to the right Hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other: however, this feems to be a Refining only of fome particular Writers, and newly invented, and which will by no Means confift with the Manner of Expreffion used by the Defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. I wish fuch Refiners would thoroughly confider, whether they diftinctly know their own Meaning, when they make a Diftinction between Indifference of the Soul as to its Power or Ability of Willing or Chufing, and the Soul's Indifference as to the Preference or Choice itself; and whether they don't deceive themselves in imagining that they have any diftinct Meaning at all, The Indifference of the Soul as to its Ability or Power to Will, must be the fame Thing as the Indifference of the State of the Power or Faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the State which the Soul itfelf, which has that Power or Faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the Exercife of that Power, in the Choice it fhall by and by make.

But not to infift any longer on the Abftrufeness and Inexplicableness of this Diftinction; let what will be fuppofed concerning the Meaning of them that make Ufe of it, thus much muft at least be intended by Arminians, when they talk of Indifference as effential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any Thing, in any Refpect to their Purpose, viz. That it is fuch an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already; but free from actual Poffeffion, and vacant of Predetermination, fo far, that there may be Room for the Exercise of the Self-determining Power of the Will; and that the Will's Freedon confifts in, or depends upon this Vacancy and Opportunity that is left for the Will itself to be the Determiner of the Act that is to be the free Act.

And

And here I would obferve in the first Place, that to make out this Scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be perfect and abfolute; there must be a perfect Freedom from all antecedent Preponderation or Inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own fovereign Power on itself, then its Inclination is not wholly owing to itfelf: If when two Opposites are proposed to the Soul for its Choice, the Propofal don't find the Soul wholly in a State of Indifference, then it is not found in a State of Liberty for mere Self-determination.The least Degree of antecedent Bias must be inconfiftent with their Notion of Liberty: For fo long as prior Inclination poffeffes the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, fo that it is utterly impoffible that the Will fhould act otherwife than agreeably to it. Surely the Will can't act or chufe contrary to a remaining prevailing Inclination of the Will. To fuppofe otherwise, would be the fame Thing as to fuppofe, that the Will is inclined contrary to its prefent prevailing Inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will chufes and prefers, that, all Things confidered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impoffible for the Will to chufe contrary to its own remaining and prefent preponderating Inclination, as 'tis to prefer contrary to its own prefent Preference, or chufe contrary to its own prefent Choice. The Will therefore, fo long as it is under the Influence of an old preponderating Inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free Act, or any At that fhall now be an Act of Self-determination. The Act which is a Self-determin'd free Act, must be an Act which the Will determines in the Poffeffion and Use of fuch a Liberty, as confifts in a Freedom from every Thing, which, if it were there, would make it impoffible that the Will, at that

Time,

Time, fhould be otherwife than that Way to which it tends.

If any one should fay, there is no Need that the Indifference should be perfect; but altho' a former Inclination and Preference ftill remains, yet, if it ben't very strong and violent, poffibly the Strength of the Will may oppofe and overcome it.

This is grofly abfurd; for the Strength of the Will, let it be ever fo great, does not at all enable it to act one Way, and not the contrary Way, both at the fame Time. It gives it no fuch Sovereignty and Command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the fame Time, or to chufe contrary to its own prefent Choice,

Therefore, if there be the leaft Degree of antecedent Preponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at Liberty to determine itself the contrary Way. And if the Will determines itself the fame Way, it is not a free Determination, because the Will is not wholly at Liberty in fo doing: Its Determination is not altogether from itself, but it was partly determined before, in its prior Inclination: And all the Freedom the Will exercifes in the Cafe, is in an Increase of Inclination, which it gives itself, over and above what it had by the foregoing Bias ; fo much is from itself, and fo much is from perfect Indifference. For tho' the Will had a previous Tendency that Way, yet as to that additional Degree of Inclination, it had no Tendency. Therefore the previous Tendency is of no Confideration, with Refpect to the Act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the fame Thing which was said at first, that as to the Act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be perfect Indifference, or Equilibrium.

To

To illuftrate this; If we fhould fuppofe a fovereign Self-moving Power in a natural Body: But that the Body is in Motion already, by an antecedent Bias; for Instance, Gravitation towards the Center of the Earth; and has one Degree of Motion already, by Virtue of that previous Tendency; but by its felf-moving Power it adds one Degree more to its Motion, and moves fo much more fwiftly towards the Center of the Earth than it would do by its Gravity only: It is evident, that all that is owing to a felf-moving Power in this Cafe, is the additional Degree of Motion; and that the other Degree of Motion which it had from Gravity, is of no Confideration in the Cafe, don't help the Effect of the free felf-moving Power in the leaft; the Effect is just the fame, as if the Body had received from itself one Degree of Motion from a State of perfect Reft. So if we fhould fuppofe a self-moving Power given to the Scale of a Balance, which has a Weight of one Degree beyond the oppofite Scale; and we afcribe to it an Ability to add to itself another Degree of Force the fame Way, by its felf-moving Power; This is just the fame Thing as to afcribe to it a Power to give itself one Degree of Preponderation from a perfect Equilibrium; and fo much Power as the Scale has to give itfelf an Over-balance from a perfect Equipoife, fo much felf-moving felf-preponderating Power it has, and no more. So that its free Power this Way is always to be measured from perfect Equilibrium.

I need fay no more to prove, that, if Indifference be effential to Liberty, it must be perfe& Indifference ; and that fo far as the Will is deftitute of this, fo far it is deftitute of that Freedom by which it is its own Mafter, and in a Capacity of being its own Determiner, without being at

all

all paffive, or fubject to the Power and Sway of fomething else, in its Motions and Determinations.

Having obferved thefe Things, let us now try whether this Notion of the Liberty of Will confifting in Indifference and Equilibrium, and the Will's Self-determination in fuch a State, be not abfurd and inconfiftent.

And here I would lay down this as an Axiom of undoubted Truth; That every free Act is done in a State of Freedom, and not only after fuch a State. If an Act of the Will be an Act wherein the Soul is free, it must be exerted in a State of Freedom, and in the Time of Freedom. It will not fuffice, that the Act immediately follows a State of Liberty but Liberty muft yet continue, and co-exift with the Act; the Soul remaining in Poffeffion of Liberty. Because that is the Notion of a free A& of the Soul, even an Act wherein the Soul ufes or exercises Liberty. But if the Soul is not, in the very Time of the Act, in the Poffeffion of Liberty, it can't at that Time be in the Use of it.

Now the Question is, whether ever the Soul of

Man puts forth any Act of Will, while it yet remains in a State of Liberty, in that Notion of a State of Liberty, viz. as implying a State of Indifference; or whether the Soul ever exerts an Act of Choice or Preference, while at that very Time the Will is in a perfect Equilibrium, not inclining one Way more than another. The very putting of the Question is fufficient to fhew the Abfurdity of the affirmative Answer: For how ridiculous would it be for any Body to infift, that the Soul chufes one Thing before another, when at the very fame Instant it is perfectly indifferent with

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