to be inconfiftent with itself. For to fay, that God certainly, and without all Conjecture, knows that a Thing will infallibly be, which at the fame Time he knows to be fo contingent, that it may poffibly not be, is to fuppofe his Knowledge inconfiftent with itself, or that one Thing that he knows is utterly inconfiftent with another Thing that he knows. 'Tis the fame Thing as to fay, He now knows a Propofition to be of certain infallible Truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain Truth. If a future Volition is fo without all Neceffity, that there is nothing hinders but that it may not be, then the Propofition which afferts its future Existence, is fo uncertain, that there is Nothing hinders but that the Truth of it may entirely fail: And if God knows all Things, He knows this Propofition to be thus uncertain; and that is inconfiftent with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and fo inconfiftent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the Thing be indeed contingent, God views it fo, and judges it to be contingent, if he views Things as they are. If the Event be not neceffary, then it is poffible it may never be: And if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may poffibly never be; and that is to know that the Propofition which affirms its Existence, may poffibly not be true; and that is to know that the Truth of it is uncertain; which furely is inconfiftent with his knowing it as a certain Truth. If Volitions are in Themselves contingent Events, without all Neceffity, then 'tis no Argument of Perfection of Knowledge in any Being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an Argument of Ignorance and Mistake: Because it would argue, that he supposes that Propofition to be certain, which in its own Nature, and all Things confidered, is uncertain and contingent. To fay in fuch a Cafe, that that God may have Ways of knowing contingent Events which we can't conceive of, is ridiculous; as much fo, as to fay, that God may know Contradictions to be true, for ought we know, or that he may know a Thing to be certain, and at the fame Time know it not to be certain, tho' we can't conceive how; because he has Ways of knowing, which we can't comprehend. Corol. 1. From what has been obferved it is evident, that the abfolute Decrees of God are no more inconfiftent with human Liberty, on Account of any Neceffity of the Event which follows from fuch Decrees, than the abfolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the Connection between the Event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indiffoluble, as between the Event and an abfolute Decree: That is, 'tis no more impoffible that the Event and Decree fhould not agree together, than that the Event and abfolute Foreknowledge fhould difagree. The Connection between the Event and Foreknowledge is abfolutely perfect, by the Suppofition: because it is fuppofed, that the Certainty and Infallibility of the Knowledge is abfolutely perfect. And it being fo, the Certainty can't be increased; and therefore the Connection between the Knowledge and Thing known, can't be increased; fo that if a Decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it don't at all increase the Connection, or make it more infallible and indiffoluble. If it were not fo, the Certainty of Knowledge might be increafed by the Addition of a Decree; which is contrary to the Suppofition, which is, that the Knowledge is abfolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest poffible Degree. There There is as much of an Impoffibility but that the Things which are infallibly foreknown, fhould be, or (which is the fame Thing) as great a Neceffity of their future Existence, as if the Event were already written down, and was known and read by all Mankind, through all preceding Ages, and there were the most indiffoluble and perfect Connection poffible, between the Writing, and the Thing written. In fuch a Cafe, it would be as impoffible the Event fhould fail of Existence, as if it had existed already; and a Decree can't make an Event furer or more neceffary than this. And therefore, if there be any fuch Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necef fity of Connection and Confequence, is not at all inconfiftent with any Liberty which Man, or any other Creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferr'd, that abfolute Decrees of God, which don't at all increase the Neceffity, are not at all inconfiftent with the Liberty which Man enjoys, on any fuch Account, as that they make the Event decreed neceffary, and render it utterly impoffible but that it fhould come to pafs. Therefore if abfolute Decrees are inconfiftent with Man's Liberty as a moral Agent, or his Liberty in a State of Probation, or any Liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on Account of any Neceffity which abfolute Decrees infer. Dr. Whitby fupposes, there is a great Difference between God's Foreknowledge, and his Decrees, with Regard to Neceffity of future Events. In his Difcourfe on the five Points, p. 474, &c. he fays, "God's Prefcience has no Influence at all "on our Actions. Should God (fays he) by "immediate Revelation, give me the Knowledge "of the Event of any Man's State or Actions, —— "would "would my Knowledge of them have any In"fluence upon his Actions? Surely none at all."Our Knowledge doth not affect the Things we "know, to make them more certain, or more “future, than they would be without it. Now "Foreknowledge in God is Knowledge. As "therefore Knowledge has no Influence on Things "that are, fo neither has Foreknowledge on Things that fhall be. And confequently, the "Foreknowledge of any Action that would be "otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that "Freedom. Whereas God's Decree of Election "is powerful and active, and comprehends the Preparation and Exhibition of fuch Means, as "shall unfruftrably produce the End.--Hence "God's Prefcience renders no Actions neceffary." And to this Purpose, p. 473. he cites Origen, where he fays, God's Prefcience is not the Caufe of Things future, but their being future is the Caufe of God's Prefcience that they will be: And Le Blanc, where he fays, This is the truest Refolution of this Difficulty, that Prefcience is not the Caufe that Things are future; but their being future is the Cause they are forefeen. In like Manner Dr. Clark, in his Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, P. 95-99. And the Author of the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature, fpeaking to the like Purpose with Dr. Whitby, reprefents Foreknowledge as having no more Influence on Things known, to make them neceffary, than After-Knowledge, or to that Purpose. To all which I would fay; That what is faid about Knowledge, its not having Influence on the Thing known to make it neceffary, is Nothing to the Purpose, nor does it in the leaft affect the foregoing Reasoning. Whether Prescience be the Thing that makes the Event neceffary or no, it al ters ters not the Cafe. Infallible Foreknowledge may prove the Neceffity of the Event foreknown, and yet not be the Thing which causes the Neceffity. If the Foreknowledge be abfolute, this proves the Event known to be neceffary, or proves that 'tis impoffible but that the Event fhould be, by fome Means or other, either by a Decree, or fome other Way, if there be any other Way: Because, as was faid before, 'tis abfurd to say, that a Propofition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may poffibly prove not true. The whole of the feeming Force of this Evasion lies in this; that, in as much as certain Foreknowledge don't caufe an Event to be neceffary, as a Decree does; therefore it don't prove it to be neceffary, as a Decree does. But there is no Force in this arguing: For it is built wholly on this Suppofition, that Nothing can prove, or be an Evidence of a Thing's being neceffary, but that which has a caufal Influence to make it fo. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future exifting of an Event, be not the Thing which firft makes it impoffible that it should fail of Exiftence; yet it may, and certainly does demonftrate, that it is impoffible it should fail of it, however that Impoffibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the Cause, but the Effect of this Impoffibility, it may prove that there is such an Impoffibility, as much as if it were the Caufe. It is as ftrong arguing from the Effect to the Caufe, as from the Cause to the Effect. 'Tis enough, that an Existence which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that Impoffibility arifes from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. 'Tis as evident, as 'tis poffible any Thing fhould be, that it is impoffible a Thing which is infallibly known to be true, fhould prove not to be true: therefore there is a Neceffity that it fhould be otherwife; whether the |