Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconfiftent with all Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious Actions.

AS Arminian Notions of that Liberty, which A is effential to Virtue or Vice, are inconfiftent with common Sense, in their being inconfiftent with all virtuous or vicious Habits and Difpofitions; fo they are no lefs fo in their Inconfiftency with all Influence of Motives in moral Actions.

'Tis equally against thofe Notions of Liberty of Will, whether there be, previous to the Act of Choice, a Preponderancy of the Inclination, or a Preponderancy of thofe Circumstances, which have a Tendency to move the Inclination: And indeed it comes to juft the fame Thing. To fay, the Circumftances of the Mind are fuch as tend to fway and turn its Inclination one Way, is the fame Thing as to fay, the Inclination of the Mind, as under fuch Circumftances, tends that Way.

Or if any think it most proper to say, that Motives do alter the Inclination, and give a new Bias to the Mind; it will not alter the Cafe, as to the prefent Argument. For if Motives operate by giving the Mind an Inclination, then they operate by destroying the Mind's Indifference, and laying it under a Bias. But to do this, is to deftroy the Arminian Freedom: It is not to leave the Will to its own Self-determination, but to bring it into Subjection to the Power of fomething ex

trinsick,

trinfick, which operates upon it, fways and determines it, previous to its own Determination. So that what is done from Motive, can't be either virtuous or vicious. And befides, if the Acts of the Will are excited by Motives, thofe Motives are the Caufes of thofe Acts of the Will: which makes the Acts of the Will neceffary; as Effects neceffarily follow the Efficiency of the Cause. And if the Influence and Power of the Motive causes the Volition, then the Influence of the Motive determines Volition, and Volition don't determine itself; and fo is not free, in the Senfe of Arminians (as has been largely fhewn already) and confequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.

The Suppofition, which has already been taken Notice of as an infufficient Evafion in other Cafes, would be in like Manner impertinently alleged in this Cafe; namely, the Suppofition that Liberty confifts in a Power of fufpending Action for the prefent, in order to Deliberation. If it fhould be faid, Tho' it be true, that the Will is under a Neceffity of finally following the strongest Motive, yet it may for the prefent forbear to act upon the Motive prefented, till there has been Opportunity thoroughly to confider it, and compare its real Weight with the Merit of other Motives. anfwer as follows.

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Here again it must be remember'd, that if determining thus to fufpend and confider, be that Act of the Will wherein alone Liberty is exercifed, then in this all Virtue and Vice muft confift; and the Acts that follow this Confideration, and are the Effects of it, being neceffary, are no more virtuous or vicious than fome good or bad Events which happen when men are faft afleep,

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and which are the Confequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore I would here obferve two Things.

1. To fuppofe that all Virtue and Vice, in every Cafe, confifts in determining whether to take Time for Confideration, or not, is not agreeable to common Senfe. For according to fuch a Suppofition, the moft horrid Crimes, Adultery, Murder, Buggery, Blafphemy, &c. do not at all confist in the horrid Nature of the Things themfelves, but only in the Neglect of thorough Confideration before they were perpetrated; which brings their Viciousness to a small Matter, and makes all Crimes equal. If it be faid, that Neglect of Confideration, when fuch heinous Evils are proposed to Choice, is worse than in other Cafes: I answer, this is inconfiftent, as it fuppofes the very Thing to be, which at the fame Time is fuppofed not to be; it fuppofes all moral Evil, all Vicioufnefs and Heinoufnefs, does not confift merely in the want of Confideration. It fuppofes fome Crimes in themselves, in their own Nature, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to Confideration or Inconfideration, which lays the Perfon under a previous Obligation to confider in fome Cafes more than others.

2. If it were fo, that all Virtue and Vice, in every Cafe, confifted only in the Act of the Will, whereby it determines whether to confider or no, it would not alter the Cafe in the leaft, as to the prefent Argument. For ftill in this Act of the Will on this Determination, it is induced by fome Motive, and neceffarily follows the strongest Motive; and fo is neceffary, even in that Act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.

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One Thing more I would obferve, concerning the Inconfiftence of Arminian Notions of moral Agency with the Influence of Motives. I fuppose none will deny, that 'tis poffible for Motives to be fet before the Mind fo powerful, and exhibited in fo ftrong a Light, and under fo advantageous Circumftances, as to be invincible; and fuch as the Mind cannot but yield to. In this Cafe, Arminians will doubtlefs fay, Liberty is destroyed. And if fo, then if Motives are exhibited with half fo much Power, they hinder Liberty in Proportion to their Strength, and go half-way towards deftroying it. If a thousand Degrees of Motive abolish all Liberty, then five Hundred take it half away. If one Degree of the Influence of Motive don't at all infringe or diminish Liberty, then no more do two Degrees; for Nothing doubled, is ftill Nothing. And if two Degrees don't diminish the Will's Liberty, no more do four, eight, fixteen, or fix Thousand. For Nothing multiplied ever fo much, comes to but Nothing. If there be nothing in the Nature of Motive or moral Suafion, that is at all oppofite to Liberty, then the greatest Degree of it can't hurt Liberty. But if there be any Thing in the Nature of the Thing, that is against Liberty, then the leaft Degree of it hurts it in fome Degree; and confequently hurts and diminishes Virtue. If invincible Motives to that Action which is good, take away all the Freedom of the Ac&t, and fo all the Virtue of it; then the more forceable the Motives are, fo much the worse, so much the lefs Virtue; and the weaker the Motives are, the better for the Caufe of Virtue; and none is beft of all.

Now let it be confidered, whether thefe Things are agreeable to common Senfe. If it thould be

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allowed,

allowed, that there are fome Inftances wherein the Soul chufes without any Motive; what Virtue can there be in fuch a Choice? I am fure, there is no Prudence or Wisdom in it. Such a Choice is made for no good End; for it is for no End at all. If it were for any End, the View of the End would be the Motive exciting to the Act; and if the Act be for no good End, and fo from no good Aim, then there is no good Intention in it: And therefore, according to all our natural Notions of Virtue, no more Virtue in it than in the Motion of the Smoke, which is driven to and fro by the Wind, without any Aim or End in the Thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor why. and wherefore, it is moved.

Corol. 1. By thefe Things it appears, that the Argument against the Calvinifts, taken from the Ufe of Counfels, Exhortations, Invitations, Expoftulations, &c. fo much infifted on by Arminians, is truly against themselves. For thefe Things can operate no other Way to any good Effect, than as in them is exhibited Motive and Inducement, tending to excite and determine the Acts of the Will. But it follows on their Principles, that the Acts of Will excited by fuch Caufes, can't be virtuous; because so far as they are from these, they are not from the Will's felf-determining Power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth the while to offer any Arguments to perfuade Men to any virtuous Volition or voluntary Action; 'tis in vain to fet before them the Wisdom and Amiableness of Ways of Virtue, or the Odioufnefs and Folly of Ways of Vice. This Notion of Liberty and moral Agency fruftrates all Endeavours to draw Men to Virtue by Inftruction, or Perfuafion, Precept, or Example: For tho' thefe Things may induce Men to what is ma

terially