SECTION XIII.

Concerning that Objection against the Reasoning, by which the Calvinistic Doctrine is fupported, that it is Metaphyfical and Abftrufe.

IT

T has often been objected against the Defenders of Calvinistic Principles, that in their Reafonings, they run into nice Scholaftic Diftinctions, and abftrufe metaphyfical Subtilties, and fet thefe in Oppofition to common Senfe. And 'tis poffible, that after the former Manner it may be alleged against the Reafoning by which I have endeavoured to confute the Arminian Scheme of Liberty and moral Agency, that it is very abftracted and metaphyfical. — Concerning this, I would obferve the following Things.

I. If that be made an Objection against the foregoing Reasoning, that it is metaphyfical, or may properly be reduced to the Science of Metaphyficks, it is a very impertinent Objection; whether it be fo or no, is not worthy of any Difpute or Controverfy. If the Reasoning be good, 'tis as frivolous to inquire what Science it is properly reduc'd to, as what Language it is delivered in: And for a Man to go about to confute the Arguments of his Opponent, by telling him, his Arguments are Metaphyfical, would be as weak as to tell him, his Arguments could not be fubftantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The Question is not, Whether what is faid be Metaphyficks, Phyficks, Logick, or Mathematicks, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But, Whether the Reasoning be good, and the Arguments truly conclufive? The foregoing Arguments are

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no more metaphyfical, than thofe which we use against the Papifts, to difprove their Doctrine of Tranfubftantiation; alleging, it is inconfiftent with the Notion of corporeal Identity, that it fhould be in ten Thousand Places at the fame Time. 'Tis by metaphyfical Arguments only we are able to prove, that the rational Soul is not corporeal; that Lead or Sand can't think; that Thoughts are not fquare or round, or don't weigh a Pound. The Arguments by which we prove the Being of God, if handled closely and diftinctly, fo as to fhew their clear and demonftrative Evidence, must be metaphyfically treated, 'Tis by Metaphyficks only, that we can demonftrate, that God is not limited to a Place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is impoffible for him to lie, or be unjuft; and that there is one God only, and not Hundreds or Thousands. And indeed we have no ftrict Demonftration of any Thing, excepting mathematical Truths, but by Metaphyficks. We can have no Proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one Propofition, relating to the Being and Nature of God, his Creation of the World, the Dependence of all Things on him, the Nature of Bodies or Spirits, the Nature of our own Souls, or any of the great Truths of Morality and natural Religion, but what is metaphyfical. I am willing, my Arguments thould be brought to the Teft of the ftricteft and jufteft Reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate Meaning of the Terms I ufe, fhould be infifted on; but let not the Whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the Epithet Metaphyfical.

II. If the Reasoning which has been made ufe of, be in fome Senfe Metaphyfical, it will not folCc 4

low,

Part IV. low, that therefore it must needs be abftrufe, unintelligible, and a-kin to the Jargon of the Schools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing Reasoning, at leaft as to those Things which are moft material belonging to it, depends on no abftrufe Definitions or Diftinctions, or Terms without a Meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined Signification, or any Points of fuch Abftraction and Subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive Underftanding in Clouds and Darkness. There is no high Degree of Refinement and abftrufe Specula, tion, in determining, that a Thing is not before it is, and fo can't be the Cause of itself; or that the first Act of free Choice, has not another Act of free Choice going before that, to excite or direct it; or in determining, that no Choice is made, while the Mind remains in a State of abfolute Indifference; that Preference and Equilibrium never co-exist; and that therefore no Choice is made in a State of Liberty, confifting in Indifference: And that fo far as the Will is determined by Motives, exhibited and operating previous to the Act of the Will, fo far it is not determined by the Act of the Will itfelf; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a Cause, or fome antecedent Ground or Reason, why it then begins to be; that Effects depend on their Causes, and are connected with them; that Virtue is not the worse, nor Sin the better, for the Strength of Inclination, with which it is practifed, and the Difficulty which thence arifes of doing otherwise ; that when it is already infallibly known, that a Thing will be, it is not a Thing contingent whether it will ever be or no; or that it can be truly faid, notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it fhould be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the like might be obferved of many other

Things which belong to the foregoing Reafoning.

If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing Reasoning is nothing but metaphyfical Sophiftry and that it must be so, that the feeming Force of the Arguments all depends on fome Fallacy and Wile that is hid in the Obfcurity, which always attends a great Degree of metaphyfical Abftraction and Refinement; and fhall be ready to fay, "Here is indeed fomething that tends to con"found the Mind, but not to fatisfy it: For who "can ever be truly fatisfied in it, that Men are "fitly blamed or commended, punished or re"warded for those Volitions which are not from "themselves, and of whose Existence they are not the Causes. Men may refine, as much as "they please, and advance their abftract Notions, and make out a Thoufand feeming Con"tradictions, to puzzle our Understandings; yet "there can be no Satisfaction in fuch Doctrine as "this: The natural Sense of the Mind of Man will always refift it."* I humbly conceive, that

fuch

* A certain noted Author of the prefent Age fays, The Arguments for Neceffity are nothing but Quibbling, or Logomachy, ufing Words without a Meaning, or Begging the Queflion.—I don't know what Kind of Neceffity any Authors he may have Reference to, are Advocates for; or whether they have managed their Arguments well, or ill. As to the Arguments I have made afe of, if they are Quibbles, they may be fhewn to be fo: fuch Knots are capable of being untied, and the Trick and Cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with Refpect to the Grounds and Reasons I have relied upon, I fhall have juft Occafion for the future to be filent, if not to be ashamed of my Argumentations. I am willing, my Proofs fhould be thoroughly examined; and if there be nothing but Begging the Queftion, or mere Logomachy, or Difpute of Words, let it be made manifeft, and fhewn how the feeming Strength

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fuch an Objector, if he has Capacity and Humility and Calmnefs of Spirit, fufficient impartially and thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not really what he would be at; and that indeed his Difficulty is nothing but a mere Prejudice, from an inadvertent cuftomary Ufe of Words, in a Meaning that is not clearly under

ftood,

of the Argument depends on my ufing Words without a Meaning, or arifes from the Ambiguity of Terms, or my making use of Words in an indeterminate and unfteady Manner; and that the Weight of my Reasons reft mainly on fuch a Foundation: And then, I fhall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the Man that has done the kind Part, or fhall be justly expofed for my Obftinacy.

The fame Author is abundant in appealing, in this Affair, from what he calls Logomachy and Sophifiry, to Experience. A Perfon can experience only what paffes in his own Mind. But yet, as we may well fuppofe, that all Men have the same human Faculties; fo a Man may well argue from his own Experience to that of others, in Things that fhew the Nature of thofe Faculties, and the Manner of their Operation. But then one has as good Right to allege his Experience, as another. As to my own Experience, I find, that in innumerable Things I can do as I will; that the Motions of my Body, in many Re spects, inftantaneously follow the Acts of my Will concerning thofe Motions; and that my Will has fome Command of my Thoughts; and that the Acts of my Will, are my own, i. e. that they are Acts of my Will, the Volitions of my own Mind; or in other Words, that what I will, I will. Which, I prefume, is the Sum of what others experience in this Affair. But as to finding by Experience, that my Will is originally determin'd by itself; or that my Will firft chufing what Voli tion there fhall be, the chofen Volition accordingly follows; and that this is the firft Rife of the Determination of my Will in any Affair; or that any Volition arifes in my Mind contin gently; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by Experience, of this Nature; and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the leaft Appearance or Shadow of any fuch Thing, or gives me any more Reason to fuppofe or fufpect any fuch Thing, than to fuppofe that. my Volitions exifted twenty Years before they exifted. 'Tis true, I find myfelf poflets'd of my Vouti ons before I can fee the effectual Power of any Cause to pio duce them (for the Power and Efficacy of the Caufe is not feen

but