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stood, nor carefully reflected upon.-Let the Objector reflect again, if he has Candor and Patience enough, and don't fcorn to be at the Trouble of close Attention in the Affair.--He would have a Man's Volition be from himself. Let it be from himself, moft primarily and originally of any Way conceivable; that is, from his own Choice: How will that help the Matter, as to his being justly blamed or praised, unlefs that Choice itself be blame or praise-worthy? And how is the Choice itfelf (an ill Choice, for Inftance) blame-worthy, according to thefe Principles, unlefs that be from himself too, in the fame Manner; that is, from his own Choice? But the original and firft-determining Choice in the Affair is not from his Choice: His Choice is not the Caufe of it.--And if it be from himself fome other Way, and not from his Choice, furely that will not help the Matter: If it ben't from himself of Choice, then it is not from himself voluntarily, and if fo, he is furely no more to blame, than if it were not from himfelf at all. It is a Vanity, to pretend it is a fufficient Answer to this, to fay, that it is nothing but metaphyfical Refinement and Subtilty, and fo attended with Obscurity and Uncertainty,

If it be the natural Senfe of our Minds, that what is blame-worthy in a Man must be from himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be from fomething bad in himself, a bad Choice, or

bad

but by the Effect) and this, for ought I know, may make fomé imagine, that Volition has no Caufe, or that it produces itfelf. But I have no more Reafon from hence to determine any fuch Thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself my own Being, or that I came into Being accidentally without a Caufe, because I first found myself poffeffed of Being, before I had Knowledge of a Caufe of my Being.

bad Difpofition. But then our natural Senfe is, that this bad Choice or Difpofition is evil in itself, and the Man blame-worthy for it, on its own Account, without taking into our Notion of its Blameworthiness, another bad Choice, or Difpofition going before this, from whence this arifes for that is a ridiculous Abfurdity, running us into an immediate Contradiction, which our natural Sense of Blame-worthiness has nothing to do with, and never comes into the Mind, nor is fuppofed in the Judgment we naturally make of the Affair. As was demonftrated before, natural Senfe, don't place the moral Evil of Volitions and Difpofitions in the Cause of them, but the Nature of them. An Evil Thing's being FROM a Man, or from fomething antecedent in him, is not effential to the original Notion we have of Blame-worthiness: But 'tis its being the Choice of the Heart; as appears by this, that if a Thing be from us, and not from our Choice, it has not the Nature of Blame-worthiness or Ill-defert, according to our natural Senfe. When a Thing is from a Man, in that Sense, that it is from his Will, or Choice, he is to blame for it, because his Will is IN IT: So far as the Will is in it, Blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our Notion of Blame, to inquire whether the bad Will be FROM a bad Will: There is no Confideration of the Original of that bad Will; because according to our natural Apprehenfion, Blame originally confifts in it. Therefore a Thing's being from a Man, is a fecondary Confideration, in the Notion of Blame or Ill-defert. Because those Things in our external Actions, are moft properly faid to be from us, which are from our Choice; and no other external Actions but those that are from us in this Senfe, have the Nature of Blame;

and

and they indeed, not fo properly because they are from us, as because we are in them, i. e. our Wille are in them; not fo much because they are from fome Property of ours, as because they are our Properties.

However, all these external Actions being truly from us, as their Cause; and we being fo ufed, in ordinary Speech, and in the common Affairs of Life, to speak of Men's Actions and Conduct that we fee, and that affect human Society, as deferving Ill or Well, as worthy of Blame or Praife; hence it is come to pass, that Philofophers have incautiously taken all their Measures of Good and Evil, Praise and Blame, from the Dictates of common Senfe, about these overt Alts of Men; to the running of every Thing into the most lamentable and dreadful Confusion. And therefore I observe,

III. 'Tis fo far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the Proof of the Doctrine which has been maintain'd, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphyfical Terms and Notions; and that the Arminian Scheme, without needing fuch Clouds and Darkness for its Defence, is fupported by the plain Dictates of common Sense; that the very Reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great Degree. 'Tis Fact, that they, and not we, have confounded Things with metaphyfical, unintelligible Notions and Phrafes, and have drawn them from the Light of plain Truth, into the grofs Darkness of abftrufe metaphyfical Propofitions, and Words without a Meaning. Their pretended Demonftrations depend very much on fuch unintelligible, metaphyfical Phrases, as Self-determination, and Sovereignty of the Will, and the metaphyfical Senfe they put on fuch Terms, as Neceffity, Contingency,

Action,

Part IV. Action, Agency, &c. quite diverfe from their Meaning as used in common Speech; and which, as they use them, are without any confiftent Meaning, or any Manner of diftinct confiftent Ideas; as far from it as any of the abftrufe Terms and perplexed Phrafes of the Peripatetic Philofophers, or the most unintelligible Jargon of the Schools, or the Cant of the wildeft Fanaticks. Yea, we may be bold to fay, these metaphysical Terms, on which they build so much, are what they use without knowing what they mean themfelves; they are pure metaphyfical Sounds, without any Ideas whatsoever in their Minds to anfwer them; in-as-much as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any Notion in the Mind confiftent with thefe Expreffions, as they pretend to explain them; because their Explanations deftroy themselves. No fuch Notions as imply Selfcontradiction, and Self-abolition, and this a great many Ways, can fubfift in the Mind; as there can be no Idea of a Whole which is less than any of its Parts, or of folid Extenfion without Dimenfions, or of an Effect which is before its Caufe.--Arminians improve thefe Terms, as Terms of Art, and in their metaphyfical Meaning, to advance and establish thofe Things which are contrary to common Senfe, in a high Degree. Thus, inftead of the plain vulgar Notion of Liberty, which all Mankind, in every Part of the Face of the Earth, and in all Ages, have; confifting in Opportunity to do as one pleases; they have introduced a new ftrange Liberty, confifting in Indifference, Contingence, and Self-determination; by which they involve themselves and others in great Obfcurity, and manifold grofs Inconfiftence. So, instead of placing Virtue and Vice, as common Senfe places them very much,

in

in fix'd Bias and Inclination, and greater Virtue and Vice in stronger and more establish'd Inclination; thefe, through their Refinings and abstruse Notions, fuppofe a Liberty confifting in Indifference, to be effential to all Virtue and Vice. So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphyfical Diftinctions, but metaphyfical Confufion, into many Principles about moral Agency, Blame, Praise, Reward and Punishment, which are, as has been fhewn, exceeding contrary to the common Senfe of Mankind; and perhaps to their own Senfe, which governs them in common Life.

THE

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