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terially virtuous, yet at the fame Time they take away the Form of Virtue, because they deftroy Liberty; as they, by their own Power, put the Will out of its Équilibrium, determine and turn the Scale, and take the Work of felf-determining Power out of its Hands. And the clearer the Inftructions are that are given, the more powerful the Arguments that are ufed, and the more moving the Perfuafions or Examples, the more likely they are to fruftrate their own Defign; because they have fo much the greater Tendency to put the Will out of its Balance, to hinder its Freedom of Self-determination; and fo to exclude the very Form of Virtue, and the Effence of whatfoever is Praife-worthy.

So it clearly follows from thefe Principles, that God has no Hand in any Man's Virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral Influence; that none of the moral Methods He ufes with Men to promote Virtue in the World, have Tendency to the Attainment of that End; that all the Inftructions which He has given to Men, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, by Prophets, or Apoftles, or by his Son Jefus Chrift; that all his Counfels, Invitations, Promifes, Threatenings, Warnings and Expoftulations; that all Means He has ufed with Men, in Ordinances, or Providences; yea, all Influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no Tendency at all to excite any one virtuous Act of the Mind, or to promote any Thing morally good and commendable, in any Refpect. For there is no Way that thefe or any other Means can promote Virtue, but one of these three. Either (1.) By a phyfical Operation on the Heart. But all Effects that are wrought in Men in this Way, have no Virtue in them, by

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the concurring Voice of all Arminians. Or (2.) Morally, by exhibiting Motives to the Underftanding, to excite good Acts in the Will. But it has been demonftrated, that Volitions which are excited by Motives, are neceffary, and not excited by a felf-moving Power; and therefore, by their Principles, there is no Virtue in them. Or (3.) By merely giving the Will an Opportunity to determine itfelf concerning the Objects propofed, either to chufe or reject, by its own uncaufed, unmoved, uninfluenced Self-determination. And if this be all, then all thofe Means do no more to promote Virtue than Vice: For they do Nothing but give the Will Opportunity to determine itself either Way, either to Good or Bad, without laying it under any Bias to either: And fo there is really as much of an Opportunity given to determine in Favour of Evil, as of Good.

Thus that horrid blafphemous Confequence will certainly follow from the Arminian Doctrine, which they charge on others; namely, that God acts an inconfiftent Part in ufing fo many Counfels, Warnings, Invitations, Intreaties, &c. with Sinners, to induce 'em to forfake Sin, and turn to the Ways of Virtue; and that all are infincere and fallacious. It will follow from their Doctrine, that God does thefe Things when He knows at the fame Time, that they have no Manner of Tendency to promote the Effect He feems to aim at; yea, knows that if they have any Influence, this very Influence will be inconfiftent with fuch an Effect, and will prevent it. But what an Imputation of Infincerity would this fix on Him. who is infinitely holy and true! So that their's is the Doctrine which if purfued in its Confequences, does horribly reflect on the moft High,

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and fix on Him the Charge of Hypocrify; and not the Doctrine of the Calvinit; according to their frequent, and vehement Exclamations and Invectives.

Corol. 2. From what has been obferved in this Section, it again appears, that Arminian Principles and Notions, when fairly examined, and pursued in their demonftrable Confequences, do evidently fhut all Virtue out of the World, and make it impoffible that there fhould ever be any fuch Thing, in any Cafe; or that any fuch Thing fhould ever be conceiv'd of. For by these Principles, the very Notion of Virtue or Vice implies Abfurdity and Contradiction. For it is abfurd in itself, and contrary to common Senfe, to fuppose a virtuous act of Mind without any good Întention or Aim; and by their Principles, it is abfurd to suppose a virtuous A&t with a good Intention or Aim; for to act for an End, is to act from a Motive. So that if we rely on thefe Principles, there can be no virtuous Act with a good Defign and End; and 'tis felf-evident, there can be none without confequently there can be no virtuous Act at all.

Corol. 3. 'Tis manifeft, that Arminian Notions of moral Agency, and the Being of a Faculty of Will, cannot confift together; and that if there be any fuch Thing as, either a virtuous, or vicious Act, it can't be an Act of Will; no Will can be at all concerned in it. For that Act which is performed without Inclination, without Motive, without End, must be performed without any Concern of the Will. To fuppofe an Act of the Will without thefe, implies a Contradiction. If the Soul in its Act has no Motive or End; then in that Act (as was obferved before) it feeks No

thing, goes after Nothing, exerts no Inclination to any Thing; and this implies, that in that Act it defires Nothing, and chufes Nothing; fo that there is no Act of Choice in the Cafe: And that is as much as to fay, there is no Act of Will in the Cafe. Which very effectually fhuts out all vicious and virtuous Acts out of the Universe in as much as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous Act wherein the Will is concerned; and according to the plaineft Dictates of Reason, and the Light of Nature, and also the Principles of Arminians themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious Act wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore there is no Room for any virtuous or vicious Acts at all.

Corol. 4. If none of the moral Actions of intelligent Beings are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, another ftrange Thing will follow; and this is, that God not only can't foreknow any of the future moral Actions of his Creatures, but He can make no Conjecture, can give no probable Guefs concerning them. For, all Conjecture in Things of this Nature, muft depend on fome Difcerning or Apprehenfion of these two Things, previous Difpofition, and Motive; which, as has been obferved, Arminian Notions of moral Agency, in their real Confequence, altogether exclude.

PART

PART IV.

Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians, in Support and Defence of the foremention'd Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c. and against the oppofite Doctrine, are confidered.

SECTION I.

The Effence of the Virtue and Vice of Difpofitions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.

NE main Foundation of the Reasons, which are brought to establish the foremention'd Notions of Liberty, Virtue, Vice, &c. is a Suppofition, that the Virtuoufnefs of the Difpofitions or Acts of the Will confifts not in the Nature of these Difpofitions or Acts, but wholly in the Origin or Cause of them: fo that if the Dif pofition of the Mind or Act of the Will be ever

fo

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