fo the Existence of the Thing may be confequentially neceffary; as it may be furely and firmly connected with fomething elfe, that is neceffary in one of the former Respects, by being either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is abfolutely neceffary in its own Nature, or with fomething which has already received and made fure of Existence. This Neceffity lies in, or may be explained by the Connection of two or more Propofitions one with another. Things which are perfectly connected with other Things that are neceffary, are ne ceffary Themselves, by a Neceffity of Confequence.

And here it may be obferved, that all Things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be faid to be neceffary, are neceffary only in this laft Way. Their Existence is not neceffary in itself; for if fo, they always would have exifted. Nor is their Exiftence become neceffary by being made fure, by being already come to país, Therefore, the only Way that any Thing that is to come to pafs hereafter, is or can be neceffary, is by a Connection with fomething that is neceffary in its own Nature, or fomething that already is, or has been; fo that the one being fuppofed, the other certainly follows. And this alfo is the only Way that all Things paft, excepting those which were from Eternity, could be neceffary before they came to pass, or could come to pafs neceffarily; and therefore the only Way in which any Effect or Event, or any Thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will have a Beginning, has come into Being neceffarily, or will hereafter neceffarily exist. And therefore this is the Neceffity which efpecially belongs to Controverfies about the Acts of the Will.

It may be of fome Ufe in thefe Controverfies, further to obferve concerning metaphyfical Neceffity,

that

that (agreeable to the Distinction before obferved of Neceffity, as vulgarly understood) Things that exift may be faid to be neceffary, either with a general or particular Neceffity. The Existence of a Thing may be faid to be neceffary with a general Neceffity, when all Things whatsoever being confidered, there is a Foundation for Certainty of its Existence; or when in the moft general and univerfal View of Things, the Subject and Predicate of the Propofition, which affirms its Existence, would appear with an infallible Connection.

An Event, or the Exiftence of a Thing, may be faid to be neceffary with a particular Neceffity, or with Regard to a particular Perfon, Thing or Time, when Nothing that can be taken into Confideration, in or about that Perfon, Thing or Time, alters the Cafe at all, as to the Certainty of that Event, or the Existence of that Thing; or can be of any Account at all, in determining the Infallibility of the Connection of the Subject and Predicate in the Propofition which affirms the Existence of the Thing; fo that it is all one, as to that Perfon, or Thing, at leaft, at that Time, as if the Exiftence were neceffary with a Neceffity that is most univerfal and abfolute. Thus there are many Things that happen to particular Perfons, which they have no Hand in, and in the Exiftence of which no Will of theirs has any Concern, at least, at that Time; which, whether they are neceffary or not, with Regard to Things in general, yet are neceffary to them, and with Regard to any Volition of theirs at that Time; as they prevent all Acts of the Will about the Affair. I fhall have Occafion to apply this Obfervation to particular Instances in the following Difcourfe. Whether the fame Things that are neceffary with a particular Neceffity, be not alfo neceffary with a general Neceffity, may

be

be a Matter of future Confideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the Cafe, as to the Use of this Diftinction of the Kinds of Neceffity.

Thefe Things may be fufficient for the explaining of the Terms Neceffary and Neceffity, as Terms of Art, and as often ufed by Metaphyficians, and controverfial Writers in Divinity, in a Senfe diverfe from, and more extenfive than their original Meaning, in common Language, which was before explain'd,

What has been faid to fhew the Meaning of the Terms Neceffary and Neceffity, may be fufficient for the Explaining of the oppofite Terms, Impoffible and Impoffibility. For there is no Difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former pofitive. Impoffibility is the fame as negative Neceffity, or a Neceffity that a Thing fhould not be. And it is ufed as a Term of Art in a like Diversity from the original and vulgar Meaning, with Neceffity.

The fame may be obferved concerning the Words Unable and Inability. It has been obferved, that these Terms, in their original and common Ufe, have Relation to Will and Endeavour, as fuppofable in the Cafe, and as infufficient for the bringing to pass the Thing will'd and endeavoured. But as thefe Terms are often used by Philofophers and Divines, especially Writers on Controverfies about Free-Will, they are used in a quite different, and far more extenfive Senfe, and are applied to many Cafes wherein no Will or Endeavour for the bringing of the Thing to pafs, is or can be fuppofed, but is actually denied and excluded in the Nature of the Cafe.

As the Words necessary, impoffible, unable, &c. are ufed by polemic Writers, in a Senfe diverse

from

from their common Signification, the like has happen'd to the Term Contingent. Any Thing is faid to be contingent, or to come to pafs by Chance or Accident, in the original Meaning of fuch Words, when its Connection with its Caufes or Antecedents, according to the establish'd Course of Things, is not difcerned, and fo is what we have no Means of the Fore-fight of. And efpecially is any Thing faid to be contingent or accidental with regard to us, when any Thing comes to pafs that we are concerned in, as Occafions or Subjects, without our Foreknowledge, and befide our Defign and Scope.

But the Word Contingent is abundantly used in a very different Senfe; not for That whofe Connection with the Series of Things we can't difcern, fo as to foresee the Event; but for fomething which has abfolutely no previous Ground or Reafon, with which its Existence has any fix'd and certain Connection.

SECTION IV.

Of the Distinction of natural and moral Neceffity, and Inability.

TH

HAT Neceffity which has been explain'd, confifting in an infallible Connection of the Things fignified by the Subject and Predicate of a Propofition, as intelligent Beings are the Subjects of it, is diftinguish'd into moral and natural Neceffity.

I fhall not now ftand to inquire whether this Diftinction be a proper and perfect Diftinction; but fhall only explain how thefe two Sorts of Neceffity are understood, as the Terms are fometimes

ufed,

ufed, and as they are used in the following Dif course.

The Phrafe, moral Neceffity, is ufed variously: fometimes 'tis used for a Neceffity of moral Obligation. So we fay, a Man is under Neceffity, when he is under Bonds of Duty and Conscience, which he can't be discharged from. So the Word Neceffity is often used for great Obligation in Point of Interest. Sometimes by moral Neceffity is meant that apparent Connection of Things, which is the Ground of moral Evidence; and fo is diftinguifh'd from abfolute Neceffity, or that fure Connection of Things, that is a Foundation for infallible Certainty. In this Senfe, moral Neceffity fignifies much the fame as that high Degree of Probability, which is ordinarily fufficient to fatisfy, and be relied upon by Mankind, in their Conduct and Behaviour in the World, as they would confult their own Safety and Intereft, and treat others properly as Members of Society. And fometimes. by moral Neceffity is meant that Neceflity of Connection and Confequence, which arifes from fuch moral Caufes, as the Strength of Inclination, or Motives, and the Connection which there is in many Cafes between thefe, and fuch certain Volitions and Actions. And it is in this Senfe, that I use the Phrase, moral Neceffity, in the following Discourse.

By natural Neceffity, as applied to Men, I mean fuch Neceffity as Men are under through the Force of natural Causes; as diftinguifh'd from what are called moral Caufes, fuch as Habits and Difpofitions of the Heart, and moral Motives and Inducements. Thus Men placed in certain Circumftances, are the Subjects of particular Senfations by Neceffity: They feel Pain when their Bodies are wounded; they fee the Objects prefented before

them