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be allowed, 'tis no Evidence of any Neceffity of the Event foreknown. Now I defire, that this Matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think, that on particular and full Confideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed fo, or not,

In order to a proper Confideration of this Matter, I would obferve the following Things.

I. 'Tis very evident, with regard to a Thing whofe Existence is infallibly and indiffolubly connected with something which already hath, or has had Existence, the Existence of that Thing is neceffary. Here may be noted,

1. I obferved before, in explaining the Nature of Neceffity, that in Things which are paft, their past Existence is now neceffary having already made fure of Existence, 'tis too late for any Paffibility of Alteration in that Refpect: 'Tis now impoffible, that it should be otherwife than true, that that Thing has exifted.

2. If there be any fuch Thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the Volitions of free Agents, that Foreknowledge, by the Suppofition, is a Thing which already has, and long ago had Existence; and fo, now its Existence is neceffary; it is now utterly impoffible to be otherwife, than that this Foreknowledge fhould be, or fhould have been.

3. 'Tis alfo very manifeft, that those Things which are indiffolubly connected with other Things that are neceffary, are Themselves neceffary. As that Propofition whofe Truth is neceffarily connected with another Propofition, which is neceffarily true, is itself neceffarily true. To fay other

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Part II. otherwise, would be a Contradiction: it would be in Effect to fay, that the Connection was indiffoluble, and yet was not fo, but might be broken. If That, whose Existence is indiffolubly connected with fomething whofe Exiftence is now neceffary, is itself not neceffary, then it may poffibly not exist, notwithstanding that indiffoluble Connection of its Existence. Whether the Abfurdity be not

glaring, let the Reader judge.

4. 'Tis no lefs evident, that if there be a full, certain and infallible Foreknowledge of the future Existence of the Volitions of moral Agents, then there is a certain infallible and indiffoluble Connection between thofe Events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding Obfervations, thofe Events are neceffary Events; being infallibly and indiffolubly connected with that whose Exiftence already is, and fo is now neceffary, and can't but have been.

To fay, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the Connection of the Event with that Foreknowledge is not indiffoluble, but diffoluble and fallible, is very abfurd. To affirm it, would be the fame Thing as to affirm, that there is no neceffary Connection between a Propofition's being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonftrable, that if there be any infallible Knowledge of future Volitions, the Event is neceffary; or, in other Words, that it is impoffible but the Event fhould come to pafs. For if it be not impoffible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impoffible but that the Propofition which affirms its future coming to pafs, may not now be true: But how abfurd is that, on the Suppofition that there is now an infallible Knowledge (i. e. Know

ledge

ledge which it is impoffible fhould fail) that it is true. There is this Abfurdity in it, that it is not impoffible but that there now fhould be no Truth in that Propofition, which is now infallibly known to be true.

II. That no future Event can be certainly foreknown, whose Existence is contingent, and without all Neceffity, may be proved thus; 'Tis impoffible for a Thing to be certainly known to any Întellect without Evidence. To fuppofe otherwise, implies a Contradiction: Because for a Thing to be certainly known to any Understanding, is for it to be evident to that Understanding: And for a Thing to be evident to any Understanding, is the fame Thing, as for that Understanding to fee Evidence of it: But no Understanding, created or uncreated, can fee Evidence where there is none : For that is the fame Thing, as to fee that to be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any Truth which is abfolutely without Evidence, that Truth is abfolutely unknowable, infomuch that it implies a Contradiction to fuppofe that it is known.

But if there be any future Event, whofe Exiftence is contingent, without all Neceffity, the future Existence of that Event is abfolutely without Evidence. If there be any Evidence of it, it must be one of these two Sorts, either Self-Evidence, or Proof; for there can be no other Sort of Evidence but one of these two; an evident Thing must be either evident in itself, or evident in fomething else; that is, evident by Connection with fomething elfe. But a future Thing, whofe Existence is without all Neceffity, can have neither of these Sorts of Evidence. It can't be Self-evident: For if it be, it may be now known by what is now to be seen in the Thing itself; either its prefent Ex

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Existence, or the Neceffity of its Nature: But both these are contrary to the Suppofition. It is fuppofed, both that the Thing has no present Exiftence to be feen; and also that it is not of fuch a Nature as to be neceffarily exiftent for the future: So that its future Exiftence is not Self-evident. And fecondly, neither is there any Proof, or Evidence in any Thing else, or Evidence of Connection with fomething elfe that is evident; For this also is contrary to the Suppofition. 'Tis fuppofed, that there is now Nothing exiftent, with which the future Existence of the contingent Event is connected For fuch a Connection deftroys its Contingence, and fuppofes Neceffity. Thus 'tis demonftrated, that there is in the Nature of Things abfolutely no Evidence at all of the future Exiftence of that Event, which is contingent, without all Neceffity (if any fuch Event there be) neither Self-Evidence nor Proof. And therefore the Thing in Reality is not evident; and fo can't be feen to be evident, or, which is the fame Thing, can't be known.

Let us confider this in an Example. Suppofe that five Thoufand feven Hundred and fixty Years ago, there was no other Being but the divine Being; and then this World, or fome particular Body or Spirit, all at once ftarts out of Nothing into Being, and takes on itself a particular Nature and Form; all in abfolute Contingence, without any Concern of God, or any other Caufe, in the Matter; without any Manner of Ground or Reafon of its Existence; or any Dependence upon, or Connection at all with any Thing foregoing: I fay, that if this be fuppofed, there was no Evidence of that Event before-hand. There was no Evidence of it to be feen in the Thing itself; for the Thing itself, as yet, was not. And there was no Evidence

Evidence of it to be seen in any Thing else; for Evidence in fomething elfe, is Connection with fomething else: But fuch Connection is contrary to the Suppofition. There was no Evidence before, that this Thing would happen; for by the Suppofition, there was no Reafon why it should happen, rather than fomething else, or rather than Nothing. And if fo, then all Things before were exactly equal, and the same, with Refpect to that and other poffible Things; there was no Preponderation, no fuperiour Weight or Value; and therefore Nothing that could be of any Weight or Value to determine any Understanding. The Thing was abfolutely without Evidence, and abfolutely unknowable. An Increase of Understanding, or of the Capacity of Difcerning, has no Tendency, and makes no Advance, to a difcerning any Signs or Evidences of it, let it be increafed ever fo much yea, if it be increased infinitely. The Increase of the Strength of Sight may have a Tendency to enable to discern the Evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in Clouds and Darkness, but it has no Tendency to enable to difcern Evidence where there is none. If the Sight be infinitely ftrong, and the Capacity of Difcerning infinitely great, it will enable to fee all that there is, and to fee it perfectly, and with Eafe; yet it has no Tendency at all to enable a Being to difcern that Evidence which is not; But on the contrary, it has a Tendency to enable to difcern with great Certainty that there is none.

III. To fuppofe the future Volitions of moral Agents not to be neceffary Events; or, which is the fame Thing, Events which it is not impoffible but that they may not come to pafs; and yet to fuppofe that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all Things; is to fuppofe God's Knowledge

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