and good, he could not do otherwife than be conftantly and certainly determined by the Fitness of Things.

One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this Section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the Glory of God, to be neceffarily determined by fuperiour Fitnefs in fome Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all Things; from any Thing in the Nature of fuch Neceffity, as at all detracting from God's Freedom, Independence, abfolute Supremacy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State, or Manner of acting; or as implying any Infirmity, Reftraint, or Subjection. And if the Thing be fuch as well confifts with God's Glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of afcribing it to God in too many Things, left thereby we fhould detract from God's Glory too much.

SECTION VIII.

Some further Objections against the moral Neceffity of GoD's Volitions confidered.

HE Author laft cited, as has been obferv

Ted, owns that God, being perfectly wife,

will conftantly and certainly chufe what appears moft fit, where there is a fuperiour Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not poffible for him to do otherwife. So that it is in Effect confefs'd, that in thofe Things where there is any real Preferablenefs, 'tis no Difhonour, nothing in any Refpect unworthy of God, for him to act from Neceffity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of fuch a Neceffity,

with

with the Fate of the Stoicks, and the Neceffity maintain❜d by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were fo, that in all the different Things, among which God chufes, there were evermore a fuperiour Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Refpect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be neceffarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of fuch a Neceffity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a refting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decifion of another Point wholly diverfe; viz. Whether it be fo indeed, that in all the various poffible Things which are in God's View, and may be confidered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who fuppofes, that in many Instances, between two or more poffible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitnefs, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to anfwer any of his Defigns. Now therefore I would confider whether this be evident.

The Arguments brought to prove this, are of two Kinds. (1.) It is urged, that in many Inftances we muft fuppofe there is abfolutely no Difference between various poffible Objects of Choice, which God has in View: And (2.) that the Difference between many Things is fo inconfiderable, or of fuch a Nature, that it would be unreasonable to fuppofe it to be of any Confequence; or to fuppofe that any of God's wife De

figns would not be answered in one Way as well as the other.

Therefore,

I. The first Thing to be confidered is, Whether there are any Inftances wherein there is a perfect Likeness, and abfolutely no Difference, between different Objects of Choice, that are proposed to the divine Understanding?

And here in the first Place, it may be worthy to be confidered, whether the Contradiction there is in the Terms of the Question proposed, don't give Reason to fufpect that there is an Inconfiftence in the Thing fuppofed. 'Tis inquired, whether different Objects of Choice mayn't be abfolutely without Difference? If they are abfolutely without Difference, then how are they different Objects of Choice? If there be abfolutely no Difference in any Refpect, then there is no Variety or Diftin&ion For Diftinction is only by fome Difference. And if there be no Variety among propofed Objects of Choice, then there is no Opportunity for Variety of Choice, or Difference of Determination. For that Determination of a Thing which is not different in any Refpect, is not a different Determination, but the fame. That this is no Quibble, may appear more fully anon.

The Arguments, to prove that the moft High, in fome Instances, chufes to do one Thing rather than another, where the Things themfelves are perfectly without Difference, are two.

1. That the various Parts of infinite Time and Space, abfolutely confidered, are perfectly alike, and don't differ at all one from another: And that therefore, when God determined to create the Z

World

World in fuch a Part of infinite Duration and Space, rather than others, he determin'd and prefer'd among various Objects, between which there was no Preferableness, and abfolutely no Diffe

rence.

Anfw. This Objection fuppofes an infinite Length of Time before the World was created, diftinguifhed by fucceffive Parts, properly and truly fo; or a Succeffion of limited and unmeafurable Periods of Time, following one another, in an infinitely long Series: which muft needs be a groundless Imagination. The eternal Duration which was before the World, being only the Eternity of God's Existence; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect and invariable Poffeffion of the whole of his unlimited Life, together and at once; Vite interminabilis, tota, fimul & perfecta Poffeffio. Which is fo generally allowed, that I need not ftand to demonstrate it.*

So

* If all created Beings were taken away, all Poffibility "of any Mutation or Succeffion of one Thing to another "would appear to be alfo removed. Abftract Succeffion in

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Eternity is fcarce to be understood. What is it that fuc"ceeds? One Minute to another perhaps, velut unda fuper"venit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the "Minutes are Things feparately exifting. This is the com"mon Notion; and yet it is a manifeft Prejudice. Time is "nothing but the Existence of created fucceffive Beings, and

Eternity the neceffary Existence of the Deity. Therefore, "if this neceffary Being hath no Change or Suceffion in his "Nature, his Existence muft of Course be unfucceffive. We "feem to commit a double Overfight in this Cafe; firft, we "find Succeffion in the neceffary Nature and Existence of the "Deity himself: Which is wrong, if the Reafoniug above be "conclufive. And then we afcribe this Succeffion to Eternity, "confidered abftractedly from the eternal Being; and fup"pofe it, one knows not what, a Thing fubfifting by itself, "and flowing, one Minute after another. This is the Work "of pure Imagination, and contrary to the Reality of Things.

"Hence

So this Objection fuppofes an Extent of Space beyond the Limits of the Creation, of an infinite Length, Breadth and Depth, truly and properly diftinguished into different meafurable Parts, limited at certain Stages, one beyond another, in an infinite Series. Which Notion of abfolute and infinite Space is doubtlefs as unreasonable, as that now mention'd, of abfolute and infinite Duration. 'Tis as improper, to imagine that the Immenfity and Omniprefence of God is distinguished by a Series of Miles and Leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite Duration of God is diftinguifhed by Months and Years, one after another. A Diverfity and Order of diftinct Parts, limited by certain Periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our Imagination, in one Cafe as the other; and there is equal Reafon in each Cafe, to fuppofe that our Imagination deceives us. 'Tis equally improper, to talk of Months and Years of the divine Exiftence, and Milefquares of Deity: And we equally deceive our

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"Hence the common metaphorical Expreffions; Time runs a-pace, let us lay hold on the prefent Minute, and the like. The Philofophers themselves mislead us by their Illuftrations: "They compare Eternity to the Motion of a Point running "on for ever, and making a tracelefs infinite line. Here the "Point is fuppofed a Thing actually fubfifting, representing "the prefent Minute; and then they afcribe Motion or Succeffion to it: that is, they afcribe Motion to a mere Non"entity, to illuftrate to us a fucceffive Eternity made up of "finite fucceffive Parts. - If once we allow an all perfect "Mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite Comprehenfion of all Things, always, (and allow it we muft) "the Diftinction of paft and future vanishes with Refpect to

fuch a Mind.-In a Word, if we proceed Step by Step, as "above, the Eternity or Existence of the Deity will appear to "be Vita interminabilis, tota, fimul & perfecta Poffeffio; how "much foever this may have been a Paradox hitherto." En-quiry into the Nature of the human Soul. Vol. II. P. 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3.

Z 2

felves,