would, if he fuffered as much from the Conduct of a Man perfectly delirious; yea, tho' he first brought his Diftraction upon Him fome Way by his own Fault.

Some feem to difdain the Diftinction that we make between natural and moral Neceffity, as tho' it were altogether impertinent in this Controversy: "That which is neceffary (fay they) is neceffary; "it is that which muft be, and can't be prevent"ed. And that which is impoffible, is impoffi"ble, and can't be done: and therefore none can "be to blame for not doing it." And fuch Comparisons are made ufe of, as the commanding of a Man to walk who has loft his Legs, and condemning and punishing Him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a Man, who is fhut up in a strong Prifon, to come forth, &c. But in thefe Things Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common Senfe determine whether there be not a great Difference between thofe two Cafes ; the one, that of a Man who has offended his Prince, and is caft into Prifon; and after he has lain there a while, the King comes to him, calls him to come forth to Him; and tells him that if he will do fo, and will fall down before Him, and humbly beg his Pardon, he shall be forgiven, and fet at Liberty, and alfo be greatly enrich'd, and advanced to Honour: The Prifoner heartily repents of the Folly and Wickedness of his Offence against his Prince, is thoroughly difpofed to abase Himself, and accept of the King's Offer; but is confined by ftrong Walls, with Gates of Brafs, and Bars of Iron. The other Cafe is, that of a Man who is of a very unreasonable Spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful Difpofition; and moreover, has been brought up in traitorous Principles; and has his Heart poffeffed with an exX

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Part IV. treme and inveterate Enmity to his lawful Sovereign; and for his Rebellion is cast into Prison, and lies long there, loaden with heavy Chains, and in miferable Circumftances. At length the compaffionate Prince comes to the Prifon, orders his Chains to be knocked off, and his PrifonDoors to be fet wide open; calls to him, and tells Him, if He will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and afk his Forgiveness; He fhall be forgiven, fet at Liberty, and fet in a Place of great Dignity and Profit in his Court. But He is fo ftout and ftomachful, and full of haughty Malignity, that He can't be willing to accept the Offer his rooted ftrong Pride and Malice have perfect Power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his Heart: The Oppofition of his Heart has the Maftery over Him, having an Influence on his Mind far fuperiour to the King's Grace and Condefcenfion, and to all his kind Offers and Promifes. Now, is it agreeable to common Sense, to affert and ftand to it, that there is no Difference between these two Cafes, as to any Worthinefs of Blame in the Prifoners; because, forfooth, there is a Neceffity in both, and the required Act in each Cafe is impoffible? 'Tis true, a Man's evil Difpofitions may be as ftrong and immovable as the Bars of a Castle. But who can't fee, that when a Man, in the latter Cafe, is faid to be unable to obey the Command, the Expreffion is ufed improperly, and not in the Sense it has originally and in common Speech? And that it may properly be faid to be in the Rebel's Power to come out of Prifon, feeing he can easily do it if he pleafes; tho' by Reafon of his vile Temper of Heart which is fix'd and rooted, 'tis impoffible that it should please Him?

Upon

Upon the whole, I prefume there is no Person of good Understanding, who impartially confiders the Things which have been obferved, but will allow that 'tis not evident from the Dictates of the common Senfe, or natural Notions of Mankind, that moral Neceffity is inconfiftent with Praise and Blame. And therefore, if the Arminians would prove any fuch Inconfiftency, it must be by fome philofophical and metaphyfical Arguments, and not common Senfe.

There is a grand Illufion in the pretended Demonftration of Arminians from common Senfe. The main Strength of all these Demonftrations, lies in that Prejudice that arifes thro' the infenfible Change of the Ufe and Meaning of fuch Terms as Liberty, able, unable, neceffary, impoffible, unavoidable, invincible, Action, &c. from their original and vulgar Senfe, to a metaphyfical Sense entirely diverfe; and the ftrong Connection of the Ideas of Blamelefnefs, &c. with fome of these Terms, by an Habit contracted and establish'd, while thefe Terms were used in their first Meaning. This Prejudice and Delufion is the Foundation of all thofe Pofitions they lay down as Maxims, by which most of the Scriptures, which they allege in this Controverfy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous Demonstrations from Scripture and Reafon depend. From this fecret Delusion and Prejudice they have almost all their Advantages: 'Tis the Strength of their Bulwarks, and the Edge of their Weapons. And this is the main Ground of all the Right they have to treat their Neighbours in fo affuming a Manner, and to infult others, perhaps as wife and good as themselves, as weak Bigots, Men that dwell in the dark Caves of Superftition, perverfly fet, obftinately fbutting their Eyes against the Noon-day Light, EneX 2

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mies to common Senfe, maintaining the firft-born of Abfurdities, &c. &c. But perhaps an impartial Confideration of the Things which have been observed in the preceding Parts of this Inquiry, may enable the Lovers of Truth better to judge whose Doctrine is indeed abfurd, abftrufe, felf-contradictory, and inconfiftent with common Sense, and many Ways repugnant to the univerfal Dictates of the Reason of Mankind.

Corol. From Things which have been observed, it will follow, that it is agreeable to common Sense to suppose, that the glorified Saints have not their Freedom at all diminish'd, in any Respect; and that God Himfelf has the higheft poffible Freedom, according to the true and proper Meaning of the Term; and that He is in the highest poffible respect an Agent, and active in the Exercife of his infinite Holiness; tho' he acts therein in the highest Degree neceffarily and his Actions of this Kind are in the highest, most abfolutely perfect Manner virtuous and praise-worthy; and are fo, for that very Reason, because they are most perfectly neceffary.

SECTION

Concerning thofe Objections, that this Scheme of Neceffity renders all Means and Endeavours for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain, and to no Purpofe; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion.

A

Rminians fay, if it be so, that Sin and Virtue come to pass by a Neceffity consisting in a fure Connection of Caufes and Effects, Antecedents and Confequents, it can never be worth the while to use any Means or Endeavours to obtain the one, and avoid the other; seeing no Endeavours can alter the Futurity of the Event, which is become neceffary by a Connection already established.

But I defire, that this Matter may be fully confidered; and that it may be examined with a thorough Strictnefs, whether it will follow that Endeavours and Means, in order to avoid or obtain any future Thing, must be more in vain, on the Suppofition of fuch a Connection of Antecedents and Confequents, than if the contrary be fuppofed.

For Endeavours to be in vain, is for 'em not to be fuccefsful; that is to fay, for 'em not eventually to be the Means of the Thing aimed at, which can't be, but in one of these two Ways; either, First, That although the Means are used, yet the Event aimed at don't follow: Or, Secondly,