to deliberate, or on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading A&t; or whether it be or no, if there be another Act before it, which determines that; or whatever be the original and leading Act; ftill the foregoing Proof ftands good, that the Non-compliance of the leading Act implies moral Inability to comply.

If it fhould be objected, that these Things make all moral Inability equal, and suppose Men morally unable to will otherwife than they actually do will, in all Cafes, and equally fo, in every Inftance.

In answer to this Objection, I defire two Things may be observed. First, That if by being equally unable, be meant as really unable; then fo far as the Inability is merely moral, 'tis true, the Will, in every Inftance, acts by moral Neceffity, and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one Cafe as another; as I humbly conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonftrated by what has been faid in the preceding Part of this Effay. But yet, in fome Refpect, the Inability may be faid to be greater in fome Inftances than others: Tho' the Man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do fome Things than others. As it is in Things which Men are naturally unable to do, A Person whofe Strength is no more than fufficient to lift the Weight of one Hundred Pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one Hundred and one Pounds, as ten Thoufand Pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter Weight than the former; and fo, according to common Ufe of Speech, has a greater Inability

for

for it. So it is in moral Inability. A Man is truly morally unable to chufe contrary to a prefent Inclination, which in the leaft Degree prevails ; or contrary to that Motive, which, all Things confidered, has Strength and Advantage now to move the Will, in the leaft Degree, fuperiour to all other Motives in View: But yet he is further from Ability to refift a very ftrong Habit, and a violent and deeply rooted Inclination, or a Motive vastly exceeding all others in Strength. And again, the Inability may in fome Refpects be called greater, in fome Inftances than others, as it may be more general and extenfive to all Aus of that Kind. So Men may be faid to be unable in a different Senfe, and to be further from moral Ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they who have only that Inability which is occafional and particular. * Thus in Cafes of natural Inability; he that is born blind may be faid to be unable to fee, in a different Manner, and is in fome Refpects further from being able to fee, than He whofe Sight is hinder'd by a tranfient Cloud or Mist.

And befides, that which was obferved in the firft Part of this Difcourfe concerning the Inability which attends a strong and fettled Habit, fhould be here remember'd; viz. that fix'd Habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is diftinguished from occafional Volition, namely, that Endeavours to avoid future Volitions of that Kind, which are agreeable to fuch a Habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and infufficient. For tho' it is impoffible there should be any true fincere Defires and Endeavours Q4 against

* See this Diftinction of moral Inability explain'd in PART I. Sect. IV.

Part III against a prefent Volition or Choice, yet there may be against Volitions of that Kind, when view'd at a Distance. A Perfon may defire and use Means to prevent future Exercifes of a certain Inclination; and in order to it, may wish the Habit might be removed; but his Defires and Endeavours may be ineffectual. The Man may be faid in fome Sense to be unable; yea, even as the Word unable is a relative Term, and has Relation to ineffectual Endeavours; yet not with Regard to prefent, but remote Endeavours.

Secondly, It must be borne in Mind, according to what was obferv'd before, that indeed no Inability whatsoever which is merely moral, is properly called by the Name of Inability; and that in the ftricteft Propriety of Speech, a Man may be faid to have a Thing in his Power, if he has it at his Election; and He can't be faid to be unable to do a Thing, when He can do it now if he pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct and immediate Defire for it. As to thofe Defires and En deavours that may be against the Exercises of a ftrong Habit, with Regard to which Men may be faid to be unable to avoid thofe Exercises, they are remote Defires and Endeavours in two Refpects. First, as to Time; they are never against prefent Volitions, but only against Volitions of fuch a Kind, when view'd at a Distance. Secondly, as to their Nature; thefe oppofite Defires are not directly and properly against the Habit and Inclination itself, or the Volitions in which it is exercifed; for thefe, in themselves confidered, are agreeable; but against fomething elfe, that attends them, or is their Confequence; the Oppofition of the Mind is levelled entirely against this; the Inclination or Volitions themselves are not at all oppofed directly, and for their own fake, but only indirectly,

indirectly, and remotely on the Account of fomething alien and foreign.

III. Tho' the Oppofition of the Will itself, or the very want of Will to a Thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that Thing; yet, if it be as has been already fhewn, that the Being of a good State or Act of Will, is a Thing moft properly required by Command; then, in fome Cafes, fuch a State or Act of Will may properly be required, which at prefent is not, and which may alfo be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore thofe Things may properly be commanded, which Men have a moral Inability for.

Such a State or Act of the Will, may be required by Command, as does not already exift. For if that Volition only may be commanded to be which already is, there could be no use of Precept; Commands in all Cafes would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may fuch a Will be required as is wanting before the Command is given, but alfo fuch as may poffibly be wanting afterwards; fuch as the Exhibition of the Command may not be effectual to produce or excite. Otherwise, no fuch Thing as Difobedience to a proper and rightful Command is poffible in any Cafe; and there is no Cafe fuppofable or poffible, wherein there can be an inexcufable or faulty Difobedience. Which Arminians cannot affirm, confiftently with their Principles for this makes Obedience to juft and proper Commands always neceffary, and Difobedience impoffible. And fo the Arminian would overthrow Himfelf, yielding the very Point we are upon, which He fo ftrenuoufly denies, viz. that Law and Command are confiftent with Neceflity.

If

Part III. If merely that Inability will excufe Difobedience, which is implied in the Opposition or Defect of Inclination, remaining after the Command is exhibited, then Wickednefs always carries that in it which excufes it. 'Tis evermore fo, that by how much the more Wickednefs there is in a Man's Heart, by fo much is his Inclination to Evil the stronger, and by fo much the more therefore has he of moral Inability to the Good required. His moral Inability, confifting in the Strength of his evil Inclination, is the very Thing wherein his Wickedness confifts; and yet according to Arminian Principles, it must be a Thing inconfiftent with Wickedness; and by how much the more he has of it, by fo much is he the further from Wickedness.

Therefore, on the whole, it is manifeft, that moral Inability alone (which confifts in Difinclination) never renders any Thing improperly the Subject-matter of Precept or Command, and never can excufe any Perfon in Difobedience, or Want of Conformity to a Command.

Natural Inability, arifing from the Want of natural Capacity, or external Hinderance (which alone is properly called Inability) without doubt wholly excufes, or makes a Thing improperly the Matter of Command. If Men are excufed from doing or acting any good Thing, fupposed to be commanded, it must be through fome Defect or Obftacle that is not in the Will itself, but extrinsic to it; either in the Capacity of Understanding, or Body, or outward Circumstances.

Here two or three Things may be observed,

1. As