Page images
PDF
EPUB

Action and Energy, and under certain Circumftances, neceffarily follows on the Want of his Influence; this is no Argument that he is finful, or his Operation Evil, or has any Thing of the Nature of Evil, but on the contrary, that He, and his Agency, are altogether good and holy, and that he is the Fountain of all Holinefs. It would be ftrange arguing indeed, because Men never commit Sin, but only when God leaves 'em to themselves, and neceffarily fin, when he does fo, that therefore their Sin is not from themfelves, but from God; and fo, that God must be a finful Being: As ftrange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the Sun is gone, and never dark when the Sun is prefent, that therefore all Darkness is from the Sun, and that his Difk and Beams muft needs be black.

IV. It properly belongs to the fupreme and abfolute Governour of the Univerfe, to order all important Events within his Dominion, by his Wisdom: But the Events in the moral World are of the most important Kind; fuch as the moral Actions of intelligent Creatures, and their Confequences.

Thefe Events will be ordered by fomething. They will either be difpofed by Wisdom, or they will be difpofed by Chance; that is, they will be disposed by blind and undefigning Causes, if that were poffible, and could be called a Difpofal. Is it not better, that the Good and Evil which happens in God's World, fhould be ordered, regulated, bounded and determin'd by the good Pleafure of an infinitely wife Being, who perfectly comprehends within his Underftanding and conRant View, the Univerfality of Things, in all their Extent and Duration, and fees all the Influ

ence

ence of every Event, with Respect to every individual Thing and Circumftance, throughout the grand Syftem, and the whole of the eternal Series of Confequences; than to leave thefe Things to fall out by Chance, and to be determined by those Causes which have no Understanding or Aim? Doubtless, in these important Events, there is a better and a worfe, as to the Time, Subject, Place, Manner and Circumftances of their coming to pass, with Regard to their Influence on the State and Course of Things. And if there be, 'tis certainly beft that they fhould be determined to that Time, Place, &c. which is best. And therefore 'tis in its own Nature fit, that Wisdom, and not Chance, should order thefe Things. So that it belongs to the Being, who is the Poffeffor of infinite Wisdom, and is the Creator and Owner of the whole Syftem of created Exiftences, and has the Care of all; I fay, it belongs to him, to take Care of this Matter; and he would not do what is proper for him, if he should neglect it. And it is fo far from being unholy in him, to undertake this Affair, that it would rather have been unholy to neglect it; as it would have been a neglecting what fitly appertains to him; and fo it would have been a very unfit and unsuitable Neglect.

Therefore the Sovereignty of God doubtlefs extends to this Matter: efpecially confidering, that if it should be fuppofed to be otherwife, and God fhould leave Men's Volitions, and all moral Events, to the Determination and Difpofition of blind and unmeaning Caufes, or they should be left to happen perfectly without a Cause; this would be no more confiftent with Liberty, in any Notion of it, and particularly not in the Arminian Notion of it, than if thefe Events were fubject to

the

the Difpofal of divine Providence, and the Will of Man were determined by Circumstances which are ordered and difpofed by divine Wifdom; as appears by what has been already obferved. But 'tis evident, that fuch a providential difpofing and determining Men's moral Actions, tho' it infers a moral Neceffity of thofe Actions, yet it does not in the leaft infringe the real Liberty of Mankind; the only Liberty that common Senfe teaches to be neceffary to moral Agency, which, as has been demonftrated, is not inconfiftent with fuch Neceffity.

On the whole, it is manifeft, that God may be, in the Manner which has been described, the Orderer and Disposer of that Event, which in the inherent Subject and Agent is moral Evil, and yet His fo doing may be no moral Evil. He may will the Difpofal of fuch an Event, and its coming to pafs for good Ends, and his Will not be an immoral or finful Will, but a perfectly holy Will. And he may actually in his Providence fo difpofe and permit Things, that the Event may be certainly and infallibly connected with fuch Difpofal and Permiffion, and his Act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy Act. Sin may be an evil Thing, and yet that there thould be fuch a Difpofal and Permiffion, as that it should come to pafs, may be a good Thing. This is no Contradiction, or Inconfiftence. Jofeph's Brethren's felling him into Egypt, confider it only as it was acted by them, and with Refpect to their Views and Aims which were evil, was a very bad Thing; but it was a good Thing, as it was an Event of God's ordering, and confider'd with Refpect to his Views and Aims which were good. Gen. 1. 20. As for you, ye thought Evil against me; but God meant it unto Good. So the Crucifixion of Christ,

Chrift, if we confider only thofe Things which belong to the Event as it proceeded from his Murderers, and are comprehended within the Compass of the Affair confidered as their A&t, their Principles, Difpofitions, Views and Aims; fo it was one of the most heinous Things that ever was done; in many Refpects the most horrid of all Acts: But confider it, as it was will'd and ordered of God, in the Extent of his Designs and Views, it was the moft admirable and glorious of all Events; and God's willing the Event was the moft holy Volition of God, that ever was made known to Men; and God's Act in ordering it, was a divine Act, which above all others, manifefts the moral Excellency of the divine Being.

The Confideration of thefe Things may help us to a fufficient Answer to the Cavils of Arminians concerning what has been fuppofed by many Calvinifts, of a Diftinction between a fecret and revealed Will of God, and their Diverfity one from the other; fuppofing, that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconfiftent Wills to the moft High: Which is without any Foundation. God's fecret and revealed Will, or in other Words, his difpofing and preceptive Will may be diverfe, and exercifed in diffmilar Acts, the one in difapproving and oppofing, the other in willing and determining, without any Inconfiftence. Because, altho' thefe diffimilar Exercises of the divine Will may in fome Refpects relate to the fame Things, yet in Strictnefs they have different and contrary Objects, the one Evil and the other Good. Thus for Inftance, the Crucifixion of Chrift was a Thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God; becaufe, as it was view'd and done by his malignant Murderers, it was a Thing infinitely contrary to the holy Nature of God, and fo neceffarily contrary to the

holy

holy Inclination of his Heart revealed in his Law. Yet this don't at all hinder but that the Crucifixion of Chrift, confidered with all thofe glorious Confequences, which were within the View of the divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious Event; and confequently be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may be fecret, i. e. not revealed in God's Law. And thus confidered, the Crucifixion of Chrift was not evil, but good. If the fecret Exercifes of God's Will were of a Kind that is diffimilar and contrary to his revealed Will, refpecting the fame, or like Objects; if the Objects of both were good, or both evil; then indeed to afcribe contrary Kinds of Volition or Inclination. to God, refpecting thefe Objects, would be to ascribe an inconfiftent Will to God: but to ascribe to Him different and oppofite Exercises of Heart, refpecting different Objects, and Objects contrary one to another, is fo far from fuppofing God's Will to be inconfiftent with itself, that it can't be fuppofed confiftent with itself any other Way. For any Being to have a Will of Choice refpecting Good, and at the fame Time a Will of Rejection and Refufal refpecting Evil, is to be very confiftent But the contrary, viz. to have the fame Will towards these contrary Objects, and to chuse and love both Good and Evil at the fame Time, is to be very inconsistent,

There is no Inconfiftence in fuppofing, that God may hate a Thing as it is in itself, and confidered fimply as Evil, and yet that it may be his Will it fhould come to pafs, confidering all Confequences. I believe, there is no Person of good Understanding, who will venture to fay, he is certain that it is impoffible it should be beft, taking in the whole Compafs and Extent of Existence,

B b

and

« PreviousContinue »