Nature of the Principle or Aim, whence this real Will and true Endeavour arifes. If a Man has fome real Defire to obtain a Thing, either direct or indirect, or does really endeavour after a Thing, he is faid fincerely to defire or endeavour it; without any Confideration of the Goodnefs or Virtuoufnefs of the Principle he acts from, or any Excellency or Worthiness of the End he acts for. Thus a Man that is kind to his Neighbour's Wite, who is fick and languifhing, and very helpful in her Cafe, makes a Shew of defiring and endea- · vouring her Restoration to Health and Vigour; and not only makes fuch a Shew, but there is a Reality in his Pretence, he does heartily and carneftly defire to have her Health restored, and uses his true and utmoft Endeavours for it; He is faid fincerely to defire and endeavour it, because he does fo truly or really; tho' perhaps the Principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and fcandalous Paffion; having lived in Adultery with her, he earnestly defires to have her Health and Vigour reftored, that he may return to his criminal Pleafures with her. Or,

2. By Sincerity is meant, not merely a Reality of Will and Endeavour of fome Sort or other, and from fome Confideration or other, but a virtuous Sincerity. That is, that in the Performance of thofe particular Acts that are the Matter of Virtue, or Duty, there be not only the Matter, but the Form and Effence of Virtue, confifting in the Aim that governs the Act, and the Principle exercised in it. There is not only the Reality of the Act, that is as it were the Body of the Duty; but alfo the Soul, which fhould properly belong to fuch a Body. In this Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, when he acts with a pure Intention; not from finifter Views, or bye-Ends: He not only

in Reality defires and feeks the Thing to be done, or Qualification to be obtain'd, for fome End or other; But he wills the Thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed; the Virtue of the Thing is properly the Object of the Will.

In the former Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, in Oppofition to a mere Pretence, and Shew of the particular Thing to be done or exhibited, without any real Defire or Endeavour at all. In the latter Senfe, a Man is faid to be fincere, in Oppofition to that Shew of Virtue there is in merely doing the Matter of Duty, without the Reality of the Virtue itself in the Soul, and the Effence of it, which there is a Shew of. A Man may be fincere in the former Senfe, and yet in the latter be in the Sight of God, who fearches the Heart, a vile Hypocrite.

In the latter Kind of Sincerity only, is there any Thing truly valuable or acceptable in the Sight of God. And this is the Thing which in Scripture is called Sincerity, Uprightness, Integrity, Truth in the inward Parts, and a being of a perfect Heart. And if there be such a Sincerity, and fuch a Degree of it as there ought to be, and there be any Thing further that the Man is not able to perform, or which don't prove to be connected with his fincere Defires and Endeavours, the Man is wholly excufed and acquitted in the Sight of God; His Will fhall furely be accepted for his Deed: And fuch a fincere Will and Endeavour is all that in Strictnefs is required of him, by any Command of God. But as to the other Kind of Sincerity of Defires and Endeavours, it having no Virtue in it, (as was observed before) can be of no Avail before God, in any Case, to recommend,

fatisfy,

1

fatisfy, or excufe, and has no pofitive moral Weight or Influence whatsoever.

Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferr'd, that Nothing in the Reason and Nature of Things appears, from the Confideration of any moral Weight of that former Kind of Sincerity, which has been spoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading us to fuppofe, that God has made any pofitive Promifes of Salvation, or Grace, or any faving Affiftance, or any spiritual Benefit whatfoever, to any Defires, Prayers, Endeavours, Striving, or Obedience of those, who hitherto have no true Virtue or Holinefs in their Hearts; though we fhould fuppofe all the Sincerity, and the utmost Degree of Endeavour, that is poffible to be in a Perfon without Holiness.

Some object against God's requiring, as the Condition of Salvation, thofe holy Exercifes, which are the Refult of a fupernatural Renovation; fuch as a fupreme Refpect to Chrift, Love to God, loving Holinefs for its own fake, &c. that thefe inward Difpofitions and Exercises are above Men's Power, as they are by Nature; and therefore that we may conclude, that when Men are brought to be fincere in their Endeavours, and do as well as they can, they are accepted; and that this must be all that God requires in order to Men's being received as the Objects of his Favour, and must be what God has appointed as the Condition of Salvation. Concerning which I would obferve, that in fuch a Manner of Speaking of Men's being accepted, because they are fincere, and do as well as they can, there is evidently a Suppofition of fome Virtue, fome Degree of that which is truly Good; though it don't go fo far as were to be wifh'd. For if R 4

Men

Part III. Men do what they can, unless their fo doing be from fome good Principle, Difpofition, or Exer cife of Heart, fome virtuous Inclination or Act of the Will; their fo doing what they can, is in fome Refpects not a Whit better than if they did Nothing at all. In fuch a Cafe, there is no more pofitive moral Goodness in a Man's doing what he can, than in a Wind-mill's doing what it can ; because the Action does no more proceed from Virtue; and there is Nothing in fuch Sincerity of Endeavour, or doing what we can, that fhould render it any more a proper or fit Recommendation to pofitive Favour and Acceptance, or the Condition of any Reward or actual Benefit, than doing Nothing; for both the one and the other are alike Nothing, as to any true moral Weight or Value.

Corol. 2. Hence alfo it follows, that there is Nothing that appears in the Reason and Nature of Things, which can juftly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the neceffary Means of Salvation, or fome Way or other beftow true Holiness and eternal Life on thofe Heathen, who are fincere, (in the Sense above explained) in their Endeavours to find out the Will of the Deity, and to please Him, according to their Light, that they may escape his future Displeasure and Wrath, and obtain Happiness in their future State, through his Favour.

SECTION

Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconfiftent with it; And all, either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconfiftent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency.

T

O fuppofe fuch a Freedom of Will, as Arminians talk of, to be requifite to Virtue and Vice, is many Ways contrary to common Sense.

If Indifference belongs to Liberty of Will, as Arminians fuppofe, and it be effential to a virtuous Action that it be performed in a State of Liberty, as they alfo fuppofe; it will follow, that it is effential to a virtuous Action that it be performed in a State of Indifference: And if it be performed in a State of Indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in the Time of Indifference. And fo it will follow, that in order to the Virtuousness of an Act, the Heart must be indifferent in the Time of the Performance of that Act, and the more indifferent and cold the Heart is with Relation to the Act which is performed, fo much the better; because the Act is performed with fo much the greater Liberty. But is this agreeable to the Light of Nature? Is it agreeable to the Notions which Mankind, in all Ages, have of Virtue, that it lies in that which is contrary to Indifference, even in the Tendency and Inclination of the Heart to virtuous Action; and that the ftronger the Inclination, and fo the further from Indifference, the more virtuous the Heart, and fo

much