mination, which they suppose effential to Virtue, that God fhould be the Bestower, or (which is the fame Thing) the determining, difpofing Author of Virtue. Not the former; for natural Influence and Tendency fuppofes Caufality and Connection; and that fuppofes Neceffity of Event, which is inconfiftent with Arminian Liberty. A Tendency of Means, by biaffing the Heart in Favour of Virtue, or by bringing the Will under the Influence and Power of Motives in its Determinations, are both inconfiftent with Arminian Liberty of Will, confifting in Indifference, and fovereign Self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.

But for the more full Removal of this Prejudice against that Doctrine of Neceffity which has been maintain'd, as though it tended to encourage a total Neglect of all Endeavours as vain; the following Things may be confidered.

The Question is not, Whether Men may not thus improve this Doctrine : (We know that many true and wholesome Doctrines are abused:) But, Whether the Doctrine gives any juft Occasion for fuch an Improvement; or whether, on the Suppofition of the Truth of the Doctrine, fuch a Ufe of it would not be unreasonable? If any fhall affirm, that it would not, but that the very Nature of the Doctrine is fuch as gives juft Occafion for it, it must be on this Suppofition; namely, That fuch an invariable Neceffity of all Things already fettled, must render the Interpofition of all Means, Endeavours, Conclufions or Actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future End whatfoever, perfectly infignificant; because they can't in the least alter or vary the Course and Series of Things, in any Event or Circumftance;

all

all being already fixed unalterably by Neceffity: And that therefore 'tis Folly, for Men to ufe any Means for any End; but their Wisdom, to fave themselves the Trouble of Endeavours, and take their Eafe. No Perfon can draw fuch an Inference from this Doctrine, and come to fuch a Conclufion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very Principles he pretends to act upon: For he comes to a Conclufion, and takes a Course, in order to an End, even bis Eafe, or the faving himself from Trouble; he feeks fomething future, and uses Means in Order to a future Thing, even in his drawing up that Conclufion, that he will feek nothing, and ufe no Means in order to any Thing future; he feeks his future Ease, and the Benefit and Comfort of Indolence. If prior Neceffity that determines all Things, makes vain all Actions or Conclufions of ours, in order to any Thing future; then it makes vain all Conclufions and Conduct of ours, in order to our future Ease : The Measure of our Eafe, with the Time, Manner and every Circumftance of it, is already fix'd, by all-determining Neceffity, as much as any Thing elfe. If he fays within himself, “What "future Happiness or Mifery I shall have, is al

ready in Effect determined by the neceffary "Course and Connection of Things; therefore I "will fave myself the Trouble of Labour and Diligence, which can't add to my determin'd

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Degree of Happiness, or diminish my Misery; "but will take my Ease, and will enjoy the Com"fort of Sloth and Negligence." Such a Man contradicts himself: He fays, the Measure of his future Happiness and Mifery is already fix'd, and he won't try to diminish the one, nor add to the other: But yet in his very Conclufion, he contradicts this; for he takes up this Conclufion, to add to his future Happiness, by the Ease and Com

fort

fort of his Negligence; and to diminish his future Trouble and Mifery, by faving himself the Trouble of ufing Means and taking Pains.

Therefore Perfons can't reasonably make this Improvement of the Doctrine of Neceffity, that they will go into a voluntary Negligence of Means for their own Happiness. For the Principles they must go upon, in order to this, are inconfiftent with their making any Improvement at all of the Doctrine: For to make fome Improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to fome voluntary Conclufion, in Regard to their own Conduct, with fome View or Aim: But this, as has been fhewn, is inconfiftent with the Principles they pretend to act upon. In fhort, the Principles are fuch as cannot be acted upon at all, or in any Refpect, confiftently. And therefore in every Pretence of acting upon them, or making any Improvement at all of them, there is a Self-contradiction.

As to that Objection against the Doctrine which I have endeavoured to prove, that it makes Men no more than mere Machines; I would fay, that notwithstanding this Doctrine, Man is entirely, perfectly and unfpeakably different from a mere Machine, in that he has Reafon and Understanding, and has a Faculty of Will, and fo is capable of Volition and Choice; and in that, his Will is guided by the Dictates or Views of his Underftanding; and in that his external Actions and Behaviour, and in many Refpects alfo his Thoughts, and the Exercises of his Mind, are fubject to his Will; fo that he has Liberty to act according to his Choice, and do what he pleases; and by Means of these Things, is capable of moral Habits and moral Acts, fuch Inclinations and Actions as ac

cording

cording to the common Senfe of Mankind, are worthy of Praise, Efteem, Love and Reward; or on the contrary, of Difesteem, Deteftation, Indignation and Punishment.

In thefe Things is all the Difference from mere Machines, as to Liberty and Agency, that would. be any Perfection, Dignity or Privilege, in any Respect All the Difference that can be defired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the Pretenfions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themfelves. (Tho' their Explications overthrow and abolish the Things afferted, and pretended to be explained) For they are forced to explain a felfdetermining Power of Will, by a Power in the Soul, to determine as it chufes or wills; which comes to no more than this, that a Man has a Power of chufing, and in many Inftances, can do as he chufes. Which is quite a different Thing from that Contradiction, his having Power of chufing his first Act of Choice in the Cafe.

Or if their Scheme makes any other Difference than this, between Men and Machines, it is for the worse It is fo far from fuppofing Men to have a Dignity and Privilege above Machines, that it makes the Manner of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas Machines are guided by an understanding Caufe, by the skilful Hand of the Workman or Owner; the Will of Man is left to the Guidance of nothing, but abfolute blind Contingence.

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintain'd, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.

W HEN Calvinifts oppose the Arminian No

tion of the Freedom of Will, and Contingence of Volition, and infift that there are no Acts of the Will, nor any other Events whatsoever, but what are attended with fome Kind of Neceffity; their Oppofers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoicks in their Doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his Opinion of Neceffity.

It would not be worth while to take Notice of fo impertinent an Objection, had it not been urg'd by fome of the chief Arminian Writers.-There were many important Truths maintain'd by the ancient Greek and Roman Philofophers, and efpecially the Stoicks, that are never the worse for being held by them. The Stoick Philofophers, by the general Agrcement of Christian Divines, and even Arminian Divines, were the greateft, wifeft, and most virtuous of all the Heathen Philofophers; and in their Doctrine and Practice came the nearest to Chriftianity of any of their Sects. How frequently are the Sayings of thefe Philofophers, in many of the Writings and Sermons, even of Arminian Divines, produced, not as Arguments of the Falfeness of the Doctrines which they delivered, but as a Confirmation of fome of the greateft Truths of the Chriftian Religion, relating to the Unity and Per

fections