much the more praise-worthy the At which proceeds from it ?

If we should fuppofe (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an Act of Will in a State of Indifference; for Inftance, this Act, viz. The Will's determining to put itself out of a State of Indifference, and give itfelf a Preponderation one Way, then it would follow, on Arminian Principles, that this Act or Determination of the Will is that alone wherein Virtue confifts, because this only is performed while the Mind remains in a State of Indifference, and fo in a State of Liberty: For when once the Mind is put out of its Equilibrium, it is no longer in fuch a State; and therefore all the Acts which follow afterwards, proceeding from Bias, can have the Nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the Thing which the Will can do, while yet in a State of Indifference, and fo of Liberty, be only to fufpend acting, and determine to take the Matter into Confideration, then this Determination is that alone wherein Virtue confifts, and not proceeding to Action after the Scale is turned by Confideration. So that it will follow from thefe Principles, that all that is done after the Mind, by any Means, is once out of its Equilibrium and already poffeffed by an Inclination, and arifing from that Inclination, has nothing of the Nature of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither Blame nor Praife. But how plainly contrary is this to the univerfal Senfe of Mankind, and to the Notion they have of fincerely virtuous Actions? Which is, that they are Actions which proceed from a Heart well difpofed and inclined; and the stronger, and the more fix'd and determined the good Difpofition of the Heart, the greater the Sincerity of Virtue, and fo the more of the Truth and Reality

of

of it. But if there be any Acts which are done in a State of Equilibrium, or fpring immediately from perfect Indifference and Coldness of Heart, they cannot arife from any good Principle or Difpofition in the Heart; and confequently, according to common Senfe, have no fincere Goodness in 'em, having no Virtue of Heart in 'em. To have a virtuous Heart, is to have a Heart that favours Virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.

And befides, the Actions that are done in a State of Indifference, or that arife immediately out of fuch a State, can't be virtuous, becaufe, by the Suppofition, they are not determined by any preceding Choice. For if there be preceding

Choice, then Choice intervenes between the Act and the State of Indifference; which is contrary to the Suppofition of the Act's arifing immedi ately out of Indifference. But thofe Acts which are not determined by preceding Choice, can't be virtuous or vicious by Arminian Principles, because they are not determined by the Will. So that neither one Way, nor the other, can any Actions be virtuous or vicious according to Arminian Principles. If the Action be determined by a preceding Act of Choice it can't be virtuous; because the Action is not done in a State of Indifference, nor does immediately arife from such a State and fo is not done in a State of Liberty. If the Action be not determined by a preceding Act of Choice, then it can't be virtuous; becaufe then the Will is not Self-determined in it. So that 'tis made certain, that neither Virtue nor Vice can ever find any Place in the Universe.

;

Moreover, that it is neceffary to a virtuous Action that it be performed in a State of Indif

ference,

ference, under a Notion of that's being a State of Liberty, is contrary to common Senfe; as 'tis a Dictate of common Senfe, that Indifference itfelf, in many Cafes, is vicious, and so to a high Degree. As if when I fee my Neighbour or near Friend, and one who has in the highest Degree merited of me, in extreme Diftrefs, and ready to perifh, I find an Indifference in my Heart with Refpect to any Thing propofed to be done, which I can eafily do, for his Relief. So if it fhould be proposed to me to blafpheme God, or kill my Father, or do numberless other Things which might be mentioned; the being indifferent, for a Moment, would be highly vicious and vile.

And it may be further observed, that to fuppofe this Liberty of Indifference is effential to Virtue and Vice, deftroys the great Difference of Degrees of the Guilt of different Crimes, and takes away the Heinoufnefs of the most flagitious horrid Iniquities; fuch as Adultery, Bestiality, Murder, Perjury, Blafphemy, &c. For according to these Principles, there is no Harm at all in having the Mind in a State of perfect Indifference with Respect to these Crimes, nay, 'tis abfolutely neceffary in order to any Virtue in avoiding them, or Vice in doing them. But for the Mind to be in a State of Indifference with Refpect. to 'em, is to be next Door to doing them: It is then infinitely near to chufing, and fo committing the Fact: For Equilibrium is the next Step to a Degree of Preponderation; and one, even the leaft Degree of Preponderation (all Things confidered) is Choice. And not only fo, but for the Will to be in a State of perfect Equilibrium with Refpect to fuch Crimes, is for the Mind to be in fuch a State, as to be full as likely to chufe 'em as to refufe 'em, to do 'em as to omit 'em. And

if our Minds must be in fuch a State wherein it is as near to chufing as refufing, and wherein it muft of Neceffity, according to the Nature of Things, be as likely to commit 'em, as to refrain from 'em; where is the exceeding Heinoufnefs of chufing and committing them? If there be no Harm in often being in fuch a State, wherein the Probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an Equilibrium, and no more Tendency to one than the other; then according to the Nature and Laws of fuch a Contingence, it may be expected, as an inevitable Confequence of fuch a Difpofition of Things, that we should chufe 'em as often as reject 'em: That it fhould generally fo fall out is neceffary, as Equality in the Effect is the natural Confequence of the equal Tendency of the Caufe, or of the antecedent State of Things from which the Ef fect arifes: Why then fhould we be fo exceedingly to blame, if it does fo fall out?

'Tis many Ways apparent, that the Arminian Scheme of Liberty is utterly inconfiftent with the being of any fuch Things as either virtuous or vicious Habits or Difpofitions. If Liberty of Indifference be effential to moral Agency, then there can be no Virtue in any habitual Inclinations of the Heart; which are contrary to Indifference, and imply in their Nature the very Deftruction and Exclufion of it. They fuppofe nothing can be virtuous, in which no Liberty is exercised; but how abfurd is it to talk of exercifing Indifference under Bias and Preponderation!

And if felf-determining Power in the Will be ne ceffary to moral Agency, Praife, Blame, &c. then nothing done by the Will can be any further Praise or Blame-worthy, than fo far as the

Will

Part III. Will is moved, swayed and determined by itself, and the Scales turned by the fovereign Power the Will has over itself. And therefore the Will must not be put out of its Balance already, the Preponderation must not be determined and effected before hand; and fo the felf-determining Act anticipated. Thus it appears another Way, that habitual Bias is inconfiftent with that Liberty which Arminians fuppofe to be neceffary to Virtue or Vice; and fo it follows, that habitual Bias itfelf cannot be either virtuous or vicious.

The fame Thing follows from their Doctrine concerning the Inconfiftence of Neceffity with Liberty, Praise, Difpraife, &c. None will deny, that Bias and Inclination may be fo ftrong as to be invincible, and leave no Poffibility of the Will's determining contrary to it; and fo be attended with Neceffity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God,. Angels, and glorified Saints, with Refpect to Good; and the Will of Devils with Refpect to Evil. Therefore if Neceffity be inconfiftent with Liberty; then when fix'd Inclination is to fuch a Degree of Strength, it utterly excludes all Virtue, Vice, Praife or Blame. And if fo, then the nearer Habits are to this Strength, the more do they impede Liberty, and fo diminish Praise and Blame. If very strong Habits deftroy Liberty, the leffer Ones proportionably hinder it, according to their Degree of Strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the Act moft virtuous or vicious, when performed without any Inclination or habitual Bias at all; because it is then performed with most Liberty.

Every pre-poffeffing fix'd Bias on the Mind brings a Degree of moral Inability for the con

trary