cafion a vast Alteration thro' the whole World of Mankind. And fo innumerable other Ways might be mention'd, wherein the leaft affignable Alteration may poffibly be attended with great Confe

quences.

Another Argument, which the foremention'd Author brings against a neceffary Determination of the divine Will by a fuperiour Fitness, is, that fuch Doctrine derogates from the Freeness of God's Grace and Goodness, in chufing the Objects of his Favour and Bounty, and from the Obligation upon Men to Thankfulness for fpecial Benefits. P. 89, &c.

In answer to this Objection, I would obferve,

1. That it derogates no more from the Goodnefs of God, to fuppofe the Exercise of the Benevolence of his Nature to be determin'd by Wifdom, than to fuppofe it determined by Chance, and that his Favours are bestowed altogether at Random, his Will being determin'd by nothing but perfect Accident, without any End or Defign whatsoever; which must be the Cafe, as has been demonftrated, if Volition be not determined by a prevailing Motive. That which is owing to perfect Contingence, wherein neither previous Inducement, nor antecedent Choice has any Hand, is not owing more to Goodness or Benevolence, than that which is owing to the Influence of a wife End.

2. 'Tis acknowledged, that if the Motive that determines the Will of God, in the Choice of the Objects of his Favours, be any moral Quality in the Object, recommending that Object to his Benevolence above others, his chufing that Object is not fo great a Manifestation of the Freeness and Sovereignty of his Grace, as if it were otherwise.

But

But there is no Neceffity of fuppofing this, in order to our fuppofing that he has fome wife End in View, in determining to bestow his Favours on one Perfon rather than another. We are to dif tinguish between the Merit of the Object of God's Favour, or a moral Qualification of the Object attracting that Favour and recommending to it, and the natural Fitness of such a Determination of the Act of God's Goodness, to answer fome wife Design of his own, fome End in the View of God's Omniscience. 'Tis God's own Act, that is the proper and immediate Object of his Volition.

3. I fuppofe that none will deny, but that in fome Inftances, God acts from wife Design in determining the particular Subjects of his Favours: None will fay, I prefume, that when God diftinguishes by his Bounty particular Societies or Perfons, He never, in any Inftance, exercises any Wisdom in fo doing, aiming at fome happy Confequence. And if it be not denied to be fo in fome Inftances, then I would inquire, whether in these Inftances God's Goodness is lefs manifefted, than in those wherein God has no Aim or End at all? And whether the Subjects have lefs Caufe of Thankfulness? And if fo, who fhall be thankful for the Bestowment of diftinguishing Mercy, with that enhancing Circumftance of the Diftinction's being made without an End? How fhall it be known when God is influenced by fome wife Aim,' and when not? It is very manifeft with Refpect to the Apostle Paul, that God had wife Ends in chufing Him to be a Chriftian and an Apoftle, who had been a Perfecutor, &c. The Apostle himself mentions one End. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16. Christ Jefus came into the World to fave Sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this Caufe I obtained Mercy, that in me first, Jefus Chrift might fhew forth

all

all Long-fuffering, for a Pattern to them who should hereafter believe on Him to Life everlasting. But yet the Apostle never look'd on it as a Diminution of the Freedom and Riches of divine Grace in his Election, which He fo often and fo greatly magnifies. This brings me to obferve,

4. Our fuppofing fuch a moral Neceffity in the Acts of God's Will as has been fpoken of, is fo far from neceffarily derogating from the Riches of God's Grace to fuch as are the chosen Objects of his Favour, that in many Instances, this moral Neceffity may arife from Goodnefs, and from the great Degree of it. God may chufe this Object rather than another, as having a fuperiour Fitness to answer the Ends, Defigns and Inclinations of his Goodness; being more finful, and fo more miferable and neceffitous than others; the Inclinations of infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious Defign of God's fending his Son into the World may be more abundantly answered, in the Exercifes of Mercy towards fuch an Object, rather than another.

One Thing more I would obferve, before I finish what I have to fay on the Head of the Neceffity of the Acts of God's Will; and that is, that fomething much more like a fervile Subjection of the divine Being to fatal Neceffity, will follow from Arminian Principles, than from the Doctrines which they oppofe. For they (at least most of them) fuppofe, with Refpect to all Events that happen in the moral World depending on the Volitions of moral Agents, which are the moft important Events of the Universe, to which all others are fubordinate; I fay, they fuppofe with respect to thefe, that God has a certain Foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any Purposes or Decrees of his about them. And if fo, they have a

fix'd certain Futurity, prior to any Designs or Volitions of his, and independent on them, and to which his Volitions must be fubject, as He would wifely accommodate his Affairs to this fix'd Futurity of the State of Things in the moral World. So that here, inftead of a moral Neceffity of God's Will, arifing from or confifting in the infinite Perfection and Bleffednefs of the divine Being, we have a fix'd unalterable State of Things, properly diftinct from the perfect Nature of the divine Mind, and the State of the divine Will and Defign, and entirely independent on thefe Things, and which they have no Hand in, because they are prior to them; and which God's Will is truly fubject to, He being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it, in all his Purposes and Decrees, and in every Thing He does in his Difpofals and Government of the World; the moral World being the End of the natural; fo that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that State of the moral World, which consists in, or depends upon the Acts and State of the Wills of moral Agents, which had a fix'd Futurition from Eternity. Such a Subjection to Neceffity as this, would truly argue an Inferiority and Servitude, that would be unworthy of the fupreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the Notion' which many of the Heathen had of Fate, as above the Gods, than that moral Neceffity of Fitnefs and Wisdom which has been fpoken of; and is truly repugnant to the abfolute Sovereignty of God, and inconfiftent with the Supremacy of his Will; and really fubjects the Will of the moft High to' the Will of his Creatures, and brings him into Dependence upon them.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintain'd, that it makes GOD the Author of Sin.

'T

IS urged by Arminians, that the Doctrine

of the Neceffity of Men's Volitions, or their neceffary Connection with antecedent Events and Circumstances, makes the first Cause, and supreme Orderer of all Things, the Author of Sin; in that he has fo conftituted the State and Course of Things, that finful Volitions become neceffary, in Confequence of his Difpofal. Dr. Whitby, in his Difcourfe on the Freedom of the Will, cites one of the Ancients, as on his Side, declaring that this Opinion of the Neceffity of the Will" ab"folves Sinners, as doing nothing of their own "Accord which was Evil, and would cast all the "Blame of all the Wickednefs committed in the

World, upon God, and upon his Providence, "if that were admitted by the Affertors of this "Fate; whether he himself did neceffitate them "to do these Things, or ordered Matters fo that

they should be constrain'd to do them by fome "other Cause." And the Doctor fays in another Place, "In the Nature of the Thing, and in "the Opinion of Philofophers, Caufa deficiens, in "rebus neceffariis, ad Caufam per fe efficientem redu"cenda eft. In Things neceffary, the deficient "Cause must be reduced to the efficient. And "in this Cafe the Reason is evident; because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding "what is forbidden, being a Defect, must follow from

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* On the five Points. P. 361, † Ibid. P. 486.