If any should imagine, there is fomething in the Sort of Event that renders it poffible for it to come into Exiftence without a Caufe; and fhould fay, that the free Acts of the Will are Existences of an exceeding different Nature from other Things; by Reason of which they may come into Existence without any previous Ground or Reason of it, tho' other Things cannot; If they make this Objection in good Earneft, it would be an Evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves: For they would be giving an Account of fome Ground of the Exiftence of a Thing, when at the fame Time they would maintain there is no Ground of its Existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular Nature of Existence, be it ever fo diverse from others, can lay no Foundation for that Thing's coming into Existence without a Cause; becaufe to fuppofe this, would be to fuppofe the particular Nature of Existence to be a Thing prior to the Exiftence; and fo a Thing which makes Way for Existence, with fuch a Circumftance, namely without a Caufe or Reafon of Existence. But that which in any Refpect makes Way for a Thing's coming into Being, or for any Manner or Circumftance of its firft Existence, must be prior to the Existence. The distinguish'd Nature of the Effect, which is fomething belonging to the Effect, can't have Influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar Nature of that Thing called Volition, can do Nothing, can have. no Influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its Influence: for then the Thing has made fure of Existence already, without its Help.

So that it is indeed as repugnant to Reason, to fuppofe that an Act of the Will fhould come into Existence without a Caufe, as to fuppofe the huF

man

man Soul, or an Angel, or the Globe of the Earth, or the whole Univerfe, fhould come into Existence without a Caufe. And if once we allow, that fuch a Sort of Effect as a Volition may come to pafs without a Caufe, how do we know but that many other Sorts of Effects may do fo too? "Tis not the particular Kind of Effect that makes the Abfurdity of fuppofing it has Being without a Caufe, but fomething which is common to all Things that ever begin to be, viz. that they are not Self-existent, or neceffary in the Nature of Things.

SECTION IV.

Whether Volition can arife without a Caufe, through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.

TH

HE Author of the Effay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures, in Answer to that Objection against his Doctrine of a Self-determining Power in the Will, (P. 68, 69.) That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a fufficient Reafon why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another, allows that it is thus in corporeal Things, which are properly and philofophically speaking paffive Beings; but denies that it is thus in Spirits, which are Beings of an active Nature, who have the Spring of Action within themfelves, and can determine themfelves. By which it is plainly fuppofed, that fuch an Event as an Act of the Will, may come to pass in a Spirit, without a fufficient Reason why it comes to pafs, or why it is after this Manner, rather than another; by Reafon of the Activity of the Nature of a Spirit. But certainly this Au

thor,

thor, in this Matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,

1. The Objection or Difficulty proposed by this Author, feems to be forgotten in his Anfwer or Solution. The very Difficulty, as he himself propofes it, is this; How an Event can come to pass without a fufficient Reafon why it is, or why it is in this Manner rather than another? Instead of solving this Difficulty, or anfwering this Question with Regard to Volition, as he propofes, he forgets himself, and answers another Question quite diverfe, and wholly inconfiftent with this, viz. What is a fufficient Reason why it is, and why it is in this Manner rather than another? And he affign's the Active Being's own Determination as the Cause, and a Caufe fufficient for the Effect; and leaves all the Difficulty unrefolved, and the Queftion unanswered, which yet returns, even, How the Soul's own Determination, which he speaks of, came to exift, and to be what it was without a Caufe? The Activity of the Soul may enable it to be the Caufe of Effects; but it don't at all enable or help it to be the Subject of Effects which have no Cause; which is the Thing this Author fupposes concerning Acts of the Will. Activity of Nature will no more enable a Being to produce Effects, and determine the Manner of their Exiftence, within itself, without a Cause, than out of itself, in fome other Being. But if an active Being fhould, through its Activity, produce and determine an Effect in fome external Object, how abfurd would it be to fay, that the Effect was produced without a Cause!

2. The Question is not fo much, How a Spirit endowed with Activity comes to act, as why it exerts fuch an Act, and not another; or why it F 2

acts

acts with fuch a particular Determination? If Activity of Nature be the Caufe why a Spirit (the Soul of Man for Instance) acts, and don't lie ftill; yet that alone is not the Cause why its Action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Active Nature is a general Thing; 'tis an Ability or Tendency of Nature to Action, generally taken; which may be a Caufe why the Soul acts as Occafion or Reason is given; but this alone can't be a fufficient Cause why the Soul exerts fuch a particular Act, at fuch a Time, rather than others. In order to this, there must be fomething besides a general Tendency to Action; there must also be a particular Tendency to that individual Action.If it fhould be asked, why the Soul of Man ufes its Activity in fuch a Manner as it does; and it fhould be answered, that the Soul ufes its Activity thus, rather than otherwife, because it has Activity; would fuch an Answer fatisfy a rational Man? Would it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one?

3. An active Being can bring no Effects to pass by his Activity, but what are confequent upon his acting: He produces nothing by his Activity, any other Way than by the Exercife of his Activity, and fo Nothing but the Fruits of its Exercife He brings Nothing to pass by a dormant Activity. But the Exercife of his Activity is Action; and fo his Action or Exercife of his Activity, must be prior to the Effects of his Activity. If an active Being produces an Effect in another Being, about which his Activity is converfant, the Effect being the Fruit of his Activity, his Activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the Effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal Reafon, if the active Being is his own Object, and his Activity is converfant about Him

felf,

felf, to produce and determine fome Effect in himfelf; ftill the Exercise of his Activity must go before the Effect, which he brings to pafs and determines by it. And therefore his Activity can't be the Cause of the Determination of the first Action, or Exercife of Activity itfelf, whence the Effects of Activity arife; for that would imply a Contradiction; It would be to fay, the first Exercife of Activity is before the first Exercise of Activity, and is the Caufe of it.

4. That the Soul, though an active Substance, can't diverfify its own Acts, but by firft acting; or be a determining Caufe of different Acts, or any different Effects, fometimes of one Kind, and fometimes of another, any other Way than in Confequence of its own diverfe Acts, is manifest by this; That if fo, then the fame Caufe, the fame caufal Power, Force or Influence, without Variation in any Refpect, would produce different Effects at different Times. For the fame Subftance of the

Soul before it acts, and the fame active Nature of the Soul before it is exerted (i. e. before in the Order of Nature) would be the Cause of different Effects, viz. different Volitions at different Times. But the Subftance of the Soul before it acts, and its active Nature before it is exerted, are the fame without Variation. For 'tis fome Act that makes the first Variation in the Caufe, as to any caufal Exertion, Force or Influence. But if it be so, that the Soul has no different Caufality, or diverfe caufal Force or Influence, in producing these diverse Effects; then 'tis evident, that the Soul has no Influence, no Hand in the Diversity of the Effect; and that the Difference of the Effect can't be owing to any Thing in the Soul; or which is the fame Thing, the Soul don't determine the Diversity of the Effect; which is contrary to the