ways be fo among a Number of Objects in View, one will prevail in the Eye, or in Idea beyond others. When we have our Eyes open in the clear Sun-fhine, many Objects ftrike the Eye at once, and innumerable Images may be at once painted in it by the Rays of Light; but the Attention of the Mind is not equal to feveral of them at once; or if it be, it don't continue fo for any Time. And fo it is with Refpect to the Ideas of the Mind in general: Several Ideas are not in equal Strength in the Mind's View and Notice at once; or at leaft, don't remain fo for any fenfible Continuance. There is nothing in the World more conftantly varying, than the Ideas of the Mind: They don't remain precifely in the fame State for the leaft perceivable Space of Time: as is evident by this, That all perceivable Time is judged and perceived by the Mind only by the Succeffion or the fucceffive Changes of its own Ideas. Therefore while the Views or Perceptions of the Mind remain precifely in the fame State, there is no perceivable Space or Length of Time, because no fenfible Succeffion at all.

As the Acts of the Will, in each Step of the fore-mentioned Procedure, don't come to pass without a particular Caufe, every Act is owing to a prevailing Inducement; fo the Accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unfearchable Course of Things, to which the Mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any Thing that comes to pafs without a Cause; and the Mind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething that has no Caufe; any more than if it determined to be guided by a Lot, or the cafting of a Die. For tho' the Die's falling in fuch a Manner be accidental to him that cafts it, yet none will fuppofe that there is no

G 3

Caufe

Cause why it falls as it does. The involuntary Changes in the Succeffion of our Ideas, tho' the Caufe may not be observed, have as much a Cause, as the changeable Motions of the Motes that float in the Air, or the continual, infinitely various, fucceffive Changes of the Uneveneffes on the Surface of the Water.

There are two Things efpecially, which are probably the Occafions of Confufion in the Minds of them who infift upon it, that the Will acts in a proper Indifference, and without being moved by any Inducement, in its Determinations in fuch Cafes as have been mentioned.

1. They feem to mistake the Point in Question, or at least not to keep it diftinctly in View. The Question they difpute about, is, Whether the Mind be indifferent about the Objects prefented, one of which is to be taken, touch'd, pointed to, &c., as two Eggs, two Cakes, which appear equally good, Whereas the Question to be confidered, is, Whether the Perfon be indifferent with Refpect to his own Actions; whether he don't, on fome Confideration or other, prefer one Act with Refpect to thefe Objects before another. The Mind in its Determination and Choice, in thefe Cafes, is not most immediately and directly converfant about the Objects prefented; but the Acts to be done concerning these Objects. The Objects may appear equal, and the Mind may never properly make any Choice between them: But the next Act of the Will being about the external Actions to be performed, Taking, Touching, &c. thefe may not appear equal, and one Action may properly be chofen before another. In each Step of the Mind's Progrefs, the Determination is not about the Objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the Actions, which it chufes for

other

other Reasons than any Preference of the Objects, and for Reasons not taken at all from the Objects.

There is no Neceffity of fuppofing, that the Mind does ever at all properly chufe one of the Objects before another, either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the Man chufes to take or touch one rather than another; but not because he chufes the Thing taken, or touch'd; but from foreign Confiderations. The Cafe may be fo, that of two Things offered, a Man may, for certain Reasons, chufe and prefer the taking of that which he undervalues, and chufe to neglect to take that which his Mind prefers. In fuch a Cafe, chufing the Thing taken, and chufing to take, are diverse : and fo they are in a Cafe where the Things prefented are equal in the Mind's Efteem, and neither of them preferred. All that Fact and Experience makes evident, is, that the Mind chufes one Action rather than another. And therefore the Arguments which they bring, in order to be to their Purpose, ought to be to prove that the Mind chufes the Action in perfect Indifference, with Refpect to that Action; and not to prove that the Mind chufes the Action in perfect Indifference with Respect to the Object; which is very poffible, and yet the Will not act at all without prevalent Inducement, and proper Preponderation.

2. Another Reason of Confufion and Difficulty in this Matter, feems to be, not diftinguishing between a general Indifference, or an Indifference with Refpect to what is to be done in a more diftant and general View of it, and a particular Indifference, or an Indifference with Refpect to the next immediate Act, view'd with its particular and present Circumftances. A Man may be perfectly indifferent with Respect to his own Actions,

in the former Refpect; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing Inftance of touching one of the Squares of a Chefs-board; when 'tis first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch; because as yet I view the Matter remotely and generally, being but in the firft Step of the Mind's Progress in the Affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the last Step, and the very next Thing to be determined is, which is to be touch'd, having already determined that I will touch that which happens to be most in my Eye or Mind, and my Mind being now fix'd on a particular one, the Act of touching that, confidered thus immediately, and in these particular prefent Circumstances, is not what my Mind is abfolutely indifferent about.

Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will con◄ fifting in Indifference.

HAT has been faid in the foregoing Sec

W tion, has a Tendency in fome Measure to

evince the Abfurdity of the Opinion of fuch as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that Equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent Determination or Bias, and left hitherto free from any prepoffeffing Inclination to one Side or the other; that fo the Determination of the Will to either Side may be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own Power, and that Sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this Way rather than that

*

But

Dr. Whitby, and fome other Arminians, make a Distinc tion of different Kinds of Freedom; one of God, and per

fect

But in as much as this has been of fuch long standing, and has been fo generally received, and fo much infifted on by Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Fefuits, Socinians, Arminians, and others, it may deferve a more full Confideration. And therefore I fhall now proceed to a more particular and thorough Inquiry into this Notion.

Now left fome fhould fuppofe that I don't understand those that place Liberty in Indifference, or fhould charge me with mifreprefenting their Opinion, I would fignify, that I am fenfible, there are fome, who when they talk of the Liberty of the Will as confifting in Indifference, exprefs themselves as tho' they would not be understood of the Indifference of the Inclination or Tendency of the Will, but of, I know not what, Indifference of the Soul's Power of Willing; or that the Will, with Refpect to its Power or Ability to chufe, is indifferent, can go either Way indifferently, either

to

299.

fect Spirits above; another of Perfons in a State of Trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to confift with Neceffity; the latter he holds to be without Neceflity: And this latter he fuppofes to be requifite to our being the Subjects of Praise or Difpraife, Rewards or Punishments, Precepts and Prohibitions, Promifes and Threats, Exhortations and Dehortations, and a Covenant-Treaty. And to this Freedom he fapposes Indifference to be requifite. In his Difcourfe on the five Points, P. 300, he fays; It is a Freedom (fpeaking of a Freedom not only from Co-action, but from Neceffity) requifite, as we "conceive, to render us capable of Trial or Probation, and to "render our Actions worthy of Praise or Difpraife, and our "Persons of Rewards or Punishments." And in the next Page, fpeaking of the fame Matter, He says, "Excellent to this "Purpose, are the Words of Mr. Thorndike: We fay not, that "Indifference is requifite to all Freedom, but to the Freedom of Man "alone in this State of Travail and Proficience: the Ground of "which is God's Tender of a Treaty, and Conditions of Peace and "Reconcilement to fallen Man, together with thofe Precepts and "Prohibitions, thofe Promifes and Threats, thofe Exhortations and "Debortations, it is enforced with."