Suppofition. 'Tis true, the Subftance of the Soul before it acts, and before there is any Difference in that Respect, may be in a different State and Circumstances: But thofe whom I oppofe, will not allow the different Circumstances of the Soul to be the determining Causes of the Acts of the Will; as being contrary to their Notion of Self-determination and Self-motion.

5. Let us fuppofe, as thefe Divines do, that there are no Acts of the Soul, ftrictly speaking, but free Volitions; Then it will follow, that the Soul is an active Being in Nothing further than it is a voluntary or elective Being; and whenever it produces Effects actively, it produces Effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce Effects thus, is the fame Thing as to produce Effects in Confequence of, and according to its own Choice. And if fo, then furely the Soul don't by its Activity produce all its own Acts of Will or Choice themselves For this, by the Suppofition, is to produce all its free Acts of Choice voluntarily and electively, or in Confequence of its own free Acts of Choice, which brings the Matter directly to the fore-mentioned Contradiction, of a free Act of Choice before the firft free Act of Choice. According to thefe Gentlemen's own Notion of Action, if there arifes in the Mind a Volition without a free Act of the Will or Choice to determine and produce it, the Mind is not the active voluntary Cause of that Volition; because it don't arise from, nor is regulated by Choice or Defign. And therefore it can't be, that the Mind fhould be the active, voluntary, determining Cause of the firft and leading Volition that relates to the Affair. The Mind's being a defigning Caufe, only enables it to produce Effects in Confequence of its Defign, it will not enable it to be the designing Caufe of

all

all its own Designs. The Mind's being an elective Caufe, will only enable it to produce Effects in Confequence of its Elections, and according to them; but can't enable it to be the elective Cause of all its own Elections; because that fuppofes an Election before the firft Election. So the Mind's being an active Caufe enables it to produce Effects in Confequence of its own Acts, but can't enable it to be the determining Cause of all its own Acts; for that is ftill in the fame Manner a Contradiction; as it fuppofes a determining Act converfant about the firft Act, and prior to it, having a caufal Influence on its Existence, and Manner of Existence.

I can conceive of Nothing else that can be meant by the Soul's having Power to cause and determine its own Volitions, as a Being to whom God has given a Power of Action, but this; that God has given Power to the Soul, fometimes at least, to excite Volitions at its Pleafure, or according as it chufes. And this certainly fuppofes, in all fuch Cafes, a Choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caufed, even the first of them. Which runs into the fore-mentioned great Abfurdity.

Therefore the Activity of the Nature of the Soul affords no Relief from the Difficulties which the Notion of a Self-determining Power in the Will is attended with, nor will it help, in the leaft, its Abfurdities and Inconfiftences.

Shewing, that if the Things afferted in these Evafions fhould be fuppofed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the Caufe of Arminian Liberty; And how (this being the State of the Cafe) Arminian Writers are obliged to talk inconfiftently.

W

HAT was last obferved in the preceding Section may fhew, not only that the active Nature of the Soul can't be a Reason why an A&t of the Will is, or why it is in this Manner, rather than another; but alfo that if it could be fo, and it could be proved that Volitions are contingent Events, in that Senfe, that their Being and Manner of Being is not fix'd or determined by any Caufe, or any Thing antecedent; it would not at all ferve the Purpose of Arminians, to establish the Freedom of the Will, according to their Notion of its Freedom, as confifting in the Will's Determination of itself; which fuppofes every free A& of the Will to be determined by fome Act of the Will going before to determine it; in as much as for the Will to determine a Thing, is the fame as for the Soul to determine a Thing by Willing; for there is no Way that the Will can determine an Act of the Will, but by willing that Act of the Will, or, which is the fame Thing, chufing it. So that here must be two Acts of the Will in the Cafe, one going before another, one converfant about the other, and the latter the Object of the former, and chofen by the former. If the Will don't cause and determine the Act by Choice, it don't cause or determine it at all; for that which

is not determined by Choice, is not determined voluntarily or willingly: And to fay, that the Will determines fomething which the Soul don't determine willingly, is as much as to fay, that fomething is done by the Will, which the Soul don't do with its Will.

So that if Arminian Liberty of Will, confifting in the Will's determining its own Acts, be maintained, the old Abfurdity and Contradiction must be maintained, that every free Act of Will is caused and determined by a foregoing free Act of Will Which don't confift with the free Act's arifing without any Caufe, and being fo contingent, as not to be fix'd by any Thing fore-going. So that this Evasion must be given up, as not at all relieving, and as that which, inftead of fupporting this Sort of Liberty, directly destroys it.

And if it should be fuppofed, that the Soul determines its own Acts of Will fome other Way, than by a foregoing Act of Will; ftill it will not help the Cause of their Liberty of Will. If it determines them by an Act of the Understanding, or fome other Power, then the Will don't determine itself, and fo the Self-determining Power of the Will is given up. And what Liberty is there exercised, according to their own Opinion of Liberty, by the Soul's being determined by fomething befides its own Choice? The Acts of the Will, it is true, may be directed, and effectually determined and fix'd; but it is not done by the Soul's own Will and Pleafure: There is no Exercife at all of Choice or Will in producing the Effect: And if Will and Choice are not exercised in it, how is the Liberty of the Will exercifed in it?

So

So that let Arminians turn which Way they please with their Notion of Liberty, confifting in the Will's determining its own Acts, their Notion destroys itself. If they hold every free Act of Will to be determined by the Soul's own free Choice, or foregoing free Act of Will; foregoing, either in the Order of Time, or Nature; it implies that grofs Contradiction, that the firft free Act belonging to the Affair, is determined by a free Act which is before it. Or if they fay that the free Acts of the Will are determined by fome other Att of the Soul, and not an Act of Will or Choice; this also destroys their Notion of Liberty, confifting in the Acts of the Will being determined by the Will itself. Or if they hold that the Acts of the Will are determined by Nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in that Senfe, that they are determined and fixed by no Caufe at all; this alfo destroys their Notion of Liberty, confifting in the Will's determining its own Acts.

*

This being the true State of the Arminian Notion of Liberty, it hence comes to pass, that the Writers that defend it are forced into grofs Inconfiftences, in what they say upon this Subject. To instance in Dr. Whitby; he in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the Will, oppofes the Opinion of the Calvinists, who place Man's Liberty only in a Power of doing what He will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himfelf mentions the very fame Notion of Liberty, as the Dictate of the Senfe and common Reason of Mankind, and a Rule laid down by the Light of Nature; viz. that Liberty is a Power of acting from our Selves, or DOING WHAT WE WILL. + This is

* In his Book on the five Points, 2d Edit. p. 350, 351, 352. + Ibid. p. 325, 326.