any Thing foregoing; for fuch a Dependence or Connection excludes Contingence, and implies Neceffity. And yet their Notion of Action implies Neceffity, and fuppofes that it is neceffary, and can't be contingent. For they fuppofe, that whatever is properly called Action, must be determined by the Will and free Choice; and this is as much as to fay, that it must be neceffary, being dependent upon, and determined by fomething foregoing; namely, a foregoing Act of Choice. Again, it belongs to their Notion of Action, of that which is a proper and mere Act, that it is the Beginning of Motion, or of Exertion of Power; but yet it is implied in their Notion of Action, that it is not the Beginning of Motion or Exertion of Power, but is confequent and dependent on a preceding Exertion of Power, viz. the Power of Will and Choice for they fay there is no proper Action but what is freely chofen; or, which is the fame Thing, determined by a foregoing Act of free Choice. But if any of them thall fee Cause to deny this, and fay they hold no fuch Thing as that every Action is chofen, or determined by a foregoing Choice; but that the very first Exertion of Will only, undetermined by any preceding Act, is properly called Action; then I fay, fuch a Man's Notion of Action implies Neceffity; for what the Mind is the Subject of without the Determination of its own previous Choice, it is the Subject of neceffarily, as to any Hand that free Choice has in the Affair; and without any Ability the Mind has to prevent it, by any Will or Election of its own: because by the Suppofition it precludes all previous Acts of the Will or Choice in the Cafe, which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other Way, implied in their Notion of Act, that it is both neceffary and not neceffary. Again, it belongs to their Notion of an A, that it is no Effect of a pre-determining Bias or Preponderation, but fprings immediately out of Indifference; and this implies that it can't be from foregoing Choice, which is foregoing Preponderation: if it be not habitual, but occafional, yet if it causes the Act, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the fame Time, 'tis effential to their Notion of an Act, that it is what the Agent is the Author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previous Choice and Design. So that according to their Notion of an Act, confidered with Regard to its Confequences, these following Things are all effential to it; viz. That it fhould be neceffary, and not neceffary; that it fhould be from a Cause, and no Caufe; that it fhould be the Fruit of Choice and Design, and not the Fruit of Choice and Defign; that it should be the Beginning of Motion or Exertion, and yet confequent on previous Exertion; that it should be before it is, that it fhould fpring immediately out of Indifference and Equilibrium, and yet be the Effect of Preponderation; that it should be felf-originated, and alfo have its Original from fomething else; that it is what the Mind caufes itfelf, of its own Will, and can produce or prevent, according to its Choice or Pleafure, and yet what the Mind has no Power to prevent, it precluding all previous Choice in the Affair. So that an Act, according to their metaphyfical Notion of it, is fomething of which there is no Idea; 'tis nothing but a Confufion of the Mind, excited by Words without any diftin&t Meaning, and is an abfolute Non-entity; and that in two Refpects; (1.) There is nothing in the World that ever was, is, or can be, to anfwer the Things -- which must belong to its Defcription, according to what they fuppofe to be effential to it. And (2.) There neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any Notion or Idea to answer the Word, as they ufe and explain it. For if we fhould fuppofe any fuch Notion, it would many Ways destroy itself. But 'tis impoffible, any Idea or Notion fhould fubfift in the Mind, whofe very Nature and Elfence, which constitutes it, deftroys it. If fome learned Philofopher, who had been abroad, in giving an Account of the curious Obfervations he had made in his Travels, fhould fay, "He had "been in Terra del Fuego, and there had feen an "Animal, which he calls by a certain Name, "that begat and brought forth itself, and yet "had a Sire and a Dam diftinct from itself; that "it had an Appetite, and was hungry before it "had a Being; that his Mafter, who led him, "and governed him at his Pleasure, was always "governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he always took "a Step before the firft Step; that he went with "his Head firft, and yet always went Tail fore"moft; and this, tho' he had neither Head nor "Tail: "It would be no Impudence at all, to tell fuch a Traveller, though a learned Man, that He himself had no Notion or Idea of fuch an Animal as he gave an Account of, and never had, nor ever would have. As the foremention'd Notion of Action is very inconfiftent, fo it is wholly diverse from the original Meaning of the Word. The more ufual Signification of it in vulgar Speech, feems to be fome Motion or Exertion of Power, that is voluntary, or that is the Effect of the Will; and is ufed in the fame Senfe as doing: And most commonly 'tis ufed to fignify outward Alions. So Thinking is often often diftinguifh'd from Acting; and Defiring and Willing, from Doing. Befides this more ufual and proper Signification of the Word Action, there are other Ways in which the Word is used that are lefs proper, which yet have Place in common Speech. Oftentimes 'tis ufed to fignify fome Motion or Alteration in inanimate Things, with Relation to fome Object and Effect. So the Spring of a Watch is faid to act upon the Chain and Wheels; the Sun-beams, to act upon Plants and Trees; and the Fire, to act upon Wood. Sometimes the Word is used to fignify Motions, Alterations, and Exertions of Power, which are feen in corporeal Things, confidered abfolutely; efpecially when thefe Motions feem to arife from fome internal Caufe which is hidden; fo that they have a greater Resemblance of thofe Motions of our Bodies, which are the Effects of internal Volition, or invifible Exertions of Will. So the Fermentation of Liquor, the Operations of the Loadstone, and of electrical Bodies, are called the Action of thefe Things. And fometimes the Word Action is ufed to fignify the Exercife of Thought, or of Will and Inclination: fo meditating, loving, hating, inclining, difinclining, chufing and refufing, may be fometimes called acting; though more rarely (unless it be by Philofophers and Metaphysicians) than in any of the other Senfes. But the Word is never ufed in vulgar Speech in that Sense which Arminian Divines ufe it in, namely, for the felf-determinate Exercife of the Will, or an Exertion of the Soul that arifes without any neceffary Connection with any Thing foregoing. If a Man does fomething voluntarily, or as the Effect of his Choice, then in the moft pro per per Sense, and as the Word is moft originally and commonly used, he is faid to act: But whether that Choice or Volition be felf-determined, or no, whether it be connected with foregoing habitual Bias, whether it be the certain Effect of the ftrongeft Motive, or fome extrinfic Cause, never comes into Confideration in the Meaning of the Word. And if the Word Action is arbitrarily used by fome Men otherwise, to fuit fome Scheme of Metaphyficks or Morality, no Argument can reafonably be founded on fuch a Use of this Term, to prove any Thing but their own Pleasure. For Divines and Philofophers ftrenuously to urge fuch Arguments, as tho' they were fufficient to fupport and demonftrate a whole Scheme of moral Philofophy and Divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty Edifice on the Sand, or rather on a Shadow. And tho' it may now perhaps, through Custom, have become natural for 'em to use the Word in this Senfe (if that may be called a Senfe or Meaning, which is fo inconfiftent with itself) yet this don't prove that it is agreeable to the natural Notions Men have of Things, or that there can be any Thing in the Creation that should answer such a Meaning. And tho' they appeal to Experience, yet the Truth is, that Men are fo far from experiencing any fuch Thing, that it is impoffible for. 'em to have any Conception of it. If it should be objected, that Action and Paffion are doubtless Words of a contrary Signification; but to fuppofe that the Agent, in its Action, is under the Power and Influence of fomething extrinfick, is to confound Action and Paffion, and make 'em the fame Thing. I answer, |