der it, if he were able, would not be because he might not defire it, but only the ordering of that Matter don't belong to him. But it is no Harm for Him who is by Right, and in the greatest Propriety, the fupreme Orderer of all Things, to order every Thing in fuch a Manner, as it would be a Point of Wisdom in Him to chufe that they fhould be ordered. If it would be a plain Defect of Wisdom and Goodness in a Being, not to chufe that That should be, which He certainly knows it would, all Things confidered, be beft fhould be (as was but now obferved) then it must be impoffible for a Being who has no Defect of Wisdom and Goodness, to do otherwise than chufe it fhould be; and that, for this very Reason, because He is perfectly wife and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect Wisdom and Goodness for him to chufe that it fhould be, and the ordering of all Things fupremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite Wifdom and Goodness, to order that it fhould be. If the Choice is good, the ordering and difpofing Things according to that Choice muft alfo be good. It can be no Harm in one to whom it belongs do his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, to execute a good Volition. If his Will be good, and the Object of his Will be, all Things confidered, good and beft, then the chufing or willing it, is not willing Evil that Good may come. And if fo, then his ordering according to that Will is not doing Evil, that Good may come.

2. 'Tis not of a bad Tendency, for the fupreme Being thus to order and permit That moral Evil to be, which it is beft fhould come to pafs. For that it is of good Tendency, is the very Thing fuppofed in the Point now in Queftion. - Chrift's Crucifixion, tho' a moft horrid Fact in them that

Bb 4

perpc

perpetrated it, was of moft glorious Tendency as permitted and ordered of God.

3. Nor is there any Need of fuppofing, it proceeds from any evil Difpofition or Aim: for by the Suppofition, what is aim'd at is Good, and Good is the actual Iffue, in the final Result of Things.

SECTION X.

Concerning Sin's firft Entrance into the World.

HE Things which have already been offer

TH

ed, may serve to obviate or clear many of the Objections which might be raised concerning Sin's first coming into the World; as tho' it would follow from the Doctrine maintain'd, that God must be the Author of the firft Sin, thro' his fo difpofing Things, that it fhould neceffarily follow from his Permiffion, that the finful Act should be committed, &c. I need not therefore ftand to repeat what has been faid already, about fuch a Neceffity's not proving God to be the Author of Sin, in any ill Senfe, or in any fuch Senfe as to infringe any Liberty of Man, concerned in his moral Agency, or Capacity of Blame, Guilt and Punishment.

But if it fhould nevertheless be faid, Suppofing the Case fo, that God, when he had made Man, might fo order his Circumstances, that from these Circumstances, together with his withholding further Affistance and divine Influence, his Sin would infallibly follow, Why might not God as well have firft made Man with a fixed prevailing Principle of Sin in his Heart?

I answer,

I answer, 1. It was meet, if Sin did come into Existence, and appear in the World, it should arise from the Imperfection which properly belongs to a Creature, as fuch, and should appear fo to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the Efficient or Fountain. But this could not have been, if Man had been made at firft with Sin in his Heart; nor unless the abiding Principle and Habit of Sin were first introduced by an evil Act of the Creature. If Sin had not arofe from the Imperfection of the Creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did not arise from God, as the positive Caufe, and real Source of it. But it would require Room that can't be here allowed, fully to confider all the Difficulties which have been started, concerning the firft Entrance of Sin into the World.

And therefore,

2. I would obferve, that Objections against the Doctrine that has been laid down, in Oppofition to the Arminian Notion of Liberty, from these Difficulties, are altogether impertinent; because no additional Difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a Scheme in this Manner differing from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that the Arminians fay, about the Contingence, or felfdetermining Power of Man's Will, can ferve to explain with lefs Difficulty, how the firft finful Volition of Mankind could take Place, and Man be juftly charged with the Blame of it. To fay, the Will was felf-determined, or determined by free Choice, in that finful Volition; which is to fay, that the first finful Volition was determined by a foregoing finful Volition; is no Solution of the Difficulty. It is an odd Way of folving Difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To fay, Two and

Two

Two makes Nine; or, that a Child begat his Father, folves no Difficulty: No more does it, to fay, The first finful Act of Choice was before the first finful Act of Choice, and chofe and determined it, and brought it to pals. Nor is it any better Solution, to fay, The first finful Volition chofe, determined and produced itself, which is to fay, It was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the Difficulty, to fay, The firft finful Volition arofe accidentally, without any Caufe at all; any more than it will folve that difficult Queftion, How the World could be made out of Nothing? to fay, It came into Being out of Nothing, without any Caufe; as has been already obferved. And if we fhould allow that That could be, that the first evil Volition fhould arife by perfect Accident, without any Caufe, it would relieve no Difficulty, about God's laying the Blame of it to Man. For how was Man to Blame for perfect Accident, which had no Cause, and which therefore, he (to be fure) was not the Cause of, any more than if it came by fome external Caufe?--Such Kind of Solutions are no better, than if fome Perfon, going about to folve fome of the ftrange mathematical Paradoxes, about infinitely great and fmall Quantities; as, that fome infinitely great Quantities are infinitely greater than fome other infinitely great Quantities; and alfo that fome infinitely fmall Quantities are infinitely less than others, which yet are infinitely little; in order to a Solution, fhould fay, That Mankind have been under a Miftake, in fuppofing a greater Quantity to exceed a fmaller; and that a Hundred multiplied by Ten, makes but a fingle Unit.

SECTION

SECTION NXI.

Of a fuppofed Inconfiftence of thefe Principles, with GOD's moral Character.

Tv

HE Things which have been already obferved may be fufficient to answer most of the Objections, and filence the great Exclamations of Arminians against the Calvinists, from the fuppofed Inconfistence of Calvinistic Principles with the moral Perfections of God, as exercifed in his Government of Mankind. The Confiftence of fuch a Doctrine of Neceffity as has been maintained, with the Fitnefs and Reasonablenefs of God's Commands, Promifes, and Threatenings, Rewards and Punishments, has been particularly confidered: The Cavils of our Opponents, as tho' our Doctrine of Neceffity made God the Author of Sin, have been anfwered; and alfo their Objection against these Principles, as inconfiftent with God's Sincerity, in his Counfels, Invitations and Perfuafions, has been already obviated, in what has been obferved, refpecting the Confistence of what Calvinifts fuppofe concerning the fecret and revealed Will of God: By that it appears, there is no Repugnance in fuppofing it may be the fecret Will of God, that his Ordination and Permiffion of Events should be fuch that it fhall be a certain Confequence, that a Thing never will come to. pafs; which yet it is Man's Duty to do, and fo God's preceptive Will, that he fhould do; and · this is the fame Thing as to fay, God may fincerely command and require him to do it. And if he may be fincere in commanding him, he may for the fame Reafon be fincere in counfelling, inviting and ufing Perfuafions with him to do it. Counfels

and