Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is abfolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has fupreme Authority; abfolute and moft perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any fuperiour Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any diftinct independent Authority, either fuperiour, equal, or inferiour; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and alfo without Reftraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependence, or proper Limitation. (3.) That his Will is fupreme, underived, and independent on any Thing without Himielf, being in every Thing determin'd by his own Counfel, having no other Rule but his own Wisdom his Will not being fubject to, or restrain'd by the Will of any other, and others Wills being perfectly fubject to his. (4.) That his Wifdom, which determines his Will, is fupreme, perfect, underived, felf-fufficient, and independent; fo that it may be faid as in Ifai. xl. 14. With whom took He Counfel? And who inftructed Him and taught Him in the Path of Judgment, and taught him Knowledge, and fhewed Him the Way of Understanding ?-There is no other divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly abfolute Sovereignty: No other is defirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy and indeed there is no other conceivable or poffible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatnefs of the divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determin'd by his own infinite all-fufficient Wisdom in every Thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferiour Wisdom, or by no Wisdom; whereby it would become fenfeless Arbitrariness, determining and acting without Reason, Defign or End.

If God's Will is fteadily and furely determined in every Thing by fupreme Wisdom, then it is in every Thing neceffarily determined to that which is most wife. And certainly it would be a Difadvantage and Indignity, to be otherwife. For if the divine Will was not neceffarily determin'd to that which in every Cafe is wifeft and beft, it must be fubject to fome Degree of undefigning Contingence; and fo in the fame Degree liable to Evil. To fuppofe the divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind Contingence, which is guided by no Wisdom, no Motive, no intelligent Dictate whatsoever, (if any fuch Thing were poffible) would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and Meannefs, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a Disadvantage, for the divine Will to be attended with this moral Neceffity, then the more free from it, and the more left at Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And confequently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Understanding, and univerfally and entirely left to fenfelefs unmeaning Contingence, to act abfolutely at Random, would be the fupreme Glory.

It no more argues any Dependence of God's Will, that his fupremely wife Volition is neceffary, than it argues a Dependence of his Being, that his Existence is neceffary. If it be fomething too low, for the fupreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Neceffity, fo as neceffarily, in every Cafe, to will in the highest Degree holily and happily; then why is it not alfo fomething too low, for him to have his Existence, and the infinite Perfection of his Nature, and his infinite Happiness determined by Neceffity? It is no more

to

to God's Difhonour, to be neceffarily wife, than to be neceffarily holy. And if neither of them be to his Dishonour then it is not to his Dithonour neceffarily to act holily and wifely. And if it be not difhonourable, to be neceffarily holy and wife, in the highest poffible Degree, no more is it mean or dishonourable, neceffarily to act holily and wifely in the highest poffible Degree; or (which is the fame Thing) to do that, in every Cafe, which above all other Things is wifeft and best.

The Reason why it is not difhonourable, to be neceffarily most holy, is, because Holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable Thing. For the fame Reason, it is no Difhonour to be neceffarily most wise, and in every Cafe to act most wifely, or do the Thing which is the wifeft of all; for Wisdom is alfo in itself excellent and honourable,

The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will, &c. as has been observed, reprefents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing neceffarily determined by fuperiour Fitnefs, as making the bleffed God a Kind of almighty Minifter and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he infifts, P. 93, 94. that this moral Neceffity and Impoffibility is in Effect the fame Thing with phyfical and natural Neceffity and Impoffibility: And in P. 54, 55. he fays, "The "Scheme which determines the Will always and "certainly by the Understanding, and the Un

derstanding by the Appearance of Things, "feems to take away the true Nature of Vice "and Virtue. For the fublimeft of Virtues, and "the vileft of Vices, feem rather to be Mutters

" of

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"of Fate and Neceffity, flowing naturally and "neceffarily from the Existence, the Circum"ftances, and prefent Situation of Perfons and "Things: For this Exiftence and Situation neceffarily makes fuch an Appearance to the "Mind; from this Appearance flows a neceffary Perception and Judgment, concerning thefe "Things; this Judgment neceffarily determines "the Will: And thus by this Chain of neceffary Causes, Virtue and Vice would lofe their "Nature, and become natural Ideas, and neceffary Things, inftead of moral and free Ac"tions."

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And yet this fame Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a perfectly wife Being will constantly and certainly chufe what is moft fit; and fays, P. 102, 103. grant, and always have granted, that "wherefoever there is fuch an antecedent fuperiour "Fitness of Things, God acts according to it, "fo as never to contradict it; and particularly, "in all his judicial Proceedings, as a Governour, "and Distributer of Rewards and Punishments."

Yea, he fays exprefly, P. 42. "That it is not "poffible for God to act otherwife, than according to this Fitnefs and Goodnefs in Things."

So that according to this Author, putting thefe feveral Paffages of his Effay together, there is no Virtue, nor any Thing of a moral Nature, in the moft fublime and glorious Acts and Exercises of God's Holiness, Juftice, and Faithfulness; and he never does any Thing which is in itself fupremely worthy, and above all other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate; and in what he does as the Judge, end moral Governour of the World, He exercifes no moral

moral Excellency; exercifing no Freedom in thefe Things, becaufe He acts by moral Neceffity, which is in Effect the fame with phyfical or natural Neceffity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical Fatality; as a Being indeed of vaft UnderStanding, as well as Power and Efficiency (as He faid before) but without a Will to chufe, being a Kind of almighty Minifter of Fate, acting under its fupreme Influence. For He allows, that in all these Things God's Will is determined conftantly and certainly by a fuperiour Fitnefs, and that it is not poffible for Him to act otherwife. And if thefe Things are fo, what Glory or Praise belongs to God for doing holily and juftly, or taking the most fit, holy, wife and excellent Course, in any one Inftance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common Senfe of Mankind, it don't in the leaft derogate from the Honour of any Being, that through the moral Perfection of his Nature, he neceffarily acts with fupreme Wisdom and Holiness: But on the contrary, his Praise is the greater: Herein confifts the Height of his Glory.

The fame Author, P. 56. fuppofes, that herein appears the excellent Character of a wife and good Man, that tho' be can chufe contrary to the Fitness of Things, yet he does not; but fuffers himself to be directed by Fitness; and that in this Conduct He imitates the bleffed God. And yet He fuppofes 'tis contrariwife with the bleffed God; not that he fuffers Himself to be directed by Fitnefs, when He can chufe contrary to the Fitness of Things, but that he cannot chufe contrary to the Fitness of Things; as he fays, P. 42.-That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than, according to this Fitness, where there is any Fitness or Goodness of Things: Yea, he fuppofes, P. 31. That if a Man were perfectly wife

and