Point that be-
longs to the Science of the Will. Therefore
I fay, the Importance of this Subject greatly
demands the Attention of Christians, and espe-
cially of Divines. But as to my Manner of
handling the subject, I will be far from pre-
suming to fay, that it is such as demands the

Attention of the Reader to what I have writ-
ten. I am ready to own, that in this Matter
I depend on the Reader's Courtesy. But only
thus far I may have some Colour for putting
in a Claim ; that if the Reader be disposed to
pass his Censure on what I have written, I
may be fully and patiently heard, and well
attended to, before I am condemned. How-
ever, this is what I would humbly cjk of my
Readers, together with the Prayers of all
sincere Lovers of Truth, that I may have
much of that Spirit which Christ promised his
Disciples, which guides into all Truth; and
that the blessed and powerful Influences of
this Spirit would make Truth victorious in
the World.

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Part I.

Wherein are explain'd various Terms and Tilings belong*
ing to the Subject of the ensuing Discourse.

SECT. I. Concerning the Nature of the Will.
Pag. i, 6fa

Sect. II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. 6

Sect. III. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Neces-
Jity, Impofiibility, Inability, &c, and of Contingence. 18

Sect. IV. Of the Distinction of natural and moral Ne-
cessity and Inability. 28

Sect. V. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of
moral Agency. 38


Wherein it is considered, Whether there is, or can bo
any such Sort of Freedom Of Will, as that wherein
Arminians place the Essence of the Liberty of all moral
Agents ; and whether any such Thing ever was, or can
be conceived of.

SECT. I. Shewing the manifest Inconsistence of the
Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in
the Will's self-determining Power. Pag. 44

Sect. II. Several supposed Ways of evading the foregoing
Reasoning considered. 50
Sect. III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition
in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its
Existence, 57
Sect. IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause,
thro' the Activity of the Nature of the Soul. 66
Sect. V. Shewing that if the Things asserted in these
Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are alto-
gether Impertinent, and can't help the Cause of Arms*
man Liberty; and how this being the State of the Cafe,
Arminian Writers are obliged to talkinconsi/lently. 72
Sect. VI. Concerning the Will's determining in Things
which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the
Mind. 78
Sect. VII. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will
consisting in Indifference. 88
Sect. VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will,
as opposite to all Necessity. 1 02

Sect. IX. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will
with the Dictates of the Under/landing. j 07

Sect. X. Volition necessarily connected with the Influ-
ence of Motives; with particular Observations on the
great Inconsistence of Mr. Cbubb's Assertions and Rea-
sonings, about the Freedom of the Will. 117
Sect. XI. The Evidence of God's certain Foreinow/edge of
the Volitions of moral Agents. 137
Sect. XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Vo-
litions of moral Agents, inconsistent with such a Con-
tingence. of those Volitipns, as is without all Necessity.


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