the Knowledge be the Cause of this Neceffity, or the Neceffity the Cause of the Knowledge.

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-Knowledge, or concomitant Knowledge, proves the Thing known now to be neceffary, by fome Means or other; or proves that it is impoffible it thould now be otherwise than true.— I freely allow, that Foreknowledge don't prove a Thing to be neceffary any more than After - Knowledge: But then After-Knowledge which is certain and infallible, proves that 'tis now become impoffible but that the Propofition known fhould be true. Certain After-Knowledge proves that it is now, in the Time of the Knowledge, by fome Means or other, become impoffible but that the Propofition which predicates paft Existence on the Event, fhould be true. And fo does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the Time of the Knowledge, it is by fome Means or other, become impoffible but that the Propofition which predicates future Exiftence on the Event, fhould be true. The Neceffity of the Truth of the Propofitions, confifting in the prefent Impoffibility of the Non-existence of the Event affirmed, in both Cafes, is the immediate Ground of the Certainty of the Knowledge; there can be no Certainty of Knowledge without it.

There must be a Certainty in Things themselves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the fame Thing) known to be certain. For Certainty of Knowledge is nothing elfe but knowing or difcerning the Certainty there is in the Things themfelves which are known. Therefore there must be a Certainty in Things to be a Ground of Certainty of Knowledge, and to render Things capable of being known to be certain. And this is Nothing but the Neceffity of the Truth known, or its be

ing

ing impoffible but that it fhould be true; or, in other Words, the firm and infallible Connection between the Subject and Predicate of the Propofition that contains that Truth. All Certainty of Knowledge confifts in the View of the Firmness of that Connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Existence of any Event, is his View of the firm and indiffoluble Connection of the Subject and Predicate of the Propofition that affirms its future Exiftence. The Subject is that poffible Event; the Predicate is its future exifting: But if future Existence be firmly and indiffolubly connected with that Event, then the future Existence of that Event is neceffary. If God certainly knows the future Existence of an Event which is wholly contingent, and may poffibly never be, then He fees a firm Connection between a Subject and Predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a Contradiction.

I allow what Dr. Whitby fays to be true, That mere Knowledge don't affect the Thing known, to make it more certain or more future. But yet, I fay, it Suppofes and proves the Thing to be already, both future, and certain; i. e. neceffarily future. Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes Futurity; and a certain Knowledge of Futurity, fuppofes certain Futurity, antecedent to that certain Knowledge. But there is no other certain Futurity of a Thing, antecedent to Certainty of Knowledge, than a prior Impoffibility but that the Thing fhould prove true; or (which is the fame Thing) the Neceffity of the Event.

I would obferve one Thing further concerning this Matter, and it is this; That if it be as those foremention'd Writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the Caufe, but the Effect of the Existence

Existence of the Event foreknown; this is fo far from fhewing that this Foreknowledge don't infer the Neceffity of the Existence of that Event, that it rather fhews the contrary the more plainly. Because it fhews the Existence of the Event to be fo fettled and firm, that it is as if it had already been; in as much as in Effect it actually exifts already; its future Existence has already had actual Influence and Efficiency, and has produced an Effect, viz. Prefcience: The Effect exifts already; and as the Effect fuppofes the Caufe, is connected with the Cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future Event, which is the Caufe, had exifted already. The Effect is as firm as poffible, it having already the Poffeffion of Existence, and fo having made fure of it. But the Effect can't be more firm and ftable than its Cause, Ground and Reason. The Building can't be firmer than the Foundation.

To illustrate this Matter, let us suppose the Appearances and Images of Things in a Glafs, for Inftance, a reflecting Telescope, to be the real Effects of heavenly Bodies (at a Distance, and out of Sight) which they refemble: If it be fo, then, as thefe Images in the Telescope have had a past actual Exiftence, and it is become utterly impoffible now that it should be otherwife than that they have existed; so they being the true Effects of the heavenly Bodies they resemble, this proves the exifting of thofe heavenly Bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and neceffary, as the existing of these Effects; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other.-Now let us fuppose future Existences fome Way or other to have Înfluence back, to produce Effects before-hand, and cause exact and perfect Images of themselves in a Glafs, a Thousand Years before they exift, yea,

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Part II. in all preceding Ages; But yet that these Images are real Effects of these future Exiftences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with them as their Caufe; these Effects and Images, having already had actual Existence, rendering that Matter of their Exifting perfectly firm and ftable, and utterly impoffible to be otherwife; this proves in like Manner as in the other Inftance, that the Existence of the Things which are their Caufes, is alfo equally fure, firm and neceffary; and that it is alike impoffible but that they fhould be, as if they had been already, as their Effects have. And if inftead of Images in a Glafs, we suppose the antecedent Effects to be perfect Ideas of them in the divine Mind, which have exifted there from all Eternity, which are as properly Effects, as truly and properly connected with their Cause, the Cafe is not altered.

Another Thing which has been said by fome Arminians, to take off the Force of what is urged from God's Prescience, against the Contingence of the Volitions of moral Agents, is to this Purpofe; "That when we talk of Foreknowledge in "God, there is no ftrict Propriety in our fo

Speaking; and that altho' it be true, that there "is in God the most perfect Knowledge of all E"vents from Eternity to Eternity, yet there is no "fuch Thing as before and after in God, but He fees "all Things by one perfect unchangeable View, "without any Succeffion."To this I answer,

1. It has been already fhewn, that all certain Knowledge proves the Neceffity of the Truth known; whether it be before, after, or at the fame Time.-Tho' it be true, that there is no Succeffion in God's Knowledge, and the Manner of his Knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we

know

know concerning it, that there is no Event, past, prefent, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of; He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible Knowledge of it; He always fees the Existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always fees Things juft as they are in Truth; hence there never is in Reality any Thing contingent in fuch a Senfe, as that poffibly it may happen never to exift. If, ftrictly speaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, 'tis because those Things which are future to us, are as prefent to God, as if they already had Existence: and that is as much as to fay, that future Events are always in God's View as evident, clear, fure and neceffary, as if they already were. If there never is a Time wherein the Existence of the Event is not prefent with God, then there never is a Time wherein it is not as much impoffible for it to fail of Existence, as if its Existence were prefent, and were already come to pass.

God's viewing Things fo perfectly and unchangeably as that there is no Succeffion in his Ideas or Judgment, don't hinder but that there is properly now, in the Mind of God, a certain and perfect Knowledge of the moral Actions of Men, which to us are an Hundred Years hence: yea the Objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly don't hinder but that, by the foregoing Arguments, it is now impoffible thefe moral Actions should not come to pass.

We know, that God knows the future voluntary Actions of Men in fuch a Sense before-hand, as that he is able particularly to declare, and foretell them, and write them, or cause them to be written down in a Book, as He often has done; and that therefore the neceffary Connection which there

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