Things in the Mind of the incomprehenfible Deity, precifely as they are.

We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exactly of the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithstanding all the Progrefs which has been made in paft and prefent Ages, in this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphyficks, as it relates to thefe Things, is brought to greater Perfection than once it was; yet here is ftill Work enough left for future Inquiries and Researches, and Room for Progress still to be made, for many Ages and Generations. But we had need to be infinitely able Metaphysicians, to conceive with Clearners, according to ftrict, proper and perfect Truth, concerning the Nature of the divine Effence, and the Modes of the Action and Operation of the Powers of the divine Mind.

And it may be noted particularly, that tho' we are obliged to conceive of fome Things in God as confequent and dependent on others, and of fome Things pertaining to the divine Nature and Will as the Foundation of others, and fo before others in the Order of Nature: As, we must conceive of the Knowledge and Holiness of God as prior in the Order of Nature to his Happiness; the Perfection of his Understanding, as the Foundation of his wife Purposes and Decrees; the Holinefs of his Nature, as the Cause and Reason of his holy Determinations. And yet when we speak of Caufe and Effect, Antecedent and Confequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is felf-existent, independent, of perfect and abfolute Simplicity and Immutability, and the first Cause of all Things; doubtless there must be less Propriety in fuch Reprefentations, than when we fpeak of derived de

Y 3

pendent

pendent Beings, who are compounded, and liable to perpetual Mutation and Succeffion.

Having premised this, I proceed to obferve concerning the foremention'd Author's Exclamation, about the necessary Determination of God's Will, in all Things, by what He fees to be fittest and best;

That all the feeming Force of fuch Objections and Exclamations muft arife from an Imagination, that there is fome Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without fuch a moral Neceffity, as will make it impoffible to do any other, than always chufe what is wifeft and beft; as tho' there were fome Disadvantage, Meannefs and Subjection, in fuch a Neceffity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by fomething, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held God faft, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere Imagination and Delufion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Difhonour to a Being, neceffarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the neceffary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependence, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Afcendency. + 'Tis not inconfiftent with the abfolute

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"It might have been objected with much more Plaufiblenefs, that the fupreme Cause cannot be free, because he muft "needs do always what is beft in the Whole. But this would "not at all ferve Spinoza's Purpose: For this is a Neceffity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Neceffity confiftent with the greatest Freedom, and most perfect "Choice. For the only Foundation of this Neceffity is fuch an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impoffible for a wife Being to act foolishly." Cla's Dem, of the Being and Attrib, of God. Edit. 6. P. 64.

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"Tho'

abfolute, and moft perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and AuY 4 thority

"Tho' God is a moft perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot "but do always what is beft and wifeft on the Whole. The "Reafon is evident; because perfect Wisdom and Goodness "are as fteady and certain Principles of Action, as Neceflity "itself; and an infinitely wife and good Being, indued with "the most perfect Liberty, can no more chufe to act in Con"tradiction to Wisdom and Goodness, than a neceffary Agent "can act contrary to the Neceffity by which it is acted; it "being as great an Abfurdity and Impoffibility in Choice, for "infinite Wisdom to chufe to act unwifely, or infinite Good"ness to chufe what is not good, as it would be in Nature, "for abfolute Neceffity to tail of producing its necessary "Effect. There was indeed no Neceffity in Nature, that God "should at first create fuch Beings as he has created, or indeed "any Being at all; because he is in himfelf infinitely happy "and All-fufficient. There was alfo no Neceffity in Nature, "that he fhould preferve and continue Things in Being, after "they were created, because he would be felf-fufficient with"out their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. "But it was fit and wife and good, that infinite Wisdom should "manifeft, and infinite Goodnefs communicate itself; and "therefore it was necessary, in the Senfe of Neceflity I am "now speaking of, that Things fhould be made at fuch a Time, "and continued fo long, and indeed with various Perfections "in fuch Degrees, as infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it "wifeft and beft that they fhould." Ibid. P. 112, 113.

""Tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature, to de"fire, will and act, according to the last Result of a fair Exa"mination.This is fo far from being a Restraint or Di"minution of Freedom, that it is the very Improvement and "Benefit of it: "Tis not an Abridgment, 'tis the End and "Ufe of our Liberty; and the further we are removed from

fuch a Determination, the nearer we are to Mifery and Sla"very. A perfect Indifference in the Mind, not determin"able by its laft Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought

to attend its Choice, would be fo far from being an Advan"tage and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it "would be as great an Imperfection, as the Want of Indiffe"rency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, "would be an Imperfection on the other Side.-'Tis as "much a Perfection, that Defire or the Power of prefering fhould be determined by Good, as that the Power of acting

"fhould

thority to do whatever pleases him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and

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"should be determined by the Will: And the certainer fuch "Determination is, the greater the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by any Thing but the last Result of our own "Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, we were "not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we "might attain the Good we chufe; and therefore every Man

is brought under a Neceffity by his Conftitution, as an in"telligent Being, to be determin'd in willing by his own "Thought and Judgment, what is beft for him to do; elfe "he would be under the Determination of fome other than "himself, which is Want of Liberty. And to deny that * Man's Will, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an End that he would not have, at the fame Time that he wills and acts "for it. For if he prefers it in his prefent Thoughts, be"fore any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and "would have it before any other; unless he can have, and "not have it; will, and not will it, at the fame Time; a "Contradiction too manifest to be admitted-If we look up. "on those superiour Beings above us, who enjoy perfect HapW pinefs, we fhall have Reason to judge, that they are more fteadily determined in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no Reafon to think they are lefs happy, or less "free, than we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite "Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom "and Goodness could do, I think we might fay, that God "himself cannot chufe what is not Goad. The Freedom of the Almighty binders not his being determined by what is best.

But to give a right View of this mistaken Part of Liberty, "let me afk, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is "lefs determined by wife Determination, than a wife Man?

Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be at Liberty to play "the Fool, and draw Shame and Mifery upon a Man's felf? "If to break loofe from the Conduct of Reason, and to want "that Refraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us "from doing or chufing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, "Mad-men and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think "no Body would chufe to be mad, for the fake of fuch Liberty, but he that is mad already." Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. I. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216

This Being having all Things always neceffarily in View, muft always, and eternally will, according to his infinite

"Com

and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can ftay bis Hand, or fay unto him, What doft thou?— The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Controul, without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the leaft Measure to any other Power; and fo without any Hinderance or Restraint, that it should be either impoffible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any Dependence of his Power on any other Power, from whence it fhould be derived, or which it should stand in any

Need

"Comprehenfion of Things; that is, muft will all Things "that are wifeft and beft to be done. There is no getting "free of this Confequence. If it can will at all, it must will "this Way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of "willing otherwife than what is wifeft and best, contradicts "that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge muft "direct the Will without Error. Here then is the Origin of "moral Neceffity; and that is really, of Freedom. Perhaps it may be faid, when the divine Will is determined, from the "Confideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as neceffarily determined, as if it were phyfically impel'd, if "that were poffible. But it is Unfkilfulness, to fuppofe this an Objection. The great Principle is once established, viz. "That the divine Will is determined by the eternal Reason

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and Aptitudes of Things, inftead of being physically im"pelled; and after that, the more ftrong and neceffary this "Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be al"lowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and "adorable Being, whofe, Will and Power are constantly, im

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mutably determined, by the Confideration of what is wifeft "and beft; instead of a furd Being, with Power, but without Difcerning and Reafon. It is, the Beauty of this Neceffity, "that it is firong as Fate itself, with all the Advantage of Reafon "and Goodness. It is ftrange, to fee Men contend, that the "Deity is not Free, becaufe he is neceffarily rational, immutably good and wife; when a Man is allowed ftill the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and conftantly his Will is "determined by Reafon and Truth.' Enquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II. P. 403, 404.