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think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A Man never, in any Instance, wills any Thing contrary to his Desires, or desires any Thing contrary to his Will. The foremention'd Instance, which Mr. Locke produces, doth not prove that he ever does. He may, on some Consideration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a Tendency to persuade ano. ther, and still may desire that they may not perfuade him : But yet his Will and Desire don't run counter at all: The Thing which he wills, the very same he desires ; and he don't will a Thing, and desire the contrary in any Particular. In this Instance, it is not carefully observed, what is the Thing will'd, and what is the Thing desired : If it were, it would be found that Will and Desire don't clash in the least. The Thing will’d on some Consideration, is to utter such Words; and certainly, the fame Consideration so influences him, that he don't desire the contrary; all Things considered, he chuses to utter such Words, and don't desire not to utter 'em. And so as to the Thing which Mr, Locke speaks of as desired, viz. that the Words, tho' They tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that End, his Will is not contrary to this ;. he don't will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the fame Thing, or with respect to the very same Object of Will or Defire : But here the Objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree. And ’tis no Wonder that they should not agree in different Things, however little distinguished they are in their Nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree with Desire, in different Things. As in this very Instance which Mr.

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Löcke mentions, a Person may, on some Consideration, desire to use Persuasions, and at the same Time may desire they may not prevail ; But yet no Body will say, that Desire runs counter to Defire ; or that this proves that Desire is perfectly a distinct Thing from Desire.--The like might be observed of the other Instance Mr. Locke produces, of a Man's desiring to be eased of Pain, &c.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Defire and Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precisely the same Things or no; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every Act of Will there is an Act of Choice ; that in every Volition there is a Preference, or a prevailing Inclination of the Soul, whereby the Soul, at that Instant, is out of a State of perfect Indifference, with respect to the direct Object of the Volition, (so that in every Act, or going forth of the Will, there is some Preponderation of the Mind or Inclination, one Way rather than another; and the Soul had rather bave or do one Thing than another, or than not have or not do that Thing;) and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or chusing, but a perfect continuing Equilibrium, there is no Volition.

SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will. D Y determining the Will, if the Phrase be used

with any Meaning, must be intended, causing that the Aet of the Will or Choice should be thus, and not otherwise : And the Will is said to be decermined, when, in Consequence of some Action, or Influence, its Choice is directed to, and fix'd upon a particular Object. As when we speak of the


Determination of Motion, we mean causing the Motion of the Body to be such a Way, or in such a Direction, rather than another.

To talk of the Determination of the Will, sup. poses an Effect, which must have a Cause. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that fay, the Will determines itself. But if it be as they say, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a Cause that acts and produces Effects upon it self, and is the Object of its own Influence and Action.

With respect to that grand Enquiry, What determines the Will, it would be very tedious and unnecessary at present to enumerate and examine all the various Opinions, which have been advanced concerning this Matter; nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular Disquisition of all Points debated in Disputes on that Question, Whee ther doth the Will always follow the last Diętate of the Understanding? It is sufficient to niy present Purpose to say, It is that Motive, which, as it stands in the View of the Mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will. But it may be necessary that I should a little explain my Meaning in this.

By Motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to Volition, whether that be one Thing singly, or many Things conjunctly. Many particular Things may concur and unite their Strength to induce the Mind; and when it is so, all together are as it were one complex Motive. And when I speak of the strongest Motive, I have Respect to the Strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular Act of Volition, whether that be the Strength of one Thing alone, or of many together.


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• Whatever is a Motive, in this Sense, must be something that is extant in the View or Apprehension of the Understanding, or perceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to will or act any Thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the Mind's View; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the Mind's View, can't affect the Mind at all. 'Tis most evident, that nothing is in the Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every Thing that is properly called a Motive, Excitement or Inducement to a perceiving willing Agent, has some sort and Degree of Tendency, or Advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the Effect, or to the Act of the Will excited. This previous Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Motive. That Motive which has a less Degree of previous Advantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the View of the Mind, is what I call a weaker Motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears con. cerning it to the Understanding or Apprehension, the greatest Degree of previous Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the strongest Motive. And in this Sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest Mo. tive.

Things that exist in the View of the Mind have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertain ing to the Nature and Circumstances of the Thing view'd, the Nature and Circumstances of the Mind that views, and the Degree and Manner of its View;

of of which it would perhaps be hard to make a pera fect Enumeration. But so much I think may be determin’d in general, without Room for Controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary Agent, which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive co Volition or Choice, is consider'd or view'd as good; nor has it any Tendency to invite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to elect them, some other Way than by their appearing cligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some Sense, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent Good is : However, for the right understanding of this, two Things must be well and distinctly observed.

1. It must be observed in what Sense I use the Term Good; namely, as of the same Import with Agreeable. To appear good to the Mind, as I use the Phrase, is the same as to appear agreeable, or feem pleasing to the Mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the Mind, or tending to engage its Inclination and Choice, consider'd as evil or disagreeable ; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the Inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the Notion of that which suits the Mind. And therefore that must have the greatest Tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the Mind's View, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that Sense, is the greatest apparent Good : to say otherwise, is little, if any Thing, short of a direct and plain Contradiction.

The Word Good, in this Sense, includes in its Signification, the Removal or Avoiding of Evil,

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