Conclufion or Choice as it does? or, what is the Caufe, Ground or Reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwife? Now it must be answered, according to the Arminian Notion of Freedom, that the Will influences, orders and determines itself thus to Act. And if it does, I fay, it must be by fome antecedent Act. To fay, it is caused, influenced and determined by fomething, and yet not determined by any Thing antecedent, either in Order of Time or Nature, is a Contradiction. For that is what is meant by a Thing's being prior in the Order of Nature, that it is fome Way the Cause or Reason of the Thing, with Refpect to which it is faid to be prior.

If the particular Act or Exertion of Will, which comes into Existence, be any Thing properly determined at all, then it has fome Cause of its exifting, and of its exifting in fuch a particular determinate Manner, and not another; fome Cause, whofe Influence decides the Matter: which Caufe is diftinct from the Effect, and prior to it. But to fay, that the Will or Mind orders, influences and determines itfelf to exert fuch an Act as it does, by the very Exertion itself, is to make the Exertion both Caufe and Effect; or the exerting fuch an Act, to be a Cause of the Exertion of fuch an Act. For the Question is, What is the Caufe and Reason of the Soul's exerting fuch an Act? To which the Anfwer is, the Soul exerts fuch an Act, and that is the Cause of it. And fo, by this, the Exertion must be prior in the Order of Nature to itself, and distinct from itself.

(3.) If the Meaning be, that the Soul's Exertion of fuch a particular Act of Will, is a Thing that comes to pafs of itself, without any Cause; and that there is abfolutely no Ground or Reafon

of the Soul's being determined to exert fuch a Volition, and make fuch a Choice, rather than another; I fay, if this be the Meaning of Arminians, when they contend fo earnestly for the Will's determining its own Acts, and for Liberty of Will confifting in Self-determining Power; they do nothing but confound Themfelves and others with Words without a Meaning. In the Queftion, What determines the Will? and in their Answer, that the Will determines itfelf, and in all the Dif pute about it, it feems to be taken for granted, that fomething determines the Will; and the Controverfy on this Head is not, whether any Thing at all determines it, or whether its Determination has any Caufe or Foundation at all: But where the Foundation of it is, whether in the Will itself, or fomewhere elfe. But if the Thing intended be what is above-mention'd, then all comes to this, that Nothing at all determines the Will; Volition having abfolutely no Cause or Foundation of its Exiftence, either within, or without. There is a great Noife made about Selfdetermining Power, as the Source of all free Acts of the Will: But when the Matter comes to be explained, the Meaning is, that no Power at all is the Source of thefe Acts, neither Self-determining Power, nor any other, but they arise from Nothing; no Caufe, no Power, no Influence, being at all concern'd in the Matter.

However, this very Thing, even that the free Acts of the Will are Events which come to pafs without a Caufe, is certainly implied in the Armi nian Notion of Liberty of Will; tho' it be very inconfiftent with many other Things in their Scheme, and répugnant to fome Things implied in their Notion of Liberty. Their Opinion- implies, that the particular Determination of Voli

tion is without any Caufe; because they hold the free Acts of the Will to be Contingent Events; and Contingence is effential to Freedom in their Notion of it. But certainly, thofe Things which have a prior Ground and Reafon of their particular Existence, a Caufe which antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are, don't happen contingently. If fomething foregoing, by a caufal Influence and Connection, determines and fixes precifely their coming to. pass, and the Manner of it, then it don't remain a contingent Thing whether They fhall come to pass or no.

And because it is a Question, in many Refpects, very important in this Controverfy about the Freedom of Will, Whether the free Acts of the Will are Events which come to pass without a Cause? I fhall be particular in examining this Point in the two following Sections,

SECTION III,

Whether any Event whatfoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Caufe of its Existence.

B

EFORE I enter on any Argument on this Subject, I would explain how I would be understood, when I ufe the Word Cause in this Difcourfe fince, for want of a better Word, I fhall have Occafion to use it in a Senfe which is more extensive, than that in which it is fometimes ufed. The Word is often used in fo reftrained a Senfe as to fignify only that which has a pofitive Efficiency or Influence to produce a Thing, or bring it to pats. But there are many Things which have

n

no fuch pofitive productive Influence; which yet are Caufes in that Refpect, that they have truly the Nature of a Ground or Reafon why fome Things are, rather than others; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwife. Thus the Abfence of the Sun in the Night, is not the Cause of the Falling of the Dew at that Time, in the fame Manner as its Beams are the Cause of the Afcending of the Vapours in the Day-Time; and its Withdrawment in the Winter, is not in the fame Manner the Caufe of the Freezing of the Waters, as its Approach in the Spring is the Cause of their Thawing. But yet the Withdrawment or Absence of the Sun is an Antecedent, with which these Effects in the Night and Winter are connected, and on which they depend; and is one Thing that belongs to the Ground and Reason why they come to pass at that Time, rather than at other Times; tho' the Abfence of the Sun is Nothing pofitive, nor has any pofitive Influence.

It may be further obferved, that when I speak of Connection of Caufes and Effects, I have Respect to moral Causes, as well as those that are called natural in Diftinction from them. Moral Caufes may be Causes in as proper a Sense, as any Causes whatsoever; may have as real an Influence, and may as truly be the Ground and Reason of an Event's coming to pass.

Therefore I fometimes use the Word Caufe, in this Inquiry, to fignify any Antecedent, either natural or moral, pofitive or negative, on which an Event, either a Thing, or the Manner and Circumftance of a Thing, fo depends, that it is the Ground and Reafon, either in Whole, or in Part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is,

rather

rather than otherwife; Or, in other Words, any Antecedent with which a confequent Event is fo connected, that it truly belongs to the Reason why the Proposition which affirms that Event, is true; whether it has any pofitive Influence, or not. And in an Agreeableness to this, I fometimes ufe the Word Effect, for the Confequence of another Thing, which is perhaps rather an Occafion than a Caufe, moft properly speaking.

I am the more careful thus to explain my Meaning, that I may cut off Occafion, from any that might feek Occafion to cavil and object against fome Things which I may fay concerning the Dependance of all Things which come to pass, on fome Caufe, and their Connection with their Caufe.

Having thus explain'd what I mean by Cause, I affert, that Nothing ever comes to pafs without a Cause. What is Self-exiftent must be from Eternity, and must be unchangeable: But as to all Things that begin to be, they are not Self-exiftent, and therefore must have fome Foundation of their Existence without themfelves.--That whatsoever begins to be, which before was not, must have a Caufe why it then begins to exift, feems to be the firft Dictate of the common and natural Senfe which God hath implanted in the Minds of all Mankind, and the main Foundation of all our Reasonings about the Existence of Things, paft, prefent, or to come.

And this Dictate of common Senfe equally refpects Subftances and Modes, or Things and the Manner and Circumstances of Things. Thus, if we see a Body which has hitherto been at Rest, start out of a State of Reft, and begin to move, we do as naturally and neceffarily fuppofe there is

fome