fo good, yet if the Caufe of the Disposition or Act be not our Virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praife-worthy in it; and on the contrary, if the Will in its Inclination or Acts be ever fo bad, yet unless it arifes from fomething that is our Vice or Fault, there is Nothing vicious or blame-worthy in it. Hence their grand Objection and pretended Demonftration, or Self-Evidence, against any Virtue and Commendablenefs, or Vice and Blame-worthinefs, of thofe Habits or Acts of the Will, which are not from fome virtuous or vicious Determination of the Will itself.

Now, if this Matter be well confidered, it will appear to be altogether a Mistake, yea, a gross Abfurdity; and that it is moft certain, that if there be any fuch Things, as a virtuous, or vicious Difpofition, or Volition of Mind, the Virtuoufnefs or Vicioufnefs of them confifts not in the Origin or Cause of these Things, but in the Nature of them.

If the Effence of Virtuoufnefs or Commendableness, and of Viciousness or Fault, don't lie in the Nature of the Difpofitions or Acts of Mind, which are faid to be our Virtue and our Fault, but in their Cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for Inftance, if the Vice of a vicious Act of Will, lies not in the Nature of the A&t, but the Caufe; fo that its being of a bad Nature will not make it at all our Fault, unless it arises from fome faulty Determination of our's as its Cause, or something in us that is our Fault; then for the fame Reafon, neither can the Viciousness of that Caufe lie in the Nature of the Thing itfelf, but in its Caufe: that evil Determination of our's is not our Fault, merely because it is of a bad Nature, unless it arifes from fome Cause in us that is our Fault. And when we are come to

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this higher Caufe, ftill the Reafon of the Thing holds good; tho' this Cause be of a bad Nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that Account, unless it arises from fomething faulty in us. Nor yet can Blame-worthinefs lie in the Nature of this Caufe, but in the Cause of that. And thus we muft drive Faultinefs back from Step to Step, from a lower Caufe to a higher, in infinitum: and that is thoroughly to banish it from the World, and to allow it no Poffibility of Existence any where in the Univerfality of Things. On thefe Principles, Vice or moral Evil can't confift in any Thing that is an Effect; becaufe Fault don't confift in the Nature of Things, but in their Caufe; as well as becaufe Effects are neceffary, being unavoidably connected with their Caufe: therefore the Caufe only is to blame. And fo it follows, that Faultiness can lie only in that Caufe, which is a Caufe only, and no Effect of any Thing. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie in the Nature of the Thing itself; not in its being from any Determination of our's, nor any Thing faulty in us which is the Caufe, nor indeed from any Cause at all, for by the Suppofition, it is no Effect, and has no Caufe. And thus, He that will maintain, it is not the Nature of Habits or Acts of Will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the Cause, must immediately run Himfelf out of his own Affertion; and in maintaining it, will infenfibly contradict and deny it.

This is certain, that if Effects are vicious and faulty, not from their Nature, or from any Thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad Cause, it must be on Account of the Badness of the Cause; and fo on Account of the Nature of the Caufe: A bad Effect in the Will muft be bad, because the Caufe is bad, or of an evil Nature, or bas Badnefs as a Quality inherent in it: and a good

Effect

Effect in the Will must be good, by Reason of the Goodness of the Caufe, or its being of a good Kind and Nature. And if this be what is meant, the very Suppofition of Fault and Praise lying not in the Nature of the Thing, but the Caufe, contradicts itself, and does at leaft refolve the Effence of Virtue and Vice into the Nature of Things, and fuppofes it originally to confift in that. And if a Caviller has a Mind to run from the Abfurdity, by saying, "No, the Fault of the Thing "which is the Caufe, lies not in this, that the "Cause itself is of an evil Nature, but that the "Caufe is evil in that Senfe, that it is from an"other bad Caufe." Still the Abfurdity will follow him; for if fo, then the Caufe before charged is at once acquitted, and all the Blame must be laid to the higher Cause, and must confift in that's being evil, or of an evil Nature. So now we are come again to lay the Blame of the Thing blame-worthy, to the Nature of the Thing, and not to the Caufe. And if any is fo foolish as to go higher ftill, and afcend from Step to Step, till he is come to that which is the firft Caufe concerned in the whole Affair, and will fay, all the Blame lies in that; then at last he must be forced to own, that the Faultiness of the Thing which he fuppofes alone blame-worthy, lies wholly in the Nature of the Thing, and not in the Original or Cause of it; for the Suppofition is, that it has no Original, it is determined by no Act of our's, is caufed by nothing faulty in us, being abfolutely without any Caufe. And fo the Race is at an End, but the Evader is taken in his Flight.

'Tis agreeable to the natural Notions of Mankind, that moral Evil, with its Defert of Diflike and Abhorrence, and all its other Ill-defervings, confists in a certain Deformity in the Nature of certain Difpofitions of the Heart, and Acts of the

Will; and not in the Deformity of fomething else, diverse from the very Thing itself, which deferves Abhorrence, fuppofed to be the Caufe of it: Which would be abfurd, because that would be to fuppofe, a Thing that is innocent and not evil, is truly evil and faulty, because another Thing is evil. It implies a Contradiction; for it would be to fuppofe, the very Thing which is morally evil and blame-worthy, is innocent and not blameworthy; but that fomething elfe, which is its Caufe, is only to blame. To fay, that Vice don't confift in the Thing which is vicious, but in its Caufe, is the fame as to fay, that Vice don't confift in Vice, but in that which produces it.

'Tis true, a Caufe may be to blame, for being the Cause of Vice: It may be Wickedness in the Cause, that it produces Wickedness. But it would imply a Contradiction, to fuppofe that these two are the fame individual Wickednefs. The wicked Act of the Caufe in producing Wickedness, is one Wickedness; and the Wickednefs produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore the Wickednefs of the latter don't lie in the former, but is diftinct from it; and the Wickednefs of both lies in the evil Nature of the Things which are wicked.

The Thing which makes Sin hateful, is that by which it deferves Punishment; which is but the Expreffion of Hatred. And that which renders. Virtue lovely, is the fame with that, on the Account of which, it is fit to receive Praise and Reward; which are but the Expreffions of Efteem and Love. But that which makes Vice hateful, is its hateful Nature; and that which renders Virtue lovely, is its amiable Nature. 'Tis a certain Beauty or Deformity that is inherent in that

T

good

good or evil Will, which is the Soul of Virtue and Vice (and not in the Occafion of it) which is their Worthinefs of Efteem or Difefteem, Praise or Difpraife, according to the common Senfe of Mankind. If the Caufe or Occafion of the Rife of an hateful Difpofition or Act of Will, be alfo hateful; fuppofe another antecedent evil Will; that is entirely another Sin, and deferves Punishment by itself, under a diftinct Confideration. There is Worthiness of Difpraife in the Nature of an evil Volition, and not wholly in fome foregoing Act which is its Caufe; otherwife the evil Volition which is the Effect, is no moral Evil, any more than Sickness, or fome other natural Cala mity, which arifes from a Cause morally evil.

Thus, for Inftance, Ingratitude is hateful and worthy of Difpraife, according to common Sense; not because something as bad, or worse than Ingratitude, was the Caufe that produced it; but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent Deformity. So the Love of Virtue is amiable, and worthy of Praife, not merely because fomething else went before this Love of Virtue in our Minds, which caufed it to take Place there; for Inftance our own Choice; we chofe to love Virtue, and by fome Method or other wrought ourfelves into the Love of it; but because of the Amiableness and Condecency of fuch a Difpofition and Inclination of Heart. If that was the Cafe, that we did chufe to love Virtue, and fo produced that Love in ourselves, this Choice itfelf could be no otherwife amiable or praife-worthy, than as Love to Virtue, or fome other amiable Inclination, was exercifed and implied in it. If that Choice was amiable at all, it must be fo on Account of fome amiable Quality in the Nature of the Choice. If we chose to love Virtue,

not