Part IV. fections of the Godhead, a future State, the Duty and Happiness of Mankind, &c. as obferving how the Light of Nature and Reason in the wifeft and best of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

And it is very remarkable concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alleges the Agreement of the Stoicks with us, wherein he fupposes they maintained the like Doctrine with us, as an Argument against the Truth of our Doctrine; yet this very Dr. Whitby alleges the Agreement of the Stoicks with the Arminians, wherein he fuppofes they taught the fame Doctrine with them, as an Argument for the Truth of their Doctrine. * So that when the Stoicks agree with them, this (it feems) is a Confirmation of their Doctrine, and a Confutation of ours, as fhewing that our Opinions are contrary to the natural Sense and common Reafon of Mankind: Nevertheless, when the Stoicks agree with us, it argues no fuch Thing in our Favour; but on the contrary, is a great Argument against us, and fhews our Doctrine to be Heathenifh.

It is obferved by fome Calvinistic Writers, that the Arminians fymbolize with the Stoicks, in fome of those Doctrines wherein they are oppofed by the Calvinists; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total Corruption and Depravity of Heart; and in what they held of Man's Ability to make Himself truly virtuous and conformed to God; and in fome other Doctrines.

It may be further obferved, it is certainly no better Objection against our Doctrine, that it agrees in fome Refpects with the Doctrine of the ancient

*Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 3. p. 325, 326, 327.

ancient Stoic Philofophers, than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees in fome Refpects with the Opinion of the very worst of the Heathen Philofophers, the Followers of Epicurus, that Father of Atheism and Licentioufnefs, and with the Doctrine of the Sadducees and Jefuits.

I am not much concerned to know precisely what the ancient Stoic Philofophers held concerning Fate, in order to determine what is Truth; as tho' it were a fure Way to be in the right, to take good Heed to differ from them. It feems that they differed among themselves; and probably the Doctrine of Fate, as maintain'd by most of 'em, was in fome Refpects erroneous. But whatever their Doctrine was, if any of 'em held fuch a Fate, as is repugnant to any Liberty confifting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny fuch a Fate. If they held any fuch Fate, as is not confiftent with the common and univerfal Notions that Mankind have of Liberty, Activity, moral Agency, Virtue and Vice; I difclaim any fuch Thing, and think I have demonftrated that the Scheme I maintain is no fuch Scheme. If the Stoicks by Fate meant any Thing of fuch a Nature, as can be fuppofed to ftand in the Way of the Advantage and Benefit of the Ufe of Means and Endeavours, or makes it lefs worth the while for Men to defire, and feek after any Thing wherein their Virtue and Happiness confifts; I hold no Doctrine that is clog'd with any fuch Inconvenience, any more than any other Scheme whatsoever; and by no Means fo much as the Arminian Scheme of Contingence; as has been fhewn. If they held any fuch Doctrine of univerfal Fatality, as is inconfiftent with any Kind of Liberty, that is or can be any Perfection, Dignity, Privilege or Benefit, or any Thing defirable, in any Refpect, for

any intelligent Creature, or indeed with any Liberty that is poffible or conceivable; I embrace no fuch Doctrine. If they held any fuch Doctrine of Fate as is inconfiftent with the World's being in all Things fubject to the Difpofal of an intelligent wife Agent, that prefides, not as the Soul of the World, but as the fovereign Lord of the Univerfe, governing all Things by proper Will, Choice and Design, in the Exercise of the most perfect Liberty conceivable, without Subjection to any Constraint, or being properly under the Power or Influence of any Thing before, above or without himself; I wholly renounce any such

Doctrine.

As to Mr. Hobbes's maintaining the fame Doctrine concerning Neceffity; —I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his Opinion be what it will, we need not reject all Truth which is demonstrated by clear Evidence, merely because it was once held by fome bad Man. This great Truth, that Jefus is the Son of God, was not fpoil'd because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud Voice by the Devil. If Truth is fo defiled because it is spoken by the Mouth, or written by the Pen of fome ill-minded mischievous Man, that it must never be received, we fhall never know when we hold any of the most precious and evident Truths by a fure Tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad Use of this Truth, that is to be lamented : but the Truth is not to be thought worthy of Rejection on that Account. 'Tis common for the Corruptions of the Hearts of evil Men, to abuse the best Things to vile Purposes.

I might alfo take Notice of its having been obferved, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes † in many more Things than the Calvinists. As,

in

+ Dr. Gill, in his Anfwer to Dr. Whitby. Vol. III. P. 183, &c.

in what he is faid to hold concerning Original Sin, in denying the Neceffity of fupernatural Illumination, in denying infufed Grace, in denying the Doctrine of Juftification by Faith alone; and other Things.

SECTION

VII.

Concerning the Neceflity of the Divine Will.

SOM

OME may poffibly object against what has been fuppofed of the Abfurdity and Inconfiftence of a felf-determining Power in the Will, and the Impoffibility of its being otherwife, than that the Will fhould be determined in every Cafe by fome Motive, and by a Motive which (as it ftands in the View of the Understanding) is of fuperiour Strength to any appearing on the other Side ; That if these Things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created Minds, but the Will of God Himself is neceffary in all its Determina tions. Concerning which fays the Author of the Efay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature, p. 85, 86. "What strange Doctrine is "this, contrary to all our Ideas of the Dominion "of God? Does it not deftroy the Glory of his "Liberty of Choice, and take away from the "Creator and Governour and Benefactor of the "World, that moft free and fovereign Agent, all "the Glory of this Sort of Freedom? Does it "not feem to make Him a Kind of mechanical "Medium of Fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's "Doctrine of Fatality and Neceffity, into all

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Things that God hath to do with? Does it not "feem to represent the bleffed God, as a Being "of vaft Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency, but ftill to leave Him without a

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Y 2

"Will

"Will to chufe among all the Objects within his "View? In fhort, it feems to make the blessed "God a Sort of almighty Minister of Fate, un"der its univerfal and fupreme Influence; as it was the profefs'd Sentiment of fome of the Ancients, that Fate was above the Gods."

..

This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an Application to Men's Imaginations and Prejudices, rather than to mere Reason.-But I would calmly endeavour to confider whether there be any Reason in this frightful Representation.-But before I enter upon a particular Confideration of the Matter, I would obferve this: That 'tis reafonable to suppose, it should be much more difficult to exprefs or conceive Things according to exact metaphyfical Truth, relating to the Nature and Manner of the Existence of Things in the divine Understanding and Will, and the Operation of thefe Faculties (if I may fo call them) of the divine Mind, than in the human Mind; which is infinitely more within our View, and nearer to a Proportion to the Measure of our Comprehenfion, and more commenfurate to the Use and Import of human Speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in Regard of Terms to exprefs precife Truth concerning our own Minds, and their Faculties and Operations. Words were firft formed to exprefs external Things; and thofe that are applied to exprefs Things internal and fpiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a Sort of figurative Senfe. Whence they are most of 'em attended with a great Deal of Ambiguity and Unfixedness in their Signification, occafioning innumerable Doubts, Difficulties and Confufions in Inquiries and Controverfies about Things of this Nature. But Language is much lefs adapted to express