Several fuppofed Ways of evading the foregoing Reafoning, confidered.

F to evade the Force of what has been obferved, it fhould be faid, that when the Arminians fpeak of the Will's determining its own Acts, they don't mean that the Will determines its Acts by any preceding Act, or that one Act of the Will determines another; but only that the Faculty or Power of Will, or the Soul in the Ufe of that Power, determines its own Volitions; and that it does it without any Act going before the A&t determined; fuch an Evafion would be full of the moft grofs Abfurdity.--I confefs, it is an Evasion of my own inventing; and I don't know but I fhould wrong the Arminians, in fuppofing that any of them would make use of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would obferve upon it a few Things.

First, If the Faculty or Power of the Will determines an Act of Volition, or the Soul in the. Ufe or Exercife of that Power, determines it, that is the fame Thing as for the Soul to determine Volition by an Act of Will. For an Exercise of the Power of Will, and an Act of that Power, are the fame Thing. Therefore to fay, that the Power of Will, or the Soul in the Ufe or Exercife of that Power, determines Volition, without an A of Will preceding the Volition determined, is a Contradiction.

Secondly, If a Power of Will determines the Ac of the Will, then a Power of Chufing determines

it. For, as was before obferved, in every Act of Will, there is Choice, and a Power of Willing is a Power of Chufing. But if a Power of Chufing determines the Act of Volition, it determines it by chufing it. For 'tis moft abfurd to say, that a Power of Chufing determines one Thing rather than another, without chufing any Thing. But

if a Power of Chufing determines Volition by chufing it, then here is the Act of Volition determined by an antecedent Choice, chufing that Volition.

Thirdly, To fay, the Faculty, or the Soul, determines its own Volition, but not by any A&, is a Contradiction. Because for the Soul to direct, decide, or determine any Thing, is to act; and this is fuppofed; for the Soul is here spoken of as being a Caufe in this Affair, bringing something to pass, or doing fomething; or, which is the fame Thing, exerting itself in order to an Effect, which Effect is the Determination of Volition, or the particular Kind and Manner of an Act of Will, But certainly, this Exertion or Action is not the fame with the Effect, in order to the Production of which it is exerted; but must be something prior to it.

Again, The Advocates for this Notion of the Freedom of the Will, fpeak of a certain Sovereignty in the Will, whereby it has Power to determine its own Volitions. And therefore the Determination of Volition inuft itself be an Act of the Will; for otherwife it can be no Exercise of that supposed Power and Sovereignty.

Again, If the Will determines itself, then either the Will is active in determining its Volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the Determi E 2

nation

nation is an Act of the Will; and fo there is one Act of the Will determining another. But if the Will is not active in the Determination, then how does it exercife any Liberty in it? Thefe Gentlemen fuppofe that the Thing wherein the Will exercifes Liberty, is in its determining its own Acts. But how can this be, if it be not active in determining? Certainly the Will, or the Soul, cannot exercise any Liberty in that wherein it don't act, or wherein it don't exercise itself. So that if either Part of this Dilemma be taken, this Scheme of Liberty, confifting in Self-determining Power, is overthrown. If there be an Act of the Will in determining all its own free Acts, then one free Act of the Will is determined by another; and fo we have the Abfurdity of every free Act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free Act. But if there be no Act or Exercife of the Will in determining its own Acts, then no Liberty is exercifed in determining them. From whence it follows, that no Liberty confifts in the Will's Power to determine its own Acts: Or, which is the fame Thing, that there is no fuch Thing as Liberty confifting in a Self-determining Power of the Will.

If it fhould be faid, That altho' it be true, if the Soul determines its own Volitions, it must be active in fo doing, and the Determination itself must be an Act; yet there is no Need of fuppofing this Act to be prior to the Volition determined; But the Will or Soul determines the A&t of the Will in Willing; It determines its own Volition, in the very Act of Volition; It directs and limits the Act of the Will, caufing it to be fo and not otherwife, in exerting the Act, without any preceding Act to exert that. If any fhould fay after this Manner, they must mean

one of these three Things: Either, (1.) That the determining Act, tho' it be before the Act deter-. mined in the Order of Nature, yet is not before. it in Order of Time. Or (2.) That the determining Act is not before the Act determined, either in the Order of Time or Nature, nor is truly diftinct from it; But that the Soul's determining the Act of Volition is the fame Thing with its exerting the Act of Volition: The Mind's exerting fuch a particular Act, is its caufing and determining the Act. Or, (3.) That Volition has no Caufe, and is no Effect; but comes into Exiftence, with fuch a particular Determination, without any Ground or Reafon of its Existence and Determination. I fhall confider thefe dif

tinctly.

(1.) If all that is meant, be, that the determining Act is not before the Act determined in Order of Time, it will not help the Cafe at all, tho' it fhould be allowed. If it be before the determin'd Act in the Order of Nature, being the Caufe or Ground of its Existence, this as much proves it to be diftinct from it, and independent on it, as if it were before in the Order of Time: As the Caufe of the particular Motion of a natural Body in a certain Direction, may have no Diftance as to Time, yet can't be the fame with the Motion effected by it, but must be as diftinct from it, as any other Caufe, that is before its Effect in the Order of Time: as the Architect is diftinct from the Houfe which he builds, or the Father diftinct from the Son which he begets. And if the Act of the Will determining be diftinct from the Act determined, and before it in the Order of Nature, then we can go back from one to another, 'till we come to the firft in the Series, which has o Act of the Will before it in the Order of Na

ture, determining it; and confequently is an Act not determined by the Will, and fo hot a free Act, in this Notion of Freedom. And this being the Act which determines all the reft, none of them are free Acts. As when there is a Chain of many Links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by Hand; all the reft may follow and be moved at the fame Inftant, without any Distance of Time; but yet the Motion of one Link is before that of another in the Order of Nature; the laft is moved by the next, and that by the next, and fo till we come to the firft; which not being moved by any other, but by fomething diftinct from the whole Chain, this as much proves that no Part is moved by any Self-moving Power in the Chain, as if the Motion of one Link followed that of another in the Order of Time.

(2.) If any fhould fay, that the determining Act is not before the determined Act, either in the Order of Time, or of Nature, nor is diftin&t from it; but that the Exertion of the A&t is the Determination of the Act; That for the Soul to exert a particular Volition, is for it to caufe and determine that Act of Volition: 1 would on this obferve, that the Thing in Question feems to be forgotten, or kept out of Sight, in a Darkness and Unintelligibleness of Speech; unless fuch an Objector would mean mean to contradict himself. The very Act of Volition itself is doubtless a Determination of Mind; i. e. it is the Mind's drawing up a Conclufion, or coming to a Choice between two Things, or more, proposed to it. But determining among external Objects of Choice, is not the fame with determining the Act of Choice itself, among various poffible Acts of Choice. The Question is, What influences, directs, or determines the Mind or Will to come to fuch a

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