The common People, in their Notion of a faulty or Praife-worthy Deed or Work done by any one, do fuppofe that the Man does it in the Exercife of Liberty. But then their Notion of Liberty is only a Perfon's having Opportunity of doing as he pleafes. They have no Notion of Liberty confifting in the Will's first acting, and fo caufing its own Acts; and determining, and. fo caufing its own Determinations; or chufing, and fo caufing its own Choice. Such a Notion of Liberty is what none have, but those that have darken'd their own Minds with confufed metaphyfical Speculation, and abftrufe and ambiguous Terms. If a Man is not reftrain'd from acting as his Will determines, or conftrain'd to act otherwife; then he has Liberty, according to common Notions of Liberty, without taking into the Idea that grand Contradiction of all, the Determinations of a Man's free Will being the Effects of the Determinations of his free Will.Nor have Men commonly any Notion of Freedom confifting in Indifference. For if so, then it would be agreeable to their Notion, that the greater Indifference Men act with, the more Freedom they act with; whereas the Reverse is true. He that in acting, proceeds with the fulleft Inclination, does what He does with the greatest Freedom, according to common Senfe. And fo far is it from being agreeable to common Senfe, that fuch Liberty as confifts in Indifference is requifite to Praife or Blame, that on the contrary, the Dictate of every Man's natural Senfe thro' the World is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his acting Good or Evil, and the more he does either with or without full and ftrong Inclination, the more is he to be efteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.

II. If it were inconfiftent with the common Senfe of Mankind, that Men fhould be either to be blamed or commended in any Volitions they have or fail of, in Cafe of moral Neceffity or Impoffibility; then it would furely alfo be agreeable to the fame Sense and Reason of Mankind, that the nearer the Cafe approaches to fuch a moral Neceffity or Impoffibility, either through a strong antecedent moral Propenfity on the one Hand, or a great antecedent Oppofition and Difficulty on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blameable nor commendable; fo that Acts exerted with fuch preceding Propenfity would be worthy of proportionably lefs Praife; and when omitted, the Act being attended with fuch Difficulty, the Omiffion would be worthy of the less Blame. It is fo, as was observed before, with natural Neceffity and Impoffibility, Propenfity and Difficulty: As 'tis a plain Dictate of the Senfe of all Mankind, that natural Neceffity and Impoffibility takes away all Blame and Praife; and therefore, that the nearer the Approach is to thefe through previous Propenfity or Difficulty, fo Praife and Blame are proportionably diminished. And if it were as much a Dictate of common Senfe, that moral Neceffity of doing, or Impoffibility of avoiding, takes away all Praife and Blame, as that natural Neceffity or Impoffibility does this; then, by a perfect Parity of Reafon, it would be as much the Dictate of common Senfe, that an Approach to moral Neceffity of doing, or Impoffibility of avoiding, diminishes Praife and Blame, as that an Approach to natural Neceffity and Impoffibility does fo. 'Tis equally the Voice of common Senfe, that Perfons are excufable

in

'Tis here argued, on Suppofition that not all Propenfity implies moral Neceflity, but only fome very high Degrees; which none will deny.

in Part, in neglecting Things difficult against their Wills, as that they are excufable wholly in neglecting Things impoffible against their Wills. And if it made no Difference, whether the Impoffibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to Excufableness; fo neither would it make any Difference, whether the Difficulty, or Approach to Neceffity be natural against the Will, or moral, lying in the Propensity of the Will.

But 'tis apparent, that the Reverse of these Things is true. If there be an Approach to a moral Neceffity in a Man's Exertion of good Acts of Will, they being the Exercise of a strong Propenfity to Good, and a very powerful Love to Virtue; 'tis fo far from being the Dictate of common Senfe, that He is lefs virtuous, and the less to be esteem'd, loved and praised; that 'tis agreeable to the natural Notions of all Mankind that he is fo much the better Man, worthy of greater Refpect, and higher Commendation. And the ftronger the Inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to Neceffity in that Respect; or to Impoffibility of neglecting the virtuous Act, or of doing a vicious one; ftill the more virtuous, and worthy of higher Commendation. And on the other Hand, if a Man exerts evil Acts of Mind; as for Inftance, Acts of Pride or Malice from a rooted and ftrong Habit or Principle of Haughtinefs and Malicioufnefs, and a violent Propenfity of Heart to fuch Acts; according to the natural Senfe of all Men, he is fo far from being the lefs hateful and blameable on that Account, that he is fo much the more worthy to be detefted and condemned by all that obferve Him.

More

Moreover, 'tis manifeft that it is no Part of the Notion which Mankind commonly have of a blameable or Praife-worthy Act of the Will, that it is an Act which is not determined by an antecedent Bias or Motive, but by the fovereign Power of the Will itfelf; because if fo, the greater Hand fuch Causes have in determining any Acts of the Will, fo much the lefs virtuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the lefs Hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas the Reverse is true: Men don't think a good Act to be the lefs Praife-worthy, for the Agent's being much determined in it by a good Inclination or a good Motive; but the more. And if good Inclination or Motive has but little Influence in determining the Agent, they don't think his Act fo much the more virtuous, but the lefs. And fo concerning evil Acts, which are determined by evil Motives or Inclinations.

Yea, if it be fuppofed that good or evil Difpofitions are implanted in the Hearts of Men by Nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly fuppofed in innumerable Cafes) yet it is not commonly fuppofed that Men are worthy of no Praise or Difpraife for fuch Difpofitions; altho' what is natural is undoubtedly neceffary, Nature being prior to all Acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus for Inftance, if a Man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious Difpofition, and is fuppofed to be fo by his natural Temper, 'tis no vulgar Notion, no Dictate of the common Sense and Apprehenfion of Men, that fuch Difpofitions are no Vices or moral Evils, or that fuch Perfons are not worthy of Difesteem, Odium and Dishonour; or that the proud or malicious Acts which flow from fuch natural Difpofitions, are worthy of no Refentment. Yea, fuch vile natural Difpofitions,

and

Part IV. and the Strength of 'em, will commonly be mention'd rather as an Aggravation of the wicked Acts that come from fuch a Fountain, than an Extenuation of 'em. Its being natural for Men to act thus, is often obferved by Men in the Height of their Indignation: They will fay, ""Tis his very Nature: He is of a vile natural "Temper; 'tis as natural to Him to act fo, as it "is to breathe; He can't help ferving the Devil, "&c." But it is not thus with Regard to hurtful mischievous Things that any are the Subjects or Occafions of by natural Neceffity, against their Inclinations. In fuch a Cafe, the Neceffity, by the common Voice of Mankind, will be spoken of as a full Excufe. Thus 'tis very plain, that common Senfe makes a vaft Difference between these two Kinds of Neceffity, as to the Judgment it makes of their Influence on the moral Quality and Defert of Men's Actions.

And thefe Dictates of Men's Minds are so natural and neceffary, that it may be very much doubted whether the Arminians themfelves have ever got rid of 'em; yea, as to their greatest Doctors, that have gone furtheft in Defence of their metaphyfical Notions of Liberty, and have brought their Arguments to their greatest Strength, and as they fuppofe to a Demonftration, against the Confiftence of Virtue and Vice with any Neceffity; 'Tis to be question'd, whether there is fo much as one of them, but that if He fuffered very much from the injurious Acts of a Man under the Power of an invincible Haughtiness and Malignancy of Temper, would not, from the foremention'd natural Senfe of Mind, refent it far otherwife, than if as great Sufferings came upon Him from the Wind that blows, and Fire that burns by natural Neceffity; and otherwise than he

would,