ableness and Folly of commanding beyond what Men have Power to do?

>

And Arminians in general are very inconfiftent with themselves in what they fay of the Inability of fallen Man in this Refpect. They ftrenuously maintain, that it would be unjuft in God, to require any Thing of us beyond our present Power and Ability to perform; and also hold, that we are now unable to perform perfect Obedience, and that Chrift died to fatisfy for the Imperfections of our Obedience, and has made Way that our imperfect Obedience might be accepted instead of perfect: Wherein they feem infenfibly to run themfelves into the groffeft Inconfiftence. For, (as I have obferved elsewhere)" They hold that God "in Mercy to Mankind has abolished that rigour"ous Constitution or Law, that they were under "originally; and instead of it, has introduced a "more mild Conftitution, and put us under a

new Law, which requires no more than imper"fect fincere Obedience, in Compliance with our poor infirm impotent Circumftances fince the "Fall."

Now, how can thefe Things be made confiftent? I would afk what Law thefe Imperfections of our Obedience are a Breach of? If they are a Breach of no Law that we were ever under, then they are not Sins. And if they be not Sins, what Need of Chrift's dying to fatisfy for them? But if they are Sins, and the Breach of fome Law, what Law is it? They can't be a Breach of their new Law; for that requires no other than imperfect Obedience, or Obedience with Imperfections: And therefore to have Obedience attended with Imperfections, is no Breach of it; for 'tis as much as it requires. And they can't be a Breach

Breach of their old Law; for that, they fay, is entirely abolished, and we never were under it.They fay, it would not be juft in God to require of us perfect Obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punifh us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own Scheme, the Imperfections of our Obedience don't deferve to be punished. What need therefore of Chrift's dying, to fatisfy for them? What need of his fuffering, to fatisfy for that which is no Fault, and in its own Nature deferves no fuffering? What need of Chrift's dying, to purchase, that our imperfect Obedience fhould be accepted, when according to their Scheme, it would be unjuft in itself, that any other Obedience than imperfect should be required? What need of Chrift's dying to make Way for God's accepting fuch an Obedience, as it would be unjust in Him not to accept? Is there any Need of Chrift's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously? - If it be faid, that Chrift died to fatisfy that old Law for us, that fo we might not be under it, but that there might be Room for our being under a more mild Law; ftill I would inquire, what Need of Chrift's dying that we might not be under a Law, which (by their Principles) it would be in itself unjust that we should be under, whether Chrift had died or no, because in our present State we are not able to keep it?

So the Arminians are inconfiftent with themfelves, not only in what they fay of the Need of Chrift's Satisfaction to atone for thofe Imperfections which we cannot avoid, but alfo in what they fay of the Grace of God, granted to enable Men to perform the fincere Obedience of the new

Law.

Law.

"I grant (fays Dr. Stebbing *) indeed, that by Reason of original Sin, we are utterly dif "abled for the Performance of the Condition, " without new Grace from God. But I fay then, "that He gives fuch Grace to all of us, by "which the Performance of the Condition is

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truly poffible: And upon this Ground he may, "and doth moft righteously require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to fpeak properly, by Grace he muft mean, that Affiftance which is of Grace, or of free Favour and Kindnefs. But yet in the fame Place he speaks of it as very unreasonable, unjuft and cruel, for God to require that, as the Condition of Pardon, that is become impoffible by original Sin. If it be fo, what Grace is there in giving Affistance and Ability to perform the Condition of Pardon? Or why is that called by the Name of Grace, that is an abfolute Debt, which God is bound to bestow, and which it would be unjuft and cruel in Him to with-hold, feeing he requires that, as the Condition of Pardon, which we cannot perform without it?

Command, and Obligation to Obedience, confiftent with moral Inability to obey.

T being fo much infifted on by Arminian Writers, that Neceffity is inconfiftent with Law or Command, and particularly, that it is abfurd to fuppofe God by his Command fhould require that of Men which they are unable to do; not allowing in this Cafe for any Difference that there is between

* Treatife of the Operations of the Spirit. 2 Edit.

p. 112, 113.

between natural and moral Inability; I would therefore now particularly confider this Matter.

And for the greater Clearnefs, I would diftinctly lay down the following Things.

I. The Will itself, and not only thofe Actions which are the Effects of the Will, is the proper Object of Precept or Command. That is, fuch or fuch a State or Acts of Men's Wills, is in many Cafes, properly required of them by Command; and not only thofe Alterations in the State of their Bodies or Minds that are the Confequences of Volition. This is moft manifeft; for 'tis the Soul only, that is properly and directly the Subject of Precepts or Commands; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving Commands. The Motions or State of the Body are Matter of Command, only as they are fubject to the Soul, and connected with its Acts. But now the Soul has no other Faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper Senfe, confent, yield to, or comply with any Command, but the Faculty of the Will, and 'tis by this Faculty only, that the Soul can directly difobey, or refuse Compliance : For the very Notions of Confenting, Yielding, Accepting, Complying, Refufing, Rejecting, &c. are, according to the Meaning of the Terms, Nothing but certain Acts of the Will. Obedience, in the primary Nature of it, is the fubmitting and yielding

of the Will of one to the Will of another. Difobedience is the not confenting, not complying of the Will of the commanded to the manifefted Will of the Commander. Other Acts that are not the Acts of the Will, as certain Motions of the Body and Alterations in the Soul, are Obedience or Difobedience only indirectly, as they are connected with the State or Acts of the Will,

according

according to an established Law of Nature. So that 'tis manifeft, the Will itself may be required: And the Being of a good Will is the most proper, direct and immediate Subject of Command; and if this can't be prefcribed or required by Command or Precept, nothing can; for other Things can be required no otherwife than as they depend upon, and are the Fruits of a good

Will.

Corol. 1. If there be feveral Acts of the Will, or a Series of Acts, one following another, and one the Effect of another, the first and determining Act is properly the Subject of Command, and not only the confequent Acts, which are dependent upon it. Yea, 'tis this more especially which is that which Command or Precept has a proper Refpect to; becaufe 'tis this Act that determines the whole Affair: In this A&t the Obedience or Difobedience lies, in a peculiar Manner; the confequent Acts being all fubject to it, and governed and determined by it. This determining governing Act must be the proper Subject of Precept,

or none.

Corol. 2. It alfo follows from what has been obferved, That if there be any Sort of Act, or Exertion of the Soul, prior to all free Acts of the Will or Acts of Choice in the Cafe, directing and determining what the Acts of the Will fhall be; that Act or Exertion of the Soul can't properly be fubject to any Command or Precept, in any Refpect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such Acts can't be fubject to Commands directly, because they are no Acts of the Will; being by the Suppofition prior to all Acts of the Will, determining and giving Rife to all its Acts: They not being Acts of the