there is between God's Knowledge and the Event known, does as much prove the Event to be neceffary before-hand, as if the divine Knowledge were in the fame Senfe before the Event, as the Prediction or Writing is. If the Knowledge be infallible, then the Expreffion of it in the written Prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible Connection between that written Prediction and the Event. And if fo, then it is impoffible it should ever be otherwise, than that that Prediction and the Event should agree: And this is the fame Thing as to fay, 'tis impoffible but that the Event fhould come to pafs: and this is the fame as to fay, that its coming to pafs is necessary.——So that it is manifeft, that there being no proper Succeffion in God's Mind, makes no Alteration as to the Neceffity of the Existence of the Events which God knows. Yea,

2. This is fo far from weakening the Proof, which has been given of the Impoffibility of the not coming to pafs of future Events known, as that it establishes that wherein the Strength of the foregoing Arguments confifts, and fhews the Clearness of the Evidence. For,

(1.) The very Reason why God's Knowledge is without Succeffion, is, because it is abfolutely perfect, to the highest poffible Degree of Clearness and Certainty: all Things, whether past, present or to come, being view'd with equal Evidence and Fulnefs; future Things being feen with as much Clearness, as if they were prefent; the View is always in abfolute Perfection; and abfolute conftant Perfection admits of no Alteration, and fo no Succeffion; the actual Existence of the Thing known, don't at all increase, or add to the Clearnefs or Certainty of the Thing known: God calls

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the Things that are not, as tho' they were; they are all one to Him as if they had already exifted. But herein confifts the Strength of the Demonftration before given, of the Impoffibility of the not existing of thofe Things whofe Existence God knows; That it is as impoffible they should fail of Existence, as if they exifted already. This Objection, instead of weakening this Argument, fets it in the clearest and strongest Light; for it supposes it to be fo indeed, that the Existence of future Events is in God's View fo much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least Alteration or Variation in his View or Knowledge of them.

(2.) The Objection is founded on the Immutability of God's Knowledge: For 'tis the Immutability of Knowledge makes his Knowledge to be without Succeffion. But this moft directly and plainly demonstrates the Thing I infift on, viz. that 'tis utterly impoffible the known Events fhould fail of Existence. For if that were poffible, then it would be poffible for there to be a Change in God's Knowledge and View of Things. For if the known Event fhould fail of Exiftence, and not come into Being, as God expected, then God would fee it, and fo would change his Mind, and fee his former Mistake; and thus there would be a Change and Succeffion in his Knowledge. But as God is immutable, and fo it is utterly and infinitely impoffible that his View fhould be changed; fa 'tis, for the fame Reason, juft fo impoffible that the fore-known Event fhould not exift: And that is to be impoffible in the highest Degree and therefore the contrary is neceffary. Nothing is more impoffible than that the immutable God fhould be changed, by the Succeffion of Time; who comprehends all Things, from Eternity to Eter

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Eternity, in one, moft perfect, and unalterable View; fo that his whole eternal Duration is Vite interminabilis, tota, fimul, & perfeita Poffeffio.

On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no Geometrical Theorem or Propofition whatfoever, more capable of strict Demonstration, than that God's certain Prefcience of the Volitions of moral Agents is inconfiftent with fuch a Contingence of these Events, as is without all Neceffity; and fo is inconfiftent with the Arminian Notion of Liberty.

Corol. 2. Hence the Doctrine of the Calvinifts. concerning the abfolute Decrees of God, does not at all infer any more Fatality in Things, than will demonftrably follow from the Doctrine of most Arminian Divines, who acknowledge God's Omnifcience, and univerfal Prefcience. Therefore all Objections they make against the Doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying Hobbes's Doctrine of Neceffity, or the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, lie no more against the Doctrine of Calvinists, than their own Doctrine: And therefore it don't become thofe Divines, to raise fuch an Out-cry against the Calvinifts, on this Account.

Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from Neceffity, against the Doctrine of the Inability of unregenerate Men to perform the Conditions of Salvation, and the Commands of God requiring fpiritual Duties, and against the Calvinistic Doctrine of efficacious Grace; I fay, all Arguings of Arminians (fuch of them as own God's Omnifcience) againft thefe Things, on this Ground, that thefe Doctrines, though they don't fuppofe Men to be under any Constraint or Coaction, yet fuppofe them under Neceffity, with Refpect to their moral Ac

tions, and those Things which are requir'd of 'em in Order to their Acceptance with God; and their arguing against the Neceffity of Men's Volitions, taken from the Reasonableness of God's Commands, Promises, and Threatenings, and the Sincerity of his Counfels and Invitations; and all Objections against any Doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconfiftent with human Liberty, because they infer Neceffity; I fay, all these Arguments and Objections must fall to the Ground, and be justly esteem'd vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being maintain'd in an Inconfiftence with themselves, and in like Manner levelled against their own Doctrine, as against the Doctrine of the Calvinists,

Whether we fuppofe the Volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any Thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in fuch a Senfe as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

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VERY Act of the Will has a Cause, or it has not. If it has a Cause, then, according to what has already been demonftrated, it is not contingent, but neceffary; the Effect being neceffarily dependent and confequent on its Caufe; and that, let the Caufe be what it will. If the Caufe is the Will itself, by antecedent Acts chufing and determining, till the determined and caufed A& muft be a neceffary Effect. The Ac that is the determined Effect of the foregoing Act which is its Caufe, can't prevent the Efficiency of its Caufe; but muft be wholly fubject to its Determination and Command, as much as

the Motions of the Hands and Feet. The consequent commanded Acts of the Will are as paffive and as neceffary, with Refpect to the antecedent determining Acts, as the Parts of the Body are to the Volitions which determine and command them. And therefore, if all the free Acts of the Will are thus, if they are all determined Effects, determined by the Will itself, that is, determined by antecedent Choice, then they are all neceffary; they are all fubject to, and decifively fixed by the foregoing Act, which is their Caufe: Yea, even the determining Act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another Act, preceding that, if it be a free and voluntary Act, and fo must be neceffary. So that by this all the free Acts of the Will are neceffary, and can't be free unless they are neceffary: Because they can't be free, according to the Arminian Notion of Freedom, unless they are determined by the Will; which is to be determined by antecedent Choice i which being their Caufe, proves them neceffary. And yet they fay, Neceffity is utterly inconfiftent with Liberty. So that, by their Scheme, the Acts of the Will can't be free unless they are neceffary, and yet cannot be free if they be neceffary.

But if the other Part of the Dilemma be taken, and it be affirm'd that the free Acts of the Will have no Cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before them and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and ab folute Contingence, and this thould be allowed to be poffible; ftill it will not ferve their Turn. For if the Volition comes to pafs by perfect Contingence, and without any Caufe at all, then it is certain, no Act of the Will, no prior Act of the Soul was the Caufe, no Determination or Choice of the Soul, had any Hand in it. The Will, or

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