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One's being capable of Virtue or Vice, and properly the Subject of Command or Counsel, Praise or Blame, Promifes or Threatenings, Rewards or Punishments; or whether that which has been described, as the Thing meant by Liberty in common Speech, be not fufficient, and the only Liberty, which makes, or can make any One a moral Agent, and fo properly the Subject of these Things. In this Part, I fhall confider whether any fuch Thing be poffible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians infift on; and fhall inquire whether any fuch Sort of Liberty be neceffary to moral Agency, &c. in the next Part.

And First of all, I fhall confider the Notion of a Self-determining Power in the Will: wherein, according to the Arminians, does most effentially confift the Will's Freedom; and fhall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly abfurd, and a manifest Inconfiftence, to fuppofe that the Will itself determines all the free Acts of the Will.

Here I fhall not infift on the great Impropriety. of fuch Phrases, and Ways of speaking, as the Will's determining itself; because Actions are to be ascribed to Agents, and not properly to the Powers of Agents; which improper Way of speaking leads to many Mistakes, and much Confufion, as Mr. Locke obferves. But I fhall fuppofe that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the Soul willing. I fhall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, as the Determiner, they mean the Soul in the Exercife of a Power of Willing, or acting voluntarily. I fhall fuppofe this to be their Meaning, because nothing elfe can be meant, without the groffeft and plaineft Abfurdity. In all Cafes, when we fpeak of the Powers or Principles

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of Acting, as doing fuch Things, we mean that the Agents which have these Powers of acting, do them, in the Exercise of those Powers. So when we fay, Valour fights couragiously, we mean the Man who is under the Influence of Valour fights couragiously. When we fay, Love feeks the Object loved, we mean, the Perfon loving feeks that Object. When we say, the Understanding difcerns, we mean the Soul in the Exercise of that Faculty. So when it is faid, the Will decides or determines, the Meaning muit be, that the Person in the Exercife of a Power of Willing and Chufing, or the Soul acting voluntarily, determines.

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free Acts, the Soul determines all the free Acts of the Will in the Exercise of a Power of Willing and Chufing; or, which is the fame Thing, it determines them of Choice; it determines its own Acts by chufing its own Acts. If the Will determines. the Will, then Choice orders and determines the Choice: and Acts of Choice are subject to the Decifion, and follow the Conduct of other Acts of Choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free Acts, then every free Act of Choice is determined by a preceding A& of Choice, chufing that Act. And if that preceding Act of the Will or Choice be also a free Act, then by these Principles, in this Act too, the Will is Self-determined: that is, this, in like Manner, is an Act that the Soul voluntarily chufes; or which is the fame Thing, it is an Act determined still by a preceding Act of the Will, chufing that. And the like may again be observed of the last mentioned Act. Which brings us directly to a Contradiction: for it fuppofes an Act of the Will preceding the first Act in the whole Train, directing and determining the reft; or a

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free Act of the Will, before the firft free Act of the Will. Or elfe we must come at laft to an Act of the Will, determining the confequent Acts, wherein the Will is not felf-determined, and fo is not a free Act, in this Notion of Freedom: But if the first Act in the Train, determining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifeft at first View, but fhall be demonftrated presently.

If the Will, which we find governs the Members of the Body, and determines and commands their Motions and Actions, does alfo govern itself, and determine its own Motions and Acts, it doubtless determines them the fame Way, even by antecedent Volitions. The Will determines which Way the Hands and Feet fhall move, by an Act of Volition or Choice: and there is no other Way of the Will's determining, directing or commanding any Thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an Act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own Acts, it doubtless does it the fame Way that it determines other Things which are under its Command. So that if the Freedom of the Will confifts in this, that it has itself and its own Acts under its Command and Direction, and its own Volitions are determined by itfelf, it will follow, that every free Volition arifes from another antecedent Volition, directing and commanding that: And if that directing Volition be allo free, in that alfo the Will is determined; that is to say, that directing Volition is determined by another going before that; and fo on, 'till we come to the firft Volition in the whole Series: And if that first Volition be free, and the Will felf-determined in it, then that is determined by another Volition preceding that. Which is a Con

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Contradiction; because by the Suppofition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in the Train. But if that first Volition not determined by any preceding Act of the Will, then that Act is not determined by the Will, and fo is not free, in the Arminian Notion of Freedom, which confifts in the Will's Self-determination. And if that firft Act of the Will, which determines and fixes the fubfequent Acts, be not free, none of the following Acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we fuppofe there are five Acts in the Train, the fifth and laft determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the fecond, and the fecond by the firft; If the firft is not determined by the Will, and fo not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each of them is as it is, and not otherwife, is not firft owing to the Will, but to the Determination of the first in the Series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no Hand in the Determination of. And this being that which decides what the reft fhall be, and determines their Exiftence; therefore the first Determination of their Exiftence is not from the Will. The Cafe is juft the fame, if instead of a Chain of five Acts of the Will, we fhould fuppofe a Succeffion of Ten, or an Hundred, or ten Thoufand. If the first Act be not free, being determined by fomething out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and fo on; They are none of them free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by fome Caufe out of the Will: and fo all Freedom in the Cafe is excluded, and no Act of the Will can be free, according to this Notion of Freedom. If we should suppose a long Chain, of ten Thoufand Links, fo connected, that if the firft Link

moves, it will move the next, and that the next, and fo on till the whole Chain is determined to Motion, and in the Direction of its Motion, by the Motion of the firft Link; and that is moved by fomething else: In this Cafe, though all the Links, but one, are moved by other Parts of the fame Chain; yet it appears that neither the Motion of any One, nor the Direction of its Motion, is from any Self-moving or Self-determining Power in the Chain, any more than if every Link were immediately moved by fomething that did not belong to the Chain.--If the Will be not free in the first Act, which caufes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first Act for tho' indeed the Will caufed it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding Act, by which it was caufed, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the fecond Act, fo neither can it be in the third, which is caufed by that; because, in like Manner, that third was determined by an Act of the Will that was not free. And fo we may go on to the next Act, and from that to the next; and how long foever the Succeffion of Acts is, it is all one; if the firft on which the whole Chain depends, and which determines all the reft, be not a free Act, the Will is not free in caufing or determining any one of thofe Acts; because the Act by which it determines them all, is not a free Act; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all. Thus, this Arminian Notion. of Liberty of the Will, confifting in the Will's Self-Determination, is repugnant to itself, and fhuts itself wholly out of the World.

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