trary; because so far as the Mind is biaffed and pre-poffeffed, fo much Hinderance is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral Inability be inconfiftent with moral Agency, or the Nature of Virtue and Vice, then fo far as there is any fuch Thing as evil Difpofition of Heart, or habitual Depravity of Inclination; whether Covetoufnefs, Pride, Malice, Cruelty, or whatever elfe; fo much the more excufable Perfons are; fo much the less have their evil Acts of this Kind, the Nature of Vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent Difpofitions and Inclinations they have, fo much are they the lefs virtuous.

'Tis evident, that no habitual Difpofition of Heart, whether it be to a greater or lefs Degree, can be in any Degree virtuous or vicious; or the Actions which proceed from them at all Praise or Blame-worthy. Because, though we fhould fuppofe the Habit not to be of fuch Strength as wholly to take away all moral Ability and feltdetermining Power; or hinder but that, although the Act be partly from Bias, yet it may be in Part from Self-determination; yet in this Cafe, all that is from antecedent Bias must be set aside, as of no Confideration; and in eftimating the Degree of Virtue or Vice, no more must be confidered than what arifes from felf-determining Power, without any Influence of that Bias, becaufe Liberty is exercised in no more: So that all that is the Exercise of habitual Inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the Morality of the Action. By which it appears, that no Exercife of thefe Habits, let 'em be ftronger or weaker, can ever have any Thing of the Nature of either Virtue or Vice.

Here

Part III. Here if any one fhould fay, that notwithstanding all these Things, there may be the Nature of Virtue and Vice in Habits of the Mind; because thefe Habits may be the Effects of those Acts wherein the Mind exercised Liberty; that however the forementioned Reasons will prove that no Habits which are natural, or that are born or created with us, can be either virtuous or vicious; yet they will not prove this of Habits, which have been acquired and eftablifh'd by repeated free Acts.

To fuch an Objector I would fay, that this Evasion will not at all help the Matter. For if Freedom of Will be effential to the very Nature of Virtue and Vice, then there is no Virtue or Vice but only in that very Thing, wherein this Liberty is exercifed. If a Man in one or more Things that he does, exercises Liberty, and then by thofe Acts is brought into fuch Circumftances, that his Liberty ceases, and there follows a long Series of Acts or Events that come to pass neceffarily; those confequent Acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punishable; but only the free Acts that establish'd this Neceffity; for in them alone was the Man free. The following Effects that are neceffary, have no more of the Nature of Virtue or Vice, than Health or Sicknefs of Body have properly the Nature of Virtue or Vice, being the Effects of a Courfe of free Acts of Temperance or Intemperance; or than the good Qualities of a Clock are of the Nature of Virtue, which are the Effects of free Acts of the Artificer; or the Goodness and Sweetness of the Fruits of a Garden are moral Virtues, being the Effects of the free and faithful Acts of the Gardener: Liberty be abfolutely requifite to the Morality of Actions, and Neceffity wholly inconfiftent with it,

If

as

as Arminians greatly infift; then no necessary Effects whatfoever, let the Caufe be ever fo good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious; but the Virtue or Vice must be only in the free Caufe. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby fuppofes, the Neceffity that attends the good and evil Habits of the Saints in Heaven, and Damned in Hell, which are the Confequence of their free Acts in their State of Probation, are not rewardable or punishable.

On the whole, it appears, that if the Notions of Arminians concerning Liberty and moral Agency be true, it will follow that there is no Virtue in any fuch Habits or Qualities as Humility, Meeknefs, Patience, Mercy, Gratitude, Generofity, Heavenly-mindednefs; Nothing at all Praiseworthy in loving Chrift above Father and Mother, Wife and Children, or our own Lives; or in Delight in Holiness, hungering and thirsting after Righteoufnefs, Love to Enemies, univerfal Benevolence to Mankind: And on the other Hand, there is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of Difpraife, in the most fordid, beaftly, malignant devilish Difpofitions; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and Things facred and holy; or in being molt treacherous, envious and cruel towards Men. For all thefe Things are Difpofitions and Inclinations of the Heart. And in thort, there is no fuch Thing as any virtuous or vicious Quality of Mind; no fuch Thing as inherent Virtue and Holinefs, or Vice and Sin: And. the stronger thofe Habits or Difpofitions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being fo indeed; the more violent Men's Lufts are, the more fix'd their Pride, Envy, Ingratitude and Malicioufnefs, ftill the further are they from being blame-worthy. If there be a Man that by his own repeated Acts, or S

by

by any other Means, is come to be of the most hellish Difpofition, defperately inclined to treat his Neighbours with Injurioufnefs, Contempt and Malignity; the further they fhould be from any Difpofition to be angry with Him, or in the leaft to blame Him. So on the other Hand, if there be a Perfon, who is of a moft excellent Spirit, ftrongly inclining him to the moft amiable Actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c. fo much is he further from any Thing rewardable or commendable. On which Principles, the Man Jefus Christ was very far from being Praife-worthy for thofe Acts of Holiness and Kindnefs which He performed, thefe Propenfities being fo ftrong in his Heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God, is infinitely remote from any Thing commendable, his good Inclinations being infinitely ftrong, and He therefore at the utmost poffible Distance from being at Liberty. And in all Cafes, the stronger the Inclinations of any are to Virtue, and the more they love it, the lefs virtuous they are; and the more they love Wickednefs, the lefs vicious. Whether thefe Things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Chriftian, and every Man who has read the Bible, judge and whether they are agreeable to common Senfe, let every one judge, that hath hunan Understanding

in Exercise.

And if we pursue thefe Principles, we shall find that Virtue and Vice are wholly excluded out of the World; and that there never was, nor ever can be any fuch Thing as one or the other; either in God, Angels or Men. No Propenfity, Difpofition or Habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been fhewn; because they, fo far as they take Place, deftroy the Freedom of the Will, the Foundation of all moral Agency, and exclude all

Capacity

1

Capacity of either Virtue or Vice. — And if Habits and Difpofitions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the Exercife of these Difpofitions be fo: For the Exercife of Bias is not the Exercife of free felf-determining Will, and fo there is no Exercife of Liberty in it. Confequently no Man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or ill difpofed, nor in acting from a good or bad Difpofition. And whether this Bias or Difpofition be habitual or not, if it exifts but a Moment before the Act of Will, which is the Effect of it, it alters not the Cafe, as to the Neceffity of the Effect. Or if there be no previous Difpofition at all, either habitual or occafional, that determines the Act, then it is not Choice that determines it: It is therefore a Contingence, that happens to the Man, arifing from Nothing in him; and is neceffary, as to any Inclination or Choice of his; and therefore can't make Him either the better or worse, any more than a Tree is better than other Trees, because it oftener happens to be lit upon by a Swan or Nightingale or a Rock more vicious than other Rocks, because Rattle Snakes have happen'd oftener to crawl over it. So that there is no Virtue nor Vice in good or bad Difpofitions, either fix'd or tranfient; nor any Virtue or Vice in acting from any good or bad previous Inclination; nor yet any Virtue or Vice in acting wholly without any previous Inclination. Where then fhall we find Room for Virtue or Vice?