unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to chuse and cleave to him as his chief Good.

Here it may be of Ufe to observe this Diftinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occafional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the Heart to all Exercifes or Acts of Will of that Nature or Kind, through a fix'd and habitual Inclination, or an habitual and stated Defect, or Want of a certain Kind of Inclination. Thus a very ill-natur'd Man may be unable to exert fuch Acts of Benevolence, as another, who is full of good Nature, commonly exerts; and a Man, whofe Heart is habi tually void of Gratitude, may be unable to exert fuch and fuch grateful Acts, through that stated Defect of a grateful Inclination. By particular and occafional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the Will or Heart to a particular Act, through the Strength or Defect of prefent Motives, or of Inducements presented to the View of the Underftanding, on this Occafion.--If it be fo, that the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter Sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being poffible, in any Cafe, that the Will fhould, at prefent, go against the Motive which has now, all Things confidered, the greatest Strength and Advantage to excite and induce it.The former of thefe Kinds of moral Inability, confifting in that which is stated habitual and general, is most commonly called by the Name of Inability; because the Word Inability, in its most proper and original Signification, has Refpect to fome stated Defect. And this especially obtains the Name of Inability also upon another Account: I before obferved, that the Word Inability in its original and most common Ufe, is a relative Term ;

D 2

Part 1. Term; and has Respect to Will and Endeavour, as fuppofable in the Cafe, and as infufficient to bring to pafs the Thing defired and endeavoured. Now there may be more of an Appearance and Shadow of this, with Refpect to the Acts which arife from a fix'd and ftrong Habit, than others that arife only from tranfient Occafions and Caufes. Indeed Will and Endeavour againft, or diverfe from prefent Acts of the Will, are in no Cafe fuppofable, whether thofe Acts be occafional or habitual; for that would be to fuppofe the Will, at prefent, to be otherwife than, at prefent, it is. But yet there may be Will and Endeavour against future Acts of the Will, or Volitions that are likely to take Place, as view'd at a Distance. 'Tis no Contradiction, to fuppofe that the Acts of the Will at one Time, may be against the Acts of the Will at another Time; and there may be Defires and Endeavours to prevent or excite future Acts of the Will; But fuch Defires and Endeavours are, in many Cafes, rendered insufficient and vain, through Fixednefs of Habit: When the Occafion returns, the Strength of Habit overcomes, and baffles all fuch Oppofition. In this Respect, a Man may be in miferable Slavery and Bondage to a strong Habit. But it may be comparatively eafy to make an Alteration with Refpect to fuch future Acts, as are only occafional and tranfient; because the Occafion or tranfient Cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this Account, the moral Inability that attends fix'd Habits, especially obtains the Name of Inability. And then, as the Will may remotely and indirectly refift itfelf, and do it in vain, in the Cafe of ftrong Habits; fo Reason may refift prefent Acts of the Will, and its Refiftance be infufficient; and this is more commonly the Cafe alfo, when the Acts arife from ftrong Habit.

But

But it must be obferved concerning moral Inability, in each Kind of it, that the Word Inability is used in a Senfe very diverfe from its original Import. The Word fignifies only a natural Inability, in the proper Use of it; and is applied to fuch Cafes only wherein a prefent Will or Inclination to the Thing, with Refpect to which a Perfon is faid to be unable, is fuppofable. It can't be truly faid, according to the ordinary Ule of Language, that a malicious Man, let him be. ever fo malicious, can't hold his Hand from ftriking, or that he is not able to fhew his Neighbour Kindness; or that a Drunkard, let his Appetite be ever fo ftrong, can't keep the Cup from his Mouth. In the ftricteft Propriety of Speech, a Man has a Thing in his Power, if he has it in his Choice, or at his Election: And a Man can't be truly faid to be unable to do a Thing, when he can do it if he will. 'Tis improperly faid, that a Perfon can't perform thofe external Actions, which are dependent on the Act of the Will, and which would be easily performed, if the Act of the Will was prefent. And if it be improperly faid, that he cannot perform thofe external voluntary Actions, which depend on the Will, 'tis in fome Refpect more improperly faid, that he is unable to exert the Acts of the Will themselves; because it is more evidently falfe, with Refpect to thefe, that he can't if he will: For to fay fo, is a down-right Contradiction: It is to fay, he can't will, if he does will. And in this Cafe, not only is it true, that it is eafy for a Man to do the Thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has will'd, the Thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these Things to afcribe a Non-performance to the Want of Power or Ability, is not juft; because the Thing wanting is not a being able, but a being D 3 willing

willing. There are Faculties of Mind, and Capacity of Nature, and every Thing elfe, fufficient, but a Difpofition: Nothing is wanting but a Will.

SECTION

V.

Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of moral

T

Agency.

HE plain and obvious Meaning of the Words Freedom and Liberty, in common Speech, is Power, Opportunity, or Advantage, that any one bas, to do as he pleafes. Or in other Words, his being free from Hindrance or Impediment in the Way of doing, or conducting in any Respect, as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever Name we call that by, is a Perfon's being hinder'd or unable to conduct as he will, or being neceffitated to do otherwife.

If this which I have mentioned be the Meaning of the Word Liberty, in the ordinary Ufe of Language; as I trust that none that has ever learn'd to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in Propriety of Speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be afcribed to any Being or Thing, but that which has fuch a Faculty, Power or Property, as is called Will. For that which is poffeffed of no fuch Thing as Will, can't have any Power or Opportunity of doing according to its Will, nor be neceffitated to act contrary to its Will, nor be reftrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk

of

* I fay not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary forbearing to do, fitting ftill, keeping Silence, &c. are Inftances of Perions Conduct, about which Liberty is exercised; ho' they are not fo properly called doing.

of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very Will itfelf, is not to speak good Senfe; if we judge of Senfe, and Nonfenfe, by the original and proper Signification of Words. For the Will it Self is not an Agent that has a Will: The Power of chufing, itself, has not a Power of chufing. That which has the Power of Volition or Choice is the Man or the Soul, and not the Power of Volition itself. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his Will, is the Agent or Doer who is poffeffed of the Will; and not the Will which he is poffeffed of. We fay with Propriety, that a Bird let loofe has Power and Liberty to fly; but not that the Bird's Power of flying has a Power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the Property of an Agent, who is poffeffed of Powers and Faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But thefe Qualities are the Properties of Men or Perfons; and not the Properties of Properties.

There are two Things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in common Speech. One is Conftraint; the fame is otherwife called Force, Compulfion, and Coation; which is a Perfon's being neceffitated to do a Thing contrary to his Will. The other is Restraint; which is his being hindred, and not having Power to do according to his Will. But that which has no Will, can't be the Subject of thefe Things. - I need fay the lefs on this Head, Mr. Locke having fet the fame Thing forth, with great Clearnefs, in his Effay on the human UnderStanding.

fo

But one Thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely, that Power and Opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his Choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the Meaning Ꭰ .

of