must be the Subjects of fuch an Event, and fo the Event is neceffary.

If not only Coaction, but all Neceffity, will prove Men blamelefs, then Judas was blamelefs, after Chrift had given him over, and had already declared his certain Damnation, and that he fhould verily betray Him. He was guilty of no Sin in betraying his Master, on this Suppofition; though his fo doing is fpoken of by Chrift as the most aggravated Sin, more heinous than the Sin of Pilate in crucifying Him. And the Jews in Egypt, in feremiah's Time, were guilty of no Sin, in their not worshipping the true God, after God had Sworn by his great Name, that his Name fhould be no more named in the Mouth of any Man of Judah, in all the Land of Egypt, Jer. xliv. 26.

Dr. Whitby (Difc. on five Points, p. 302, 303.) denies, that Men, in this World, are ever fo given up by God to Sin, that their Wills fhould be neceffarily determined to Evil; though He owns, that hereby it may become exceeding difficult for Men to do Good, having a ftrong Bent, and powerful Inclination, to what is Evil. But if we fhould allow the Cafe to be just as he reprefents, the Judgment of giving up to Sin will no better agree with his Notions of that Liberty, which is effential to Praise or Blame, than if we fhould fuppose it to render the avoiding of Sin impoffible. For if an Impoffibility of avoiding Sin wholly excuses a Man; then, for the fame Reason, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in Part; and this juft in Proportion to the Degree of Difficulty. -If the Influence of moral Impoffibility or Inability be the fame, to excufe Perfons in not doing, or not avoiding any Thing, as that of natural Inability, (which is fuppofed) then undoubt P 4

edly

edly, in like Manner, moral Difficulty has the fame Influence to excufe with natural Difficulty. But all allow, that natural Impoffibility wholly excuses, and also that natural Difficulty excufes in Part, and makes the Act or Omiffion lefs blameable in Proportion to the Difficulty. All natural Difficulty, according to the plaineft Dictates of the Light of Nature, excufes in fome Degree, fo that the Neglect is not fo blameable, as if there had been no Difficulty in the Cafe: and fo the greater the Difficulty is, ftill the more excufeable, in Proportion to the Increase of the Difficulty. And as natural Impoffibility wholly excufes and excludes all Blame, fo the nearer the Difficulty approaches to Impoffibility, ftill the nearer a Perfon is to Blamlefsness in Proportion to that Approach. And if the Cafe of moral Impoffibility or Neceffity, be juft the fame with natural Neceffity or Coaction, as to Influence to excufe a Neglect, then alfo, for the fame Reason, the Cafe of natural Difficulty, don't differ in Influence, to excufe a Neglect, from moral Difficulty, arifing from a strong Bias or Bent to Evil, fuch as Dr. Whitby owns in the Cafe of those that are given up to their own Hearts Lufts. So that the Fault of fuch Perfons must be leffen'd, in Proportion to the Difficulty, and Approach to Impoffibility. If ten Degrees of moral Difficulty make the Action quite impoffible, and fo wholly excufe, then if there be nine Degrees of Difficulty, the Perfon is in great Part excused, and is nine Degrees in ten, lefs Blame-worthy, than if there had been no Difficulty at all; and he has but one Degree of Blame-worthiness. The Reafon is plain, on Arminian Principles; viz. becaufe as Difficulty, by antecedent Bent and Bias on the Will, is increased, Liberty of Indifference, and Self-determination in the Will, is diminifhed: fo much Hindrance and Impediment is there, in

the

the Way of the Will's acting freely, by mere Self-determination. And if ten Degrees of fuch Hindrance take away all fuch Liberty, then nine Degrees take away nine Parts in ten, and leave but one Degree of Liberty. And therefore there is but one Degree of Blameablenefs, cæteris paribus, in the Neglect; the Man being no further blameable in what He does, or Neglects, than he has Liberty in that Affair: For Blame or Praise (they fay) arifes wholly from a good Ufe or Abuse of Liberty.

From all which it follows, that a strong Bent and Bias one Way, and Difficulty of going the contrary, never caufes a Perfon to be at all more exposed to Sin, or any Thing blameable: Because as the Difficulty is increased, fo much the less is required and expected. Though in one Respect, Exposedness to Sin or Fault is increased, viz. by an Increase of Expofedness to the evil Action or Omiffion; yet it is diminished in another Refpect, to balance it; namely, as the Sinfulness or Blameableness of the Action or Omiffion is diminished in the fame Proportion. So that, on the whole, the Affair, as to Expofedness to Guilt or Blame, is left juft as it was.

To illuftrate this, let us fuppofe a Scale of a Balance to be intelligent, and a free Agent, and indued with a Self-moving Power, by Virtue of which it could act and produce Effects to a certain Degree; ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a Force equal to a Weight of ten Pounds; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary Circumftances, to move itfelf down with that Force; for which it has Power and full Liberty, and therefore would be blame-worthy if it fail'd of it. But then let us fuppofe a Weight of

ten

ten Pounds to be put in the oppofite Scale, which in Force entirely counter-balances its felf-moving Power, and fo renders it impoffible for it to move down at all; this therefore wholly excufes it from any fuch Motion. But if we fuppofe there to be only nine Pounds in the oppofite Scale, this renders its Motion not impoffible, but yet more difficult; fo that it can now only move down with the Force of one Pound: But however, this is all that is required of it under these Circumftances; it is wholly excufed from nine Parts of its Motion And if the Scale, under thefe Circumftances, neglects to move, and remains at Reft, all that it will be blamed for, will be its Neglect of that one tenth Part of its Motion; which it had as much Liberty and Advantage for, as in ufual Circumftances, it has for the greater Motion, which in fuch a Cafe would be required. So that this new Difficulty, don't at all increase its Exposedness to any Thing blame-worthy.

And thus the very Suppofition of Difficulty in the Way of a Man's Duty, or Proclivity to Sin, thro' a being given up to Hardness of Heart, or indeed by any other Means whatsoever, is an Inconfiftence, according to Dr. Whitby's Notions of Liberty, Virtue and Vice, Blame and Praise. The avoiding Sin and Blame, and the doing what is virtuous and Praife-worthy, must be always equally easy..

Dr. Whitby's Notions of Liberty, Obligation, Virtue, Sin, &c. led Him into another great Inconfiftence. He abundantly infifts, that Neceffity is inconfiftent with the Nature of Sin or Fault. He fays in the foremention'd Treatife, p. 14. Who can blame a Perfon for doing what he could not help? and p. 15. It being fenfibly unjust,

to punish any Man for doing that which it was never in his Power to avoid. And in P. 341. to confirm his Opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, faying, Why doth God command, if Man hath not Freewill and Power to obey? And again in the fame and the next Page, Who will not cry out, that it is Folly to command him, that hath not Liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn Him, that has it not in his Power to do what is required? And in P. 373. He cites another faying, A Law is given to Him that can turn to both Parts; i. e. obey or tranfgrefs it: But no Law can be against Him who is bound by Nature.

And yet the fame Dr. Whitby afferts, that fallen Man is not able to perform perfect Obedience. In P. 165. He has thefe Words, "The Nature of "Adam had Power to continue innocent, and " without Sin; whereas it is certain, our Nature "never had fo." But if we have not Power to continue innocent and without Sin, then Sin is confiftent with Neceffity, and we may be finful in that which we have not Power to avoid; and thofe Things can't be true, which He afferts elfewhere, namely, "That if we be neceffitated, nei"ther Sins of Omiffion nor Commiffion, would "deferve that Name." P. 348. If we have it not in our Power to be innocent, then we have it not in our Power to be blameless and if fo, we are under a Neceffity of being blame-worthy. And how does this confift with what he so often afferts, that Neceflity is inconfiftent with Blame or Praife? If we have it not in our Power to perform perfect Obedience to all the Commands of God, then we are under a Neceffity of breaking fome Commands, in fome Degree; having no Power to perform fo much as is commanded. And if fo, why does he cry out of the Unreafon

ableness